Kaplan confirms my assumption that he's not for the Biden plan
Friday, September 25, 2009 at 4:29AM In the post below the long interview, I criticized the Biden plan to go light with Special Forces in Afghanistan. This plan isn't really out there in terms of a public proposal, we're just hearing about it now through the media as it describes intra-administration debates. In truth, the option has always been there and it's routinely discussed; it's just never reached the critical mass support it seems to be attracting now.
In the post, I said the notion struck me as very Kaplan-y in that he's written in the past about a limited-regret strategy of keeping it light with SOF in what I call Gap regions. Whenever I've used the term "romantic" with Kaplan, it's been along those lines: what I perceived to be a very strong, 19th-century belief in super-warrior, swash-buckling types who--in small numbers--would keep the savages at bay. I have always interpreted that, given his larger body of work, to suggest he favors a containment approach regarding the Gap (these are ancient civilizations that, in their warrior ways, can never be conquered, so send in our super badass types to thin their ranks now and then and that's about as far as we should go, because these people are unconquerable and we lack similar warrior spirit). In my mind, this is a non-state-actor-level version of the Powell Doctrine.
My argument has always been that containment is not the answer regarding the Gap. Containment works to isolate the apparently strong and--in that isolation--sap their strength and/or allow the inevitable internal rot to set in. It is sometimes appropriate with nation-states, but it's not the answer with Gap regions, because it yields a sort of "Escape From New York" outcome ("I don't get it. We lump all our rotten eggs in one basket, keep the lid on tight, and somehow they keep getting more rotten!"). In sum, the Gap's rot, if you will, is already here and a magnificent problem that creates a lot of unhappy people. Among those unhappy people, you will find middle-class, well-educated leadership types who get the ball rolling on resistance, tapping that popular anger. If you want to short-circuit that process, get rid of the unhappiness. In that process, I believe the sequence is just-enough-security-to-invite-connectivity-generating-opportunity-creating-wealth-creating-middle-class-creating-political-pressure-for-change. That's how I've seen it work throughout history. Shortcuts often get you new dictatorships and crazy revolutions and a lot of dead locals (e.g., Mao's mass murdering versus Deng's economic revolution).
It's been my argument from the start that war takes fewer bodies than the peace, so I have long committed the sacrilege of stating that the SysAdmin would get the bulk of the Marines and Army ground forces, along with SOF's unconventional warfare guys (the mil-mil training and cooperation guys, not the trigger pullers I believe stay with the Leviathan). When I first make that argument years ago, including before Iraq, it was greeted as nonsense: "How can we be putting so many bodies in the peace and so few in the war?" Paul Wolfowitz later famously made a similar statement to Congress.
Years into the process, it's more conventional wisdom that the peace requires more boots than the war. [Just to be clear here: my "peace" includes counter-insurgency, nation-building, postwar stabilization and reconstruction ops, and small wars in general.] I mean, that was our argument all along with network-centric warfare (network heavy, body light), it's just that some of the more vigorous NCWers believed there would be no postwar to worry about, as our victory in war would be so amazingly decisive (the Wolfowitz fallacy or neocon corollary, if you will).
Back to the post: after saying the Biden plan struck me as Kaplan-y, I also said it was my impression that Kaplan wasn't making such arguments on Af-Pak. This is a touchy subject for him because of the way the Clinton White House interpreted his Balkan Ghosts book as a rationale for delaying U.S. intervention (in effect, "don't go there, as these are ancient conflicts you can never solve"). As I argued at length in Blueprint, I think our intervention in the Balkans was successful in a host of ways--not perfect, mind you, but it sure beat the alternative.
Anyway, that was my sense.
So I got an email from Kaplan this morning confirming my assumption. He's sees too many downstream problems from going light in this case.
If that's the case, then perhaps we have some sense of the threshold between my depiction of Kaplan's one-SOF-fits-all approach and the usual way I am depicted as advocating the U.S. invade every Gap country with guns blazing: for the bulk of the Gap situations, you do what you can, but in certain key situations, you do what your must. I have stated this all along; it simply gets lost when some people subject my thinking to caricature. Have I done this to Kaplan? He tends to write with great enthusiasm for the subject and players at hand (lately the Navy), so on some levels he does this to himself. Thus the great utility of when he clarifies across his many works.
If our two approaches meet up in this manner, then I better understand the long-time assertions of the Coming Anarchy guys that our two visions are more complimentary than competitive. I understand the dangers of forceful argument, because I've employed it my entire career, so you back off when the "violent agreement" point is discerned.
Reader Comments (2)
During the Anglo-Irish War 1919 to 1921, the British military posted it's top intelligence officers in the Irish capital city of Dublin. Most resided "off post" and some preferred to dress in civilian clothes and mingle with the general population in the city. There was also a special unit of "deep cover" operatives known as the "Cairo Gang" who attempted to penetrate the IRA hierarchy and target IRA leaders for assination. There was an elit uniformed force of over 2,000 men whose job was to take on the most active IRA units in the field. This elite unit was called the "Auxiliaries" and it was made up of young British army officers who wished to stay in military service after the end of WWI. These were experienced combat verterans and most were reputed to be tough, athletic men who were "looking for a fight." They had a fierce appearance, all wore two Webley pistols on their hips, crossed bandoliers and carried 303 Enfield rifles. (no wrap around sun glasses in those days).
On November 21st, 1920, a special squad of the Dublin Brigade of the IRA killed 14 men. The 14 were British army intelligence officers and members of the secret "Cairo Gang." Some of the officers were killed in their homes. The IRA had sent a message to Whitehall about assination teams. In retalliation a number of the fierce "Auxiliaries" drove to an open stadium in Croak Park and fired into a crowd watching a sporting event.
On November 28th, 1920, a flying column of the West Cork IRA ambushed a parol of "Auxiliaries" near the town of Kilmichael, County Cork. They killed 15 members of the 16 man patrol. The fight was short and terrible with the "Auxies" and the IRA men firing at each other at point blank range.
The news of the ambush swept over Irleand. The fierce "Auxiliaries" could be beaten....and beaten by farm boys and clerks who had received very litle training.
So the moral is....if you send in your super warriors....best not let them suffer defeat. If they do....then you have nothing left and worse...you have infused the enemy with pride and hope. And that, is a very tough enemy.