Shoot-down?

ARTICLE: North Korean Nuclear Test A Growing Possibility, By Blaine Harden, Washington Post, March 27, 2009; Page A01

ARTICLE: Japan Readies Missile Defense System, By Blaine Harden, March 27, 2009

I can't help wondering what it would take to shoot down this DPRK missile. Would be a neat trick to pull off. Not sure what level of blowback we'd get from other great powers or whether or not we've got the international law rationales lined up for it (I'm guessing we could make a decent case).

Because it would really spook Pyongyang in a cool way--and Tehran too.

I mean, if Japan is geared up for it, why not just do it for some Western solidarity?

Just day-dreaming...

Comments

[Marc]

Yeah, I think the real problem is we may not be able to shoot it down. If we try and fail, the spooking of Pyongyang and Tehran will be reversed. Many of our missile defense tests have failed (I'll leave the numbers to you, I know you know them) and in those cases we have full control of all aspects of the test. Granted, some of those testing failures have actually been a result of problems with the target, not the defense system.

What this current North Korea situation demonstrates is that the real time for "missile defense" is not in the boost, midcourse or terminal phases, it's in the prologue. We know where the North Koreans will launch from and have been watching it for weeks. If we considered this test a threat, which I don't, we'd knock it out now.

[sferrin]

Actually, far more tests have succeeded than failed. Shooting down the NK missile should be pretty doable as it would be well within the SM-3 envelope provided they take the shot early enough.

[Matthew Garcia]

Given a few things that we probably already know: [1] the launch site, [2] the likely trajectory over northern Japan, like the last medium-range two-stage test in 1998, and [3] the apparently low accuracy of medium- and long-range NK missiles...

I don't think we would have any trouble with a shoot-down at close range. Much of the missile defense testing we've done thus far, from mainland U.S. over the Pacific test range, has been at long range using proximity-fused Patriot missiles (if I'm not mistaken) against ICBM-type targets, requiring the better range of the Patriot to reach those high altitudes of the ballistic flight path. Proximity-based targeting is not nearly as effective as kinetic kill (direct-hit) methods, but the probabilities of take-down simply by destroying the missile body/engine and not necessarily the warhead are much better.

Close-range shoot-down would require rapid acquisition of the launch and trajectory and then rapid response to intercept with a basic SAM array, but it may actually be easier than ICBM defense. Given the likely low trajectory (and thus violation of Japan's sovereign airspace, not to mention messing with air traffic all over eastern Asia) I think it would be coolest to let the Japanese borrow one of our Aegis-equipped Destroyers (if they don't have one or more of their own already) that's probably already in the Sea of Japan for a little "missile defense test" of their own. Then the Japanese get credit for the shoot-down (before the missile enters their airspace, no less, showing defense capability) using American tech (from what I've read, the Aegis system fairly rocks) that has already been spread to allies in both eastern (Israel) and western (Taiwan) Asia.

That might set quite a few crazy dictators and autocrats back on their heels...does anyone know the Korean translation for "Oh, crap, they got us, let's just forget the whole thing and accept their food and energy aid before there's no North Koreans left to rule over."

[Tom Barnett]

Exactly. Why not take advantage and send a signal that may overplay our hand, but then again, scare disproportionally?

[Matthew Garcia]

Sorry--I meant western (Israel) and eastern (Taiwan) Asia. Momentarily lost my sense of direction...

[sferrin]

Re: Patriot - not even close. First of all NONE of the Pacific tests have involved any version of the Patriot. Secondly the proximity-fused versions of Patriot you're thinking of are the various flavors of PAC-2. PAC-3 (part of the Patriot "system" but not a Patriot missile per say) is a hit-to-kill missile. The missiles that have been tested over the Pacific have been the GBI (hit-to-kill), SM-3 (hit-to-kill), THAAD (hit-to-kill), and SM-2 Block IV (proximity-fused). Not sure of the exact model of SM-2 Block IV as the original Block IV was for anti-aircraft use, the Block IVA was to be anti missile with a dual mode seeker but it was cancelled due to cost and now the "new" Block IV is essentially the old, antiaircraft Block IV but without the dual-mode seeker but modified in someway that is a bit vague.

[Hanna]

Japan's one of the few countries (only?) that allows space launch over it. Unless they're launching over their own land (China -- moving theis to a southeast island location; or Russia), everyone launches over water. Even Israel launches west to avoid overflight issues. Imagine the U.S. response to Cuba or Mexico if they built launch sites that intended to launch over Florida... or Canada if they intended to launch over New York state. It wouldn't happen, because countries understand they wouldn't be allowed to launch over the U.S.

[large]

I think Matthew is pretty close in his thesis . . a close in kill on the upshot would be probably technically easier, and I think the message sent might be stronger . . To both NK and Iran.

After all, as Tom has pointed out for about 15 years, Our world is a small place. Thus, we need not wait for the warhead to come down before attempting to defend ourselves . . and of course it would take any question out of the message being delivered!

And what is the need or use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction if one cannot deliver it?

[Matthew Garcia]

Thanks for kind of setting me straight on the various Patriot systems, sferron--not something I routinely keep up on, but I remembered it mentioned in one of the failed Pacific tests. Thanks to you too, large--the kill on the upward shot is something that a surface based system only located close to the launch could do, which is why my main focus in enabling such an attempt was on the Aegis system (multi-tracking, multi-engagement capability) although I don't know if it is fitted-out for acquisition over land--I've heard of over-ocean and mostly anti-aircraft capabilities, so that makes me wonder if there's a comparable land-based system, and if Japan has it. Hanna, overflight for space launch is generally (presumably) non-malicious--this is NK launching what may be a multi-stage missile without any prior indication of interest in fielding an orbital observation or communications platform...

Tom, maybe I don't know for certain what "hand" you think we might overplay, but I didn't think there was any doubt left that the U.S. has been working on anti-missile tech for a long time, and that it's really just a technological extension of anti-aircraft tech. This is not the same as ABM tech, which relies on those various flavors of Patriot and others to catch the warhead at or near the apex of its flight path, or even closer to the target. Catching the target at launch would be a spectacular demonstration of response-time operations and tracking system capability. If we miss, then we know what to work on. If we hit, I can just see now the "missile told to self-destruct just after launch for whatever reason" message from NK in their attempt to save face, and we can just let it go at that, while the other countries with thoughts to demo similar capabilities pick their jaws up from the floor after the real story makes it through back-channel comms.

As for disproportional scare, I think there's been too much emphasis on the "proportional response" concept that seems left-over from the MAD era, and really only works up to the conventional-to-nuclear transition in weapons use. What NK aims to do with the launch is a demo of their capability in relation to their known nuclear ambitions, which has no other purpose than to scare. If we treat it not as a test, but as a proof-of-concept in their weapons development cycle, then this is our obvious and overt chance to break that cycle and set them back a few years or so. If we scare others in the process, there's two options for those scared regimes: lash out before we get into place to take similar abortive measures (bad idea), or keep quiet till it blows over (good idea!). And if that means Iran decides to launch on Israel, and Israel responds disproportionately (as is their right and exactly what we can expect from their operational history) they'll all find that their crisis remains limited and regional, because the rest of the world is already moving beyond the scare effect of mere missiles and bombs...

[Matthew Garcia]

OK--I take part of that last comment back. CNN is reporting that the "rocket" (no longer a missile) is now visible on the launch pad in DigitalGlobe imagery and that NK claims it will be a commercial satellite payload. In that case, why is there any question about whether it could reach US territory? The rocket's upper stage(s) must get at least that far if the satellite is actually expected to reach orbit...and that essentially makes the rocket a ballistic missile...

Here's a fine line we walk in dual-use technology. Is it progress, or proliferation? Common sense suggests that a lot more transparency would help the NK stance, but then there's the historical lack of same to consider. One would think that at least the "commercial satellite" operator would step forward to claim their request for a launch... That is another one of Tom's "3D" gems, though from well before Great Powers: "disconnectedness defines danger."

[Cadet Echo Boomer]

Boy, I would love to see the look on Kim Jong-il's face if we shot down the missile in the boost phase.

What I would NOT want to see is the looks on the faces in the Putin/Medvedev Kremlin. If BMD really scares them even half as much as they act like it does, a successful real world interception would send tensions sky high.