The Taliban--historically--would rather switch than fight

ARTICLE: "Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan," by Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009.

Key bit:

The idea that large groups of armed men bent on killing Americans and other Westerners can be persuaded to change sides may seem fanciful at first. But it is not--at least not in Afghanistan. After continuing uninterrupted for more than 30 years, war in Afghanistan has developed its own peculiar rules, style, and logic. One of these rules is side with the winner . . . Few factors have motivated individual Afghan commanders over the years more than the desire to end up on the winning side. They have often switched camps midconflict . . . Thus in Afghanistan, battles have often been decided less by fighting than defections. Changing sides, realigning, flipping--whatever one wants to call it--is the Afghan way of war.

Good stuff, but hardly unique to Afghanistan. Check out your history of wars in general. Lotsa countries/factions/tribes play on both sides before a conflict ends. Native American tribes did it like crazy for decades as European Americans spread westward.

But then again, regional or country experts always want to explain to readers how their situation is so different from anything else we've ever encountered--so "peculiar" in its logic, like wanting to be on the winning side at the end.

Hmmmm, the winning side . . . I like the sound of that.

Comments

[Louis Heberlein]

But, I ask again, Where is Charlie now?

[Tom Barnett]

Too cryptic by half, Louis.