Wikistrat Middle East Monitor, April 2011

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Summary

The biggest changes in April came in Syria, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories. These changes do not decisively shift the balance of power in the region but are important developments that could lead to different strategic situations.

The Friday protests in Syria escalate each week, as does the violence. This is not a decisive change from the previous month but shows that there is a strong destabilizing trend in Syria. The uprising has only strengthened in the wake of violent suppression. There are now clashes between soldiers in the 5^th Division in Daraa who have refused orders to shoot civilians, and the 4^th Division, led by Maher Assad, the brother of President Bashar Assad. This could portend a division in the military and security forces.

President Saleh and the opposition parties have agreed to a deal where he would step down within 30 days and then elections would be scheduled. Large-scale violence has continued despite this settlement and it is still possible that Saleh will find a pretext to try to justify a reneging on the agreement. The Gulf Cooperation Council’s intervention in pressuring Saleh to step down is an important development as it shows there are limits to which the Gulf governments are willing to stand by each other in the wake of popular unrest and human rights abuses.

The reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah towards the end of the month is another significant development. It could bolster the Palestinian Authority’s campaign to gain U.N. and international recognition for Palestine as an independent state. The cessation of hostilities between Hamas and Fatah is a dangerous development for Israel, as it means that the Palestinian Authority will not be fully committed to fighting the terrorist group’s operations.

 

Wikistrat Bottom Lines

Opportunities

• The uprising in Syria presents two opportunities for the West: Firstly, it weakens the Assad regime and raises the possibility that it will be overthrown, which would lead to a major strategic shift. Secondly, the violence puts tremendous pressure on the international community including the Arab world to punish the Syrian government. The Assad regime may survive but will be in a much weakened and cautious state.
• The potential for Iran to exploit unrest in the Arab world, along with its pursuit of nuclear weapons and support of terrorism, could make it more likely that Arab states will support tougher sanctions and other measures against the Iranian government.
• The Arab Spring forces the Arab governments and the Iranian regime to focus on internal matters rather than external enemies like the U.S. and Israel. The governments may try to instigate an international crisis, seeking strategic advantages or political stability, but their populations are blaming their rulers for their unsatisfactory conditions and not foreign actors.

Risks

• There is potential for civil war or sectarian violence in Syria, as the regime’s Alawite militia appears loyal. The Alawite minority could also fear a post-Assad Syria, allowing the regime to raise recruits. Any terrorists or Iranian Revolutionary Guards personnel harbored by the Assad regime should also be expected to fight on the regime’s behalf, including against defected military personnel.
• The Iranian regime may seek to solve its political troubles by engaging in foreign conflict, or may simply intervene in Bahrain as a strategic move. Hardline Iranian officials are now openly calling for intervention.
• The reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, though it is unlikely to last, could give Hamas a greater ability to operate. The terrorist group has engaged in increased amount of terrorist attacks against Israel in the past two months.

Dependencies

• The willingness of the Syrian military to follow orders to massacre civilians. This will be the most important factor in judging the future of the revolution in Syria and whether it will be defeated, civil war will ensue or if the Assad regime will fall.
• The calculations of the Iranian government regarding Bahrain. It is not a vital interest of Iran that the Bahraini government fall or that Saudi forces be forced to leave, but these are certainly goals. It is difficult to judge whether the exceptionally-heated rhetoric coming from Iran indicates an actual desire to become deeply involved and if so, what the limits to this intervention would be.
• The limits to which the coalition in Libya is willing to assist the rebels, such as through arms, greater action against Qaddafi or even through the deployment of ground forces.

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Comments

[Ralf Ostner]

At the moment the wave of democratic Arab movements is prevailing.However, the Muslim Brotherhoods and Islamist movements are waiting for their chance to bring up an anti-Israel agenda.It is interesting to see that the new Egyptian goverment is getting closer and closer to Iran. There are three indicators from which you can see this fact: First, in February 2011 the new Egyptian goverment established diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Then post-Mubarak Egypt allowed the Iranian navy for first time to pass the Suez Channel. Third: The new reconciliation treaty between Hamas and the PLO was brokered by Egypt and Iran--without any consultation of the USA.At the end of May a new Gaza flotilla will start from Turkey in support of Hamas and in September Hamas and the PLO is thinking about unilaterally announcing an independent Palestinian state.
Means: Islamist forces and the Palestinians will try to rally the Arab street for the Palestine question--Muslim solidarity for Palestine.The democratic movement in Egypt already seems to be under panmuslim pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood.At the moment we have an democratic spring in the Arab world. Bin Laden is dead, Al Kaida a fragmented terrorist organization without any mass support. But political Islam with a mass basis still exists: The Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Khameini/Ahmadinedschad-Iran, Muktadar el-Sadr in Iraq, Hisbollah in Libanon, Hamas in Palestine, all the Muslim Brotherhoods in the Sunnite-Arab countries which are waiting for their chance. Therefore it is too early to announce a post-Islamic era. The fight between the secular forces which want to get connected to the rest of the globalized world and the Islamistic forces has just begun.And if the new democratic movements don´t give an economic solution for the poverty in most of the Arab countries the Islamist will win.