The aborted call for a new security club for Asia and Europe--from Moscow
Tuesday, September 23, 2008 at 3:16AM INTERNATIONAL: "A bowl of thin alphabet soup: The Kremlin wants a new security club for Europe and Asia. Can it work? And should it worry America, which is relearning to love its allies?" The Economist, 9 August 2008, p. 55.
Fascinating to read in retrospect.
Given all the tumult in the world, says the article, "it is easy to see why officials in Moscow, Beijing and elsewhere think the security of the Eurasian land mass could be in better hands."
Old alliances, like NATO and OSCE, are viewed as outdated by their roots (anti-Soviet).
High time, so it would seem, for something better.
That, roughly, is the thinking in Moscow, where for the first time in years Russia seems to be offering new ideas rather than old grumbles. Fuller details are promised in September. For now, the plan as outlined by President Dmitry Medvedev, and promoted by Russia's ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, is to have a big international conference in Moscow next year, attended by all NATO and EU countries, Russia and its ex-Soviet allies, as well as China and (probably) India, to set up a new security organization to deal with issues such as terrorism and illegal migration. And who could object to that?
So far, the Western response has been muted. Some countries in Europe like the idea of a security structure that would rely less on American hegemony and more on international law. Others are privately sceptical, but think it would be rude to dismiss the plan before hearing it in full.
Makes you wonder what happens if Georgia doesn't start that war, doesn't it?
Reader Comments (11)
Still not convinced it was Georgia that started the war; which completely changes the dynamic here if true.
While I appreciate that linkage is unnecessary and counterproductive in most instances (see Iran, China, etc.), it seems crazy to imagine that the US and others would overlook such shameless indifference to the principle of sovereignty, particularly when it concerns a country that is at pains to ensure its place in the presently-existing European security framework. Even if "Georgia doesn't start that war," and in the unlikely event that Russian meddling didn't provoke a crisis, the resolution of this issue would still stand out as a problem -- NATO/OSCE countries aren't going to accede to a framework that doesn't affirm the foundational principles of the one to which they already belong, namely recognition of the sovereignty of all participants.
Kudos to Russia though for a successful application of Influence Warfare in convincing most people Georgia did start it.
You and Sarah Palin can hold onto the "unprovoked" notion if you want, and I'll congratulate the Georgian "influence operation" as well.
I have confidence in my source--a most excellent Western reporter on the scene. Despite being an award-winning journalist, he can't get his MSM pub to present his analysis. It just swims too much against the dominant U.S. influence operation.
There is, of course, the wisdom of the blogosphere . . ..
The fact remains that a stable Afghanistan (vice an ungoverned narco-state) is in the mutual interest of the U.S. and Iran, but preconditions related to their nuclear program and American rhetorical support for regime change have hampered productive dialogue on that front, too.
Territorial revisionism in Europe pretty much bars you from a seat at the table. Terrorism isn't a threat to vital national interests in the same way that irridentism in central Europe would be. The Georgian conflict (and Transdnistria, and Crimea, and debatably Estonia) shows that Russia isn't ready to play with the big boys just yet. Whether Georgia provoked them or not, it's clear that this issue would/will mitigate against any such grand dialogue Medvedev and Rogozin may have had in mind.
If the MSM media won't publish his analysis, maybe he would let you post it (without naming him) here. I would find it interesting to read. There is certainly a bunch of contradictory info out there and I don't discount the idea that I could be duped by a Georgian influence op.
To the best of my knowledge, the fighting broke out before the 8/7-8/8 Georgia action and was initiated by Russia (I have read at multiple locations, different sources). I am not a military type, but I find it surprising that on 8/8 Russia seemed to be all prepped and ready to roll into battle from land/air/sea for cross-border fun. I would have thought stuff like that would take weeks to ready up (as others on the blogosphere have also noted).
As far as the USGOV view, I think it is that Georgia acted stupidly, Russia took advantage of that pretext, and now Russia should back off. At least that is the way I perceive it in a simplified way.
You seem to suggest it is in Russia's interest for Afghanistan/FATA to remain a haven for terrorists, but Russia is clearly focused on both terrorism and separatism. Russia is a great power and will be/has been playing with the big boys for centuries.
(I'm unclear about who won't have a seat at which table.)
And what of the terrorist attack in Sochi on that eventful eighth day of August 02008? For some reason Russians care more for snow sports.
"Russia is a great power and will be/has been playing with the big boys for centuries.
(I'm unclear about who won't have a seat at which table.)"
...which is that Russia is not capable of shepherding a new European security system simply because it is not viewed as an honest broker or a mature participant in the existing system by precisely those states that it hopes to "lead."
"And what of the terrorist attack in Sochi on that eventful eighth day of August 02008? For some reason Russians care more for snow sports."
I'll be honest with you here: I have no idea what this means. If you're alluding to the fact that Russia is bound to be concerned and will do its best to make sure terrorists don't threaten the Olympics and as a result threaten Russia's place in the international community, then -- with all due respect -- duh.
2. Your straw man, not mine: Russia shepherds new European security system. Hardly. All I want is follow-through on Turkey's proposal for an architecture of Caucasus states: Turkey Russia Georgia Azerbaijan Armenia. This was recommended after the splendid little war in Georgia, not before.
3. Uzbekistan's a tinderbox.