Not-so-supreme leader

ARTICLE: Behind scuttled nuke pact, Iran's regime in turmoil, By Ray Takeyh, Boston Globe, December 17, 2009

The guts of the argument:

In one of the ironies of the Islamic Republic, the principal proponent of engagement with the United States has always been its noxious president. Through a series of meandering letters to President George W. Bush and maladroit attempts to reach out to Obama, Ahmadinejad has sought dialogue on his terms. He apparently perceived that he could engage the United States without making concessions on the nuclear issue.

But in the aftermath of his fraudulent election, Ahmadinejad was a diminished figure without legitimacy and began to alter his perspective. In order to reclaim his standing at home, he sought diplomatic success abroad. And he belatedly appreciated that such an achievement was inconceivable without compromise on Iran's contested nuclear file. Given his forceful and persistent personality, he somehow managed to coax the vacillating Khamenei into accepting the low-enriched uranium arrangement. However, while Ahmadinejad was embarking on his diplomatic adventure, a series of structural changes within the regime militated against his success.

During much of the summer, Iran's Revolutionary Guards and security services were undergoing a significant revision that involved integration of the command structure, expansion of the intelligence apparatus, and much more of a focus on disarming a non-existent "soft revolution.'' As part of these measures, it appears that a new committee was created to oversee national security affairs. Although shrouded in mystery, this committee seems to be operating directly out of Khamenei's office and encompasses the head of the Revolutionary Guards, members of the intelligence community, and the supreme leader's personal staff.

Khamenei formally approved the restructuring of the security organs in early October. It was then that new national security committee paid more attention to the low-enrichment uranium deal and promptly revolted against an arrangement that could retard Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations. It was the opposition from within the system - not the objections of peripheral figures such as Larijani and Rafsanjani - that proved pivotal in scuttling the deal.

Suddenly confronted with counter pressure from an influential circle that he had created and empowered, Khamenei changed his earlier consent. And Ahmadinejad, out on the limb,grudgingly reversed himself and once more reverted to his earlier, strident rhetoric about the nuclear file being closed.

Bottom line: Revolutionary Guards are in consolidation mode and thus not open to negotiations on the apparently sacred subject of the nuclear program. Neither Ahmadinejad nor Khamenei can overrule that, even when it involves a mere committee created by the latter. Some "supreme leader"!