The Taliban-After-Last

Good feature in Newsweek.

Key bits:

The old generation of fighters is mostly gone from the battlefield; most were killed, captured, or disabled before they reached their late 30s. And yet by all accounts the number of insurgents on the ground keeps rising, with ever-younger recruits joining the fight. Malik and Khan had scarcely been born when Baradar took up arms against Soviet invaders, and they hadn't yet reached their teens when Mullah Omar's fighters seized Kabul from feuding mujahedin factions in 1996. According to a senior Taliban intelligence officer, speaking to NEWSWEEK on condition of anonymity, roughly 80 percent of the group's fighters are now in their late teens or early 20s, and half the commanders in the field are 30 or under. The best young fighters tend to be promoted quickly, thanks to combat losses.

The young guns are a breed apart from earlier Taliban generations. In a series of interviews for this story with more than a dozen young insurgent leaders over the past three months, they showed themselves to be more hotheaded and less respectful of authority than their elders. War against America has steeled these young fighters in combat with an enemy that employs more accurate and lethal firepower than the Russians or the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance ever had. The experience has only made them tougher and more uncompromising, in the judgment of veteran Taliban members. "The difference between these young Taliban and those of us who fought against the Northern Alliance or even the Russians is huge—like between earth and sky," says the senior intelligence officer who is in his mid-40s, but knows many commanders in their 20s. "These young men have seen and suffered more, and have a much stronger emotional and religious commitment than we ever did."

They're also impulsive and lacking in discipline. 

The usual evolution (more commitment, less talent), not necessarily in our disfavor.  It's just the generational perversion created by long-term conflict.

Many older Taliban seem to value the young guns' fighting spirit enough to tolerate their blatant disdain for the chain of command. But it's not so easy to accept the new generation's attitude toward traditional authority. Three decades of war have shattered the centuries-old system of tribal rule that has been the only functioning law in large parts of Afghanistan. In the wake of the Taliban's collapse, some local chieftains turned against villagers who had sided with Mullah Omar's regime. "Some elders went too far," says Bari Khan, a subcommander in his early 20s in Ghazni province. "They insulted, mocked and abused Taliban supporters, thinking the winds had changed." Now the winds have shifted again, and the old men are finding themselves at the mercy of cocky young fighters and commanders. "This poor young boy whom village elders may once have ignored or humiliated now has the power to step on their throats, so they'd better listen to him," says the senior intelligence officer.

But their behavior is making enemies among the civilian population. "The Taliban's older generation was tough, too, but it respected elders and had some humanity," says a 45-year-old school principal in Helmand province, asking not to be named out of fear for his safety. "These younger guys are arrogant, radical, and show no respect for white beards." The principal says late last year he was arrested by a young subcommander for no discernible crime other than being a schoolmaster. As he was being led away, the principal produced letters from both Baradar and Zakir testifying to his good character and saying he ran a proper Islamic school. The commander threw the letters in his face and hauled the principal before an Islamic court, where he was fined $6,000—a fortune for an educator whose living depends on contributions from villagers. "They listen to no one," the principal says of the Taliban's new generation. "They're like the Afghan police—they only want to make money." They even confiscated the school's desks and chairs and sold them off at the local market.

Soon afterward, U.S. Marines drove the subcommander and his fighters out of the district—at least temporarily. The principal has cautiously reopened his school, but with no furniture, the students have to sit on the dirt floor. He's disgusted with the Taliban, but he's equally unhappy with the Kabul government and the Americans.

So basically a lose-lose for the population, with the US winning few hearts and minds.

Unless the Obama administration somehow regionalizes this mess a lot more than just relying on the Pakistanis, it's hard to see how this ends in anything but failure.  I mean, it's our corrupt allies versus Pakistan's brutal proxies, with the people trapped in between.