The military-market nexus—old school
Monday, June 16, 2008 at 2:41AM BRIEFING: "A war of money as well as bullets: The Americans are learning the tricks of the Great Game quicker than the British, who invented it," The Economist, 24 May 2008, p. 37.
EDITORIAL: "How the 'good war' could fail: America needs to lean much harder on Afghanistan's President Karzai," The Economist, 24 May 2008, p. 18.
The model emerging of U.S. air assets acting like the cavalry to the outposts manned by the increasingly larger and more competent Afghan army (unlike the still largely inefficient and corrupt police).
It's this sort of stuff that leads some pundits to assume the military IS the answer.
But the real impact is found in how our military spends money for local job creation: if the insurgents pay the equivalent of $5 per hour for bad deeds, our military simply outbids them for road work, using the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), so yeah, it's jobs—stupid!
And infrastructure, of course, meaning connectivity, which drives economics.
"Where the road ends the insurgents begin," says one American officer.
But this is old hat, even in this neck of the woods. As the Muslim scholar Ibn Qutayba (9th century) put it:
There can be no government without an army
No army without money
No money without prosperity
And no prosperity without justice and good administration
Like most things, my military-market nexus contained little new knowledge—just experience.
One thing I notice from the maps: southern Afghanistan is where the violence is, where the poppies are grown, and where the Pashtun predominate.
So when Bret Stephens of the WSJ says that anyone who argues for non-military solutions is simply repeating a "mindless shibboleth," he needs to get his head out of his ass.
And from the WSJ no less!
Reader Comments (2)
American troops become popular with the Afghans the same way American Congressmen become popular with their constituents -- they learn their concerns then they provide them with roads and government jobs (paid for by the American taxpayers).
The article reports that roads improve the lives of Afghans:
'Roads are especially favoured, because they allow remote villages to sell their produce and enable Afghan forces to move quickly to trouble spots. The recent opening of a new road linking the Pech valley to the provincial capital, Asadabad, resulted in a quadrupling of live births in the town's hospital as villagers were able to get medical help. The Americans unashamedly outbid the insurgents: if the rebels pay $5 a day for a fighter, the Americans will offer $5.50 a day for road labourers. “Where the road ends the insurgents begin,” says one American officer.'
They also note that areas with roads are green with wheat not pink and purple with opium poppies. Funny how being able to load a year's harvest into trucks instead of having to carry it on the back of animals affects people's behavior.
The editorial criticizes Hamid Karzai for being too weak and then urges the US to lean on him as if that is going to make him politically stronger. Wouldn't Karzai's political power grow enormously if he could pass out political plums like road and government jobs like American officers with CERP funds or American Congressmen?
Don't send the money into Kabul the way the British are doing. That just repeats the failures of the over centralized Paul Bremmer regime. Instead, allow Karzai to award several million dollars worth of roads a year where ever he wants them. As the article notes one of the problems is that young men don't respect their local elders. If those elders have enough pull with Karzai to get a road built into their town that will raise their status. If they can also award well paid jobs building that road that will raise their political status even more.
Put US Army reserve engineer units in charge of the road construction although you might want to allow the local politician to hand out the envelopes on pay day as long as he doesn't open the envelopes. If NATO countries want to contribute engineer units in Tajik, Uzbek or Turkoman areas they might be a lot more useful than they will ever be in the Taliban dominated areas where they are not really permitted to fight.
Hamid Karzai is often criticized as "The Mayor of Kabul" rather than the President of Afghanistan. One way to extend the city limits is to build roads and to let Mr.Karzai decide where those roads will be built. The results are likely to be a more prosperous and peaceful Afghanistan that produces a lot less narcotics.
Over the decades, one of the problems we've had with Gap country environments in the MidEast, Central Asia, Iraq and Afghanistan is that those individuals that are rational and willing to work on peaceful constructive ventures for modest reasonable pay are also very ready to leave their Gap country for futures in Core countries. They don't trust the old elders, the fanatic extremists, or the schemers. If they become successful in the Core world they don't want to return, or risk their extended families by making contacts back home, except to send money. They stay in America, Europe and developed Russia.
In contrast, the extremists lure young people who have not reached that rational level towards work, instead seek pride in conflict, and expect the movement to care for their families after their death. The high oil $ would mean terrorists have little trouble raising the car bomber fee past whatever we would pay for such workers. In a few cases, like Saudis, low/medium level blue or white collar work would a blow to family pride.
So we will need multiple game plans for the different Gap country situations ... and good quality, comprehensive, current information will be very important.