An essential problem, given the tasks that lie ahead

I see essentially four million-man armies out there: U.S., Russia, India, China. A fifth wheel would be NATO (with the body core really being Turkey).

You put those resources in rough combination (frenemies competing and collaborating economically and security-wise) and there's no question that there's enough Core-wide resources to pool against the tasks of shrinking the Gap. You put them largely at odds with each other, then the hedging requirements will gobble up most of the important budget, and in the U.S. that means a Leviathan that continues to grab the lion's share of acquisition, keeping emerging SysAdmin capabilities as strict lesser-includeds.

So here's my problem: China buys for Taiwan, India buys for Pakistan (and vice versa), and Russia optimizes to intimidate its near-abroad but may soon--if we play this wrong--redirect for the West. The U.S. already still spends way too much hedging on the past, and with a "league of democracies" mindset, will likely hold onto that strong bias, meaning we inevitably sub-optimize and sub-perform on any SysAdmin jobs in the Gap, thus encouraging more competition (Why trust the U.S. to get it right on stuff you find vital? and/or Why not challenge or compete directly with a tied-down/perceived-as-incompetent U.S. in these venues?). The more that proxy war/quasi-imperialistic competition kicks in, the heightened mistrust makes for even more intra-Core hedging (and spending) by all involved.

From history's perspective, it can't get much dumber than this: our globalization sweeping the planet in the form of an international liberal trade order, but right at its apogee, the four million-man army nations find a way to turn on each other more than the collective problems and opportunities staring them in the face.

From an international businessman's perspective, this is potential tragedy in the making. From a grand strategic perspective, this is an unthinking America playing down to the lower-order dynamics generated by less-mature great powers.

In short, we should know better and act better and avoid this pathway.

But Americans are, by their nature, strategically short-sighted. We respond emotionally to events--this week's column (above).

Comments

[Bill C.]

Reminds me of Friedman's "The Lexus and the Olive Tree."

Here, where one would think that the Old and New Core would have every reason to continue to be focused on expanding the magnificant success of "The Lexus," for some reason they now have taken their eye off of the ball and reverted to the more primitive -- and destructive -- "Olive Tree" thinking.

[Louis Heberlein]

We need to get the top dawgs to see the importance of information possession and sharing, and bottom up personal contacts in globalization, more than updated "million man army" thinking.

I'm also still looking for a better rule set to ease the anguish of Gap country leaders and population segments about the personal threats to existing cultures from globalization. I think easing that anguish is the key to reducing the terrorism movements.

I think Russia is in a 'relatively' secure from letting paranoia return to the extent it returns to Iron Curtain thinking.

China can still stumble if it cannot use its limited time and resources to retain social unity as it modernizes technically and economically. Very big loss if it happens.

Japan, can be a tremendously good asset to a global transformation, but it seems to be insecure about how it wants to evolve itself.