Tom in China Security

Tom's got a short piece in this month's China Security. Since it's on page 8 of the 70 page pdf of the whole issue, I pull out Tom's part for you here:

(Thanks: Galrahn)

The Inevitable Alliance

China Security Vol. 4 No. 2 Spring 2008

China’s main strategic vulnerability right now is that it possesses economic and network connectivity with the outside world that is unmatched by its political-military capacity to defend. This forces Beijing to “free ride” on Washington’s provision of global security services, a situation that makes China’s leaders uncomfortable today – as it should. American blood for Chinese oil is an untenable strategic transaction.

The United States faced a similar situation in its “rise” in the late 1800s and set about “rebranding” its military force over a several-decade period that culminated with a successful entry into World War I. Since World War II, the United States has maintained a primarily expeditionary force that is able to access international crises, and since the end of the Cold War has done so with unprecedented frequency. This too is an untenable strategic burden.

America needs to encourage China’s effective re-branding as an accepted worldwide provider of stability operations. The problem today is two-fold: 1) major portions of America’s military require China to remain in the enemy image to justify existing and new weapons and platforms; and 2) the Chinese military is hopelessly fixated on “access denial” strategies surrounding Taiwan, meaning it buys the wrong military for the strategic tasks that inevitably lie ahead.

So long as both nations insist on such mirror-imaging, their respective militaries will continue to buy one military while operating (or, in China’s case, needing to operate) another force that remains under-developed. Such strategic myopia serves neither great power’s longterm interests, which are clearly complimentary throughout the developing world.

The good news is that both China and the United States are within a decade’s time of seeing new generations emerge among their respective political and military leaderships. These future leaders view the potential for Sino-American strategic alliance far differently than do the current leadership generation. If Washington and Beijing can navigate the next dozen or so years without damaging current ties, I fully expect to see a Sino-American strategic alliance emerge.

I do not present this as a theoretical possibility, but as my professional judgment based on years of extensive contacts through both nations’ national security establishments.

Grand strategy often involves getting leaders to understand certain future inevitabilities. The global primacy of the Sino-American strategic alliance in the 21st century is one such future inevitability.

Thomas P.M. Barnett is the senior managing director of Enterra Solutions, and author of The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004).

Comments

[Bill C.]

China, it appears, has adopted a different grand stratagy, one which, if it continues to be successful, may appeal to future generations as well.

This different grand strategy is one in which China allies itself most substantially -- not with the United States -- but with the developing world.

In this regard, China looks to defend its economic and network connectivity by means other than military and/or diplomatic confrontation.

Herein, China may see the United States' emphasis on military and diplomatic confrontation as (1) jeapordizing economic and network connectivity and (2) playing into China's hands re: their grand strategy of allying with this important constituency (that of the developing world).

[Louis Heberlein]

Just get Japan to 're-brand' its military and China will quickly follow.

[Tom Barnett]

Let's hope the Chinese are stupid enough to replicate the client-state model of the Sovs, which burdened them worse than the colonial model did the Brits. All indications are currently to that effect, as China's perceived policy of aligning with developing economies has them paying above market prices on far too many commodities. That, plus the emerging blowback at their mercantilist ways, is untenable.

[Tom Barnett]

Bill, you need to peruse the downside/negative literature on China in Africa. Combining the costs of the Sov client-state model and the ruthless mercantilism of the colonial model simply isn't tenable.

6th generation knows this, I can tell you firsthand. Fourth doesn't.

[Bill C.]

Thanks Tom. A few questions:

If the China/developing world model is considered so unfeasable and untenable, then why has the United States so dramatically and so dynamically moved to counter this effort?

a. With AFRICOM, the Fourth Fleet, the buildup on Guam and our increased presence in the Middle East and in South and Central Asia.

b. With the move away from conventional war/new weapons programs and toward unconventional/developing world warfare preparations.

c. With the move toward substantually more aid to the developing world and a greatly expanded and enhanced diplomatic corps effort in these regions.

From its actions, the United States seems to think that the potential for success by China -- in allying itself with the developing world -- is extremely high. Indeed, countering this initiative seems to be the focus of nearly all recent United States military and foreign policy changes and efforts.

Is this (the United States determination and capability to counter) what makes the China/developing world alliance untenable?

[Cadet Echo Boomer]

Bill,

Having read and received instruction from the Army on FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) it is readily apparent that we are building, training, and maintaining a force which is designed to create connectivity with the developing world. Our force does this primarily by removing actors which attempt to isolate their states politically and economically (without exception they do this to the detriment of their fellow citizens). We are building a force to fight isolation, much in the same way Commodore Perry and the Navy opened up Japan.

The creation of AFRICOM and general reorientation of our force toward threats in the African and Southwest Asian AOR is in no way designed to counter Chinese influence. Rather, it is designed to counter actors WITHIN this region. China actually benefits greatly in this arrangement. Some would say too greatly, for the amount which they contribute to global security.

But we also benefit, by opening new markets to our own goods and services. China, being the global manufacturing center it is, also wants access to these markets. Globalization means anybody can buy from and sell to anybody, so there is no way we can deny access to China if we succeed in opening these markets. Thus our goals really don't threaten a nation-state like China.

Because we and China share these goals, Tom and many others in the National Security establishment see a natural partnership forming in the near future. I use to think that cultural differences were too great, but in the last few years I have witnessed first hand an incredible cultural shift in one of the most traditional institutions in the country, the US military. Where reluctant acceptance of an eventual armed conflict between US and China use to be the norm, I now see officers excited by the prospect of China becoming militarily involved in places like Lebanon, Haiti, Liberia, and the DRC.

[Bill C.]

Thanks very much Cadet Echo Boomer. Just a couple more questions.

Are you familiar with the result of Commodore Perry and the Navy's opening up of Japan (Japanese/regional history 1868 - 1945)? Could today's "opened" China have somewhat similar ideas and ambitions?

Since we are not "in-charge" of China and cannot dictate when, where or how she would utilize her rebranded military, would you and your fellow officers be similarly excited by China deciding to become militarily involved in places such as Burma, Thailand (after King dies), Central Asia, Malaysia, Indonesia and/or other areas of strategic importance?

As the two questions above (and their answers) may indicate, once you let this genie out of the bottle, and facilitate its rise and military expansion, there may be great difficulty in controlling the outcomes of these actions, and great difficulty in getting the genie put back in the bottle again.

This is why I perceived that the US was countering China in its current areas of involvment -- to be able to keep the genie in sight and in line.