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Entries from December 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006

4:46AM

Someone knocking at the door . . . somebody's ringing the bell.

ARTICLE: "China, Shy Giant, Shows Signs of Shedding Its False Modesty," by Joseph Kahn, New York Times, 9 December 2006.

This is important stuff, tracking nicely with my call in BFA that we need to look at China like the Brits looked at us in the beginning of the 20th century--you know, the "speak softly and carry a big stick" time of TR (actually an African saying he picked up on one of his many safaris there where he used his fire stick aplenty).

The Chinese are plenty aware of the historical comparisons, thus the study noted here:

BEIJING, Dec. 8 — China’s Communist Party has a new agenda: it is encouraging people to discuss what it means to be a major world power and has largely stopped denying that China intends to become one soon.

In the past several weeks China Central Television has broadcast a 12-part series describing the reasons nine nations rose to become great powers. The series was based on research by a team of elite Chinese historians, who also briefed the ruling Politburo about their findings.

Until recently China’s rising power remained a delicate topic, and largely unspoken, inside China. Beijing has long followed a dictum laid down by Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader who died in 1997: “tao guang yang hui,” literally to hide its ambitions and disguise its claws.

The prescription was generally taken to mean that China needed to devote its energy to developing economically and should not seek to play a leadership role abroad.

President Hu Jintao set off an internal squabble two years ago when he began using the term “peaceful rise” to describe his foreign policy goals. He dropped the term in favor of the tamer-sounding “peaceful development.”

His use of “rise” risked stoking fears of a “China threat,” especially in Japan and the United States, people told about the high-level debate said. Rise implies that others must decline, at least in a relative sense, while development suggests that China’s advance can bring others along.

Yet this tradition of modesty has begun to fade, replaced by a growing confidence that China’s rise is not fleeting and that the country needs to do more to define its objectives.

I've had the privilege of meeting the scholars behind this program, and they impressed the hell out of me. Instead of being told by Europeans galore how shrink-the-Gap just wasn't something they'd be interested in, here I am talking to strategists who see it as both inevitable and understand the strategic interests shared by the U.S. and China in making it happen.

When I spent time with PLA think tankers last time, I told them they needed to come up with a new grand myth for their military and that the "revolutionary war" one was hopelessly out of date for their current and future purposes. TR had his San Juan Hill and America had its Spanish-American war as some easy, early-on expressions of "rising America" (not toooo threatening). Then TR did his stint in settling the Russo-Japanese War (getting the Nobel Peace Prize--the only sitting U.S. president ever to do so). Then there was our rescue of Europe in WWI, repeated in WWII.

America entered the 20th century with little sense of its place in the world, with a military that had little sense of its role beyond its borders. But by 1950 we were this giant astride the planet, a mindset we've retained since.

We need to bring China along on such a ride, creating careful and easy opportunities. The tsunamis should have been one (as I noted in BFA), but we did not take advantage (nor did the Chinese).

But have no doubt, the recasting of the PLA from "revolutionary war" myth to stabilizing great power military is being calculated as I write.

And I, possessing my own foreign policy now (and PNM soon in Chinese "as is," mind you), will do everything in my power to make sure it goes well.

Why?

Best deal strategically possible for the U.S. across the 21st century. Keeps us safest. Makes the Long War a predetermined win. Puts us in the best position to make the most money within the Core and in making markets throughout the Gap.

This ain't about making nice or being naive. This is about getting what we want at the best possible price while trusting the Chinese to be Chinese--and nothing else.

Put that your realist's pipe and smoke it!

4:43AM

On the peer-to-peer microloaning...

My wife and I have already bought/"loaned" several livestock animals for families spread across several Gap states.

Vonne made the arrangements and registered the transfers in my Dad's memory.

We really believe in this sort of thing, having "adopted" several Indian girls over the past few years.

Small stuff, but it keeps it real, and it just goes to show that anyone can shrink the Gap if they want and that we possess--in aggregate--more than enough resources to pull it off.

Wait, or just act.

4:28AM

A potentially big development that could keep Iraq from fracturing

ARTICLE: "Iraqis Near Deal on Distribution of Oil Revenues by Population," by Edward Wong, New York Times, 9 December 2006.

Previous deal said central gov got all revenue to distribute from existing fields, but future ones left to individual groups (Kurds, Sunnis, Shiia). That had the Kurds pushing hard to attract their own FDI into the industry. Yes, it would have come, but it will come much faster if outside companies feel like they're not walking into a Balkans-like situation (we seem to be doing the Balkans backwards--as in, take down the dictator and then let the genocidal clashes begin that complete the separation).

But this law could hold Iraq together just enough for the natural splitting up of the nation along sectarian lines to both unfold and yet not prove fatal to the state.

BAGHDAD, Dec. 8 — Iraqi officials are near agreement on a national oil law that would give the central government the power to distribute current and future oil revenues to the provinces or regions, based on their population, Iraqi and American officials say.

If enacted, the measure, drafted by a committee of politicians and ministers, could help resolve a highly divisive issue that has consistently blocked efforts to reconcile the country’s feuding ethnic and sectarian factions. Sunni Arabs, who lead the insurgency, have opposed the idea of regional autonomy for fear that they would be deprived of a fair share of the country’s oil wealth, which is concentrated in the Shiite south and Kurdish north.

The Iraq Study Group report stressed that an oil law guaranteeing an equitable distribution of revenues was crucial to the process of national reconciliation, and thus to ending the war.

Without such a law, it would also be impossible for Iraq to attract the foreign investment it desperately needs to bolster its oil industry.

So long as the sectarian violence flares, there will be a natural tendency for the three groups to pull apart, especially the two stable ones (Kurds, Shiia) from the one unstable one (Sunni triangle). But this law may just be enough to help give the central government just enough reason to remain relevant in the meantime that, as things settle down over time, Iraq can survive the inevitable bloodletting that comes after you take the dictator down who had held the nation together through institutionalized violence.

12:40PM

Now that's what I'm talking about!

ARTICLE: "U.S.-Bound Cargo to Be Screened at Six Ports," by Spencer S. Hsu, Washington Post, 8 December 2006, p. A8.


Last September Congress mandated a pilot program to scan containers at three overseas ports (for nuke and radiological).

In February the Department of Homeland Security will begin such a program at six, including a UK port run by the same Dubai-based operations manager that Congress scared off from picking up any work over here last year.

Dems have talked of wanting such capacity at all U.S. -bound ports, which I agree with.

I'd also like chem and bio scanning added.

Chertoff rejects the idea of 100 percent scanning, saying 30 percent would be a reasonable goal, positing that the other 70 percent could be done here in the states.

Time to start talking to NYC about those Verrazano Bridge sensors, me thinks!

12:32PM

The Persistently Disconnected

ARTICLE: "The Persistently Poor: An Internal Report Criticizes World Bank's Efforts on Poverty," by Peter S. Goodman, Washington Post, 8 December 2006, p. D1.

Looking at 25 Gap/poor countries over the past decade, ones that received substantial aid, and the WB finds that "only" 11 experienced reductions in poverty.

Meanwhile, the global economy is growing like never before, so what to think?

First, 14 out of 25 ain't that bad, given the complexity of the task.

Second, remember the pool: you've gotta already be awfully sick to qualify for this doc.

That's not to say the aid delivered might suck, because it probably does.

But also ask yourself if the key to rural poverty reduction is rural development or urban industrial development.

I mean, is your goal to keep them on the farm or reduce the number on the farm?

If you develop the ag, then yes, you may push migration to cities, but if no jobs in cities, then you've just shifted poverty.

Granted, no development in the rural areas can accomplish the same thing, only giving you two problem populations instead of one.

But maybe the focus needs to be on raising the urban job draw to reduce the population trying to make do on the land. I mean, absent that, I'm not sure what aid really accomplishes in these countries.

And frankly the WB does get criticized for pushing such austerity and privatization efforts, and so if that effort is somewhat being made, then I'm back to my original caveats

12:31PM

Disingenuous

ARTICLE: "Rice to press harder for revival of Mideast talsk," by Barbara Slavin, USA Today, 8 December 2006, p. 8A.

Errand-girl Condi sent to revive the Israeli-Palestinian talks, but don't expect a "tremendous amount of energy" to likewise be applied toward any dialogue with Syria and Iran.

This is very clever by Bush-Cheney: appear to work the region diplomatically and fail valiantly while letting Israel's supporters in Congress shoot down any talk of talk with Tehran.

Talk about a non-response to the ISG. It cannot get any more blatant than this.

12:30PM

Big change from very small base

ARTICLE: "U.S. Commanders Advance Plan To Beef Up Training of Iraqi Army," by Greg Jaffe and Neil King, Jr., Wall Street Journal, 8 December 2006, p. A1.

No surprise on plan (been rolling out, PR-wise for days.

Also no surprise on timing (designed to appear responsive to ISG report--and it is).

No big deal on 250 percent increase.

But stunning is fact that 3.5 years into postwar, only 4K out of 140K U.S. troops in Iraq actually involved in training Iraqi Army.

Please!

5:28AM

Talking outta both sides of his mouth?

ARTICLE: Bush Appears Cool to Key Points Of Report on Iraq: President Talks of Forming 'New Strategy', By Peter Baker and Robin Wright, Washington Post, December 8, 2006; Page A01


Being lukewarm on ISG while promising change?

More proof that there was a profound White House-ISG disconnect. The myth of 41's people taking over seems to have been just that--a good media cover story and little else.

5:15AM

Baker's path could actualize Bush's intent, but...

ARTICLE: Dueling Views Pit Baker Against Rice, By DAVID E. SANGER, New York Times, December 8, 2006


To me, this is generous to Rice, who I don't see as possessing anything close to a worldview. To me, Rice's entire problem as national security adviser and SECSTATE is that she's all process and no content (the essence of realism). Of course, the same charge is constantly leveled at Baker (and with much good cause), but the difference here is that his preferred paths actually constitute the best way forward to actualizing Bush's original intent (remaking the Middle East), they just don't prioritize democratization with the same ideological single-mindedness of a Bush or Cheney (for whom Rice serves as mere tool but not an independent source of either process or content).

The real struggle here remains between a serious worldview in Bush-Cheney and a realist's sense of what needs to get done right now to improve our global situation (Baker). The fit is there (as I note), but the willingness is not (on the administration's side).

5:06AM

Llama power!

ARTICLE: Llamas Enlisted to Thwart Biological Weapons, Charles Q. Choi, Dec 6, 2006

Cool story from a very sexy source. What I like about it is that it says we're not exactly out of ingenuity, now are we?

The resilience assets we'll uncover in this century of biological advances will be stunning, more than amply keeping us ahead of bad guys. How so? Aging of the population, all that associated wealth, and the universal desire to extend life. Most of these security-enhancing discoveries will be accidental, as in, scientists find them when they're looking for something else.

But that's why 9/11, in the big picture, was a gift from history, because now we know better, now we look, and now we take advantage of every chance we get.

No excuses now, just opportunities--and new markets--to capitalize.

Thanks to Vonne Barnett for sending this in.

5:00AM

SOCOM can't win by itself

ARTICLE: Waging Peace in the Philippines: With innovative tactics, U.S. forces make headway in the "war on terror", By Eliza Griswold

The trick about the Special Ops guys is that there are the true nasty trigger pullers (numbering in the dozens) and then there's all the MacGyvers who can do the direct stuff more than ably (still world class, actually) but really are the all-around guys who are like SysAdm-in-a-can (or pair of pants). Then there are the dedicated support and the more classic civil affairs personnel.

You can't call all of SOCOM SysAdmin, because of the work of that kernel group, but you clearly wouldn't call 'em all Leviathan either (people got in my face a lot when I tried that early on!).

So I make the rather simplistic split in the brief (trigger pullers to Leviathan and "rest" to SysAdmin) and let it go at that, because there's no point in getting too anal at 30,000-feet.

Now, Robert Kaplan, that romantic fellow, will sell you SOF as all the SysAdmin you'll ever need throughout the bulk of the Gap, but to me, that's too Powell Doctrine-ish in its tenor of limited regret (just enough to keep the place quiet but no serious long-term integration (sort of like keeping the patient on so many pain killers so that recovery is constantly put off)).

Having said that, there's clearly the argument that size matters in some situations (not just "go big" when needed but also "go small" when it makes sense), and it's the latter situations that have always kept these guys busy as hell.

All this said simply to note that it's always a complex argument about expanding SOCOM (like I did early in BFA) because the temptation is always to outsource all of the Long War to SOCOM and basically be done with it, as far as the rest of the force is concerned. Me? I don't think that's feasible, because it won't be enough, plus the rest of the mil will then retreat into its Leviathan shell, dismiss the SysAdmin's requirements and then find itself marginalized in way too many Gap scenarios (why wage war if the peace will be totally screwed?). So that's my base fear in romanticizing too much the SOF capability.

Nevertheless, as Kaplan so ably describes in "Imperial Grunts," there are amazing capabilities within this crowd, many of which I want to see popularized in the wider SysAdmin function, within which this story's personnel and their mission obviously belong.

Do you ruin these approaches by expanding them? I think the Gap's many scenarios demand we make the effort.

To me, the key thing to remember, even with a story this cool and hopeful, is that it describes a wedge of opportunity that has to be followed up with the "everything else" that--over time--locks the Philippines into the Core (an eminently do-able proposition, but one--that I note in BFA--will happen in concert with basically all of SE Asia being commensurately recognized in a series of fell swoops that result in--one day years from now--people in my business realizing that "we never seem to scenarioize war scenarios for those guys anymore" and it's basically a done deal and you move on).

So, to sum: a great story, a great indicator of where we need to go, but not something to fall in love with to the extent of believing it gets us off the hook.

Thanks to Lexington Green for sending this in.

4:57AM

Iran seems more ripe for co-optation than ever

POST: Ayatollah’s health fails as Iran power struggle grows, by Michael Ledeen


Fascinating account by Ledeen.

Iran seems more ripe for co-optation than ever: the second cultural revolution bumping into 1989.

I was stunned by the move to shorten Ahmadinejad's term. I know, I know, a bureaucratic move to save money, but pleazzzzzzzze!

Ne slychaino! As the Sovs (and Russians to this day) liked to say...

Thanks to David Braun for sending this in.

1:00PM

Scheduled Maintenance

Yep, we're on a new server system. And tonight at 11:30 PST they'll be doing some work. You shouldn't notice it, but, if you do, that's why.

12:54PM

USA nails the ISG

EDITORIAL: "Long-awaited Iraq report offers 79 ways to 'cut and stay,'" USA Today, 7 December 2006, p.12A .


"Cut and stay" is about as accurate as it comes.

But it's realistic: it's really "pullback," not "pullout," because this is all about U.S. casualties.

Yes, we hear all about caring for Iraqi deaths, but let's be honest: Americans don't care about that and never did.

When American casualties go down, Iraqi ones will rise even more, and the same people who long castigated Rummy on too few troops can summarily ignore the results of this new , more drastic "tough love" version of the same.

And I'm sure way too few troops will accomplish what too few troops couldn't.

Wish Bush had been smart enough to bring enough of the right (i.e., New Core ) allies instead of too few of the wrong kind (the fragile, glass-jawed Old Core)? We all do.

Think we would have had to "give up" or "offer too much"?

Care to recalculate those costs today?

12:48PM

ISG charade

EDITORIAL: "The Iraq Muddle Group," Wall Street Journal, 7 December 2006, p.A18.

OP-ED: "No Way to Win a War," by Eliot Cohen, Wall Street Journal, 7 December 2006, p. A18.


WSJ and Cohen unimpressed with ISG and I must say that I am too.

The pullback argument is fine, but early 2008 doesn't exactly change anybody's debating points.

Wanting more advisers is good, but reports say this is already happening, so it basically ratifies something that perhaps the impending ISG report prompted, or maybe it would have happened anyway?

But that dynamic gets to the real purpose of such commissions, which is to provide political cover for changes truly worked out behind the scenes,and on what I consider to be the most important proposal here (the regional peace initiative and direct talks with Iran and Syria, both ideas being ridiculed here as essentially being too painful due to implied costs and perceived humiliation), but just the opposite seems to be the case here. Instead of providing cover for a serious change of course, Bush 43 seems to have suffered this public intervention by 41's minions only to appear that he's considered alternatives, when in reality it appears W. (and Cheney) have not. Otherwise Zellikow (and his 80 percent, or screw-the-Sunnis approach that I both support and have made myself going back to Feb 05) wouldn't be leaving..

The upshot?

Despite disavowing the tripartite path of acknowledging fake state Iraq is falling apart, that situation is indeed happening, quite probably with Maliki playing a very purposeful role on behalf of fellow Shiia. You can call it bad. You can pretend that "option" ain't on the table. But it's basically happening and if you don't want it to happen, you might want to take your lumps vis-a-vis Iran and Syria because ... buddy ... that's the price for screwing up Iraq.

Any hanging out the "regional war" bugaboo is similarly cynical: that's just the follow-on dynamic following the splitting-up of Iraq that we're letting happen because we screwed the postwar and now are being unrealistic about what results quite naturally from that failure.

In sum, I don't see W. changing course here. I think the Baker Commission was a complete charade, not in execution but in intent--primarily because the White House made it so.

12:47PM

Sad sign of this administration's end times

ARTICLE: "U.S. Offers North Korea Aid For Dropping Nuclear Plans," by Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, New York Times, 6 December 2006, p. A11.


A sad commentary. Now this White House has come full circle on the DPRK: returning to the vomit this dog has eaten before. Now we're back in the business of rewarding North Korea's bad behavior.

An enabling dysfunctional relationship before, and destined to be one again.

This only shows how much Iraq has sabotaged this administration's entire national security strategy in the second term.

12:44PM

Good news on my final resting place

ARTICLE: "NASA Plans Permanent Base For Exploration on the Moon," by Warren E. Leary, New York Times, 5 December 2006, p. A1.


I confess: I'm not a big fan of NASA, because I hate how it has held up private-sector exploration and exploitation of space.

I mean, imagine how bad our commercial airline industry would still be if we had put the government in charge ... say ... in 1910.

As I have always told my kids: I have but one personal dream for my old age: I want to die off this planet.

So this is somewhat good news, even as I fully expect to do it at some outer-space Hilton instead of any NASA facility.

12:36PM

What if Bush went to Tehran?

NEWS: Students Cry Out for Freedom in Large Demonstration at Tehran University


The forwarder said, in effect, imagine what Air Force One touching down in Tehran might set off?

Indeed, that's why I titled the original section in the Feb 05 article in Esquire: "Nixon Goes to Tehran."

Going on the offensive in the Long War ain't always about going kinetic, but it's always about shaking things up and putting the other guy on his heels.

You know what happens when I'm losing? Getting embarrassed? Running out of options?

I crank up the confidence even higher and try another path, another window, another door.

And I do so with maximum offense in mind.

My regime is sound. Iran's is not.

My economy's humming. Iran's is not.

My military is world class. Iran's is not.

My future is bright. Iran's is not.

Bush wastes our swagger and confidence on the worst things, like "stay the course," when our options are many and our strengths profound.

Our biggest boots-on-the-ground asset is staring us in the face--the Iranian people.

If only Bush would cowboy up when it matters and where it matters, it'd be wheels down in Tehran later today.

Thanks to an anonymous reader for sending this in.

12:33PM

Buried treasure in the ISG report

Iraq Study Group Report, p. 93


Easy to say, harder to do, but the G-N reference is telling, as is the realism of accepting that Iraq opens the book (finally) but does not close it, no matter how ugly it gets.
RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United
States government needs to improve how its constituent
agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International Development,
Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others—
respond to a complex stability operation like that
represented by this decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and
the previous decade’s operations in the Balkans. They need to
train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries,
following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has
proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.

Thanks to an anonymous reader for sending this in.

12:17PM

Why invest in Russia?

POST: The fog of the “new cold war”, Economist.com, Dec 7th 2006

I don't dispute the facts here, nor the trajectory. I also agree this was easily forecast, as I noted in a recent post (Look who comes out of the Soviet experience most adept at moving ahead? Cops and criminals).

But trying to elevate Europe's task ahead (maturing both Russia and its relationship with it--a generational task at least) into a geo-strategic challenge on par with the Cold War is--as the preamble admits--risking the charge of absurdity.

Is there a serious bleed into security affairs? No.

Does the U.S. want any ownership of such a resurrected stand-off? Much less pick up the "near abroad" to boot? No way.

Do these concerns trump the clear requirement to focus on building more important relations and alliance with China (to include its maturation)? Hardly, and I'd say the same for India to boot (Hell, wouldn't even prioritize it over Brazil.)

Does the upside (alliance and resources tapped) on Russia potentially outrank that trio on the Long War? Maybe with serious effort, Russia ties India for long-term importance, but I think I get 95 percent of that help from Moscow with no effort beyond what the Europeans will need to do anyway, so why make the effort in a busy world?

In sum, I stipulate the backsliding (nothing is linear--not even America's membership under Bush!) but cannot summon the argument for recasting America's approach, Russia's membership in the Core (which isn't about democracy, as I've always argued), or Russia's relative importance in the Long War (again, why pick fights I don't need to divert resources I can't spare).

I'm an ideologue about markets, not democracy, and I suffer managed markets before I take on security burdens that time will heal on its own. My idealism, as I note in BFA, is long-term. My realism is short-term. That's how I think we hold a Shrink the Gap strategy together over the long haul, just like we did containment.

Thanks to Eric Hansen for sending this in.