Final reflections on the Fallon article in Esquire
Friday, March 14, 2008 at 3:23AM A lot of analysis has been offered from a wide variety of angles, all of it trying to parse out the meaning and impact of the entire sequence of events, and some of it trying to assess responsibility among the various actors involved, including myself.
After giving it a lot of thought, here are my final reflections.
With any project like this, I see four essential components: the article, the reporting, the subject and its behavior and the dynamics that behavior creates, and finally, the response to that subject/behavior/dynamics--both popular and authoritative.
I bear responsibility, along with Esquire, for the first two components.
The article was not the proximate cause for Admiral Fallon's forced resignation, the reporting was the proximate cause. The ultimate cause was clearly the White House's response to his pattern of behavior in the job. For those who agree with that pattern of behavior, as I did, the response seemed disproportional and unwise. For those who disagreed with that pattern of behavior, as the president clearly did, the response was proportional and justified. Each side in this debate can cite plenty of good precedence and logic, and those who will tell you that it was a "clear-cut case of" anything are simply shrouding their interpretation in rhetoric. The job of combatant commander is obviously complex and subject to wide-ranging interpretation. That will only become more true in the future, given the complex nature of the long-term conflict in which we're engaged. That's what makes this story so important and simplistic readings of the rule book so painfully inadequate.
But there is no doubt that the president gets to replace commanders with whom he does not agree. That's the nature of our system. Once elected, it's the president's job to rule as he sees fit and it's the public's job to complain and push back as it sees fit. The press has a crucial role in the latter. Ultimately, the most heated questions arising from this affair involve the way this country is being ruled right now. I don't pretend to have all the answers there. I do know it is a subject of great contention and thus controversy, as it typically is during a time of significant overseas military interventions that generate casualties. That's why Esquire and I wanted to do the piece on Fallon. We felt the American people should know about this man's thinking and behavior, in his official capacity as Central Command commander, on the all-important question of how to approach the possibility of conflict with Iran, and to place that thinking and behavior within the larger context of his regional responsibilities. We felt the American people should be aware of the significant tension within the chain of command that this thinking and behavior generated. The question of whether or not America turns a two-country war into a three-country war is enormous. It was enormous back in 1951 and given the stakes, it's just as big now. Arguing that this debate is somehow privileged information or that the American public shouldn't be bothered with such knowledge is, in my opinion, dangerously wrong, as history has proven time and time again.
Knowing what I know now, I would indeed alter the article somewhat, but this is true of every article I've ever written. You don't have perfect knowledge upon publication. You argue the thing out from every angle you can conceive of and you make your best call on tone and content. I have worked with a number of publications over the years, and nobody takes this aspect of the work more seriously or attacks this responsibility more comprehensively than Esquire. As such, I am immensely proud and grateful to work with the magazine as a contributing editor.
Inevitably, as I would now change some aspects of the article, toning them down somewhat, there are just as many aspects that I would amplify more. Again, that it is the nature of the beast. The end result would not have been to alter the article significantly. It would remain powerfully cast and demanding of the reader's attention. That's Esquire style and it's my style. I seek to learn from every experience in this regard, and this article has provided plenty of learning.
If there is a weakness in the article, it's that we did not know exactly how close to the truth its reporting was. Again, perfect pre-knowledge would be fabulous to achieve, but I don't expect to achieve it next time either, so I try to get smarter through this experience and improve my personal judgment with time.
Several blog readers have noted the inherent tension between the task of being a reporter/journalist in this venue and my role as strategist or adviser in my ongoing interactions with all sorts of players spread throughout the national security community. That tension is real and it's something I seek to address every chance I get, but in general, I don't find it hard keeping the two functions separate. When people are being profiled in Esquire, they know it, as does everyone else involved. When I'm advising, I'm subject to all the same constraints as anybody else in this business. In both venues, I seek to remain as transparent as possible, arguing the truth as I see it and letting matters unfold as they must in response to that truth and its articulation. When that truth is no longer in fashion, neither will I be. That's the nature of the game: it happens to the best, it happens to the rest.
As for the reporting, there I wouldn't and couldn't change a thing. It was accurate and it was truthful. I am not surprised nor bothered by criticism of the article that seeks to divert attention from the underlying reporting. It's a natural response, but it's an ultimately futile one.
The reporting defined this piece. The reporting triggered the authoritative response. But that decision was ultimately about the behavior, and thus the only responsibility that matters in the end lies with those who made this response. Again, this is the nature of our system, in which I believe deeply.
What the reported behavior and the authoritative response say about the current state of civil-military relations in this country is something that will be debated for some time, I imagine. This is inevitable and it is good, because that debate overshadows everything and everyone involved in this affair.
Reader Comments (20)
I think this is absolutely true. My objection to the article was more about tone than anything else -- the dismissive rhetoric about chickenhawk neocons and trash-talking towards World War III and a President who can't tolerate dissent. That's all fine in an opinion piece, but in a profile where the subject is quoted so extensively -- nearly 1,300 words, you've said -- it's hard to see how Fallon could escape criticism for such close association with what in many places looks like an anti-Bush hit piece.
I can't help but think that the more overt political criticisms might've been toned down in a different venue. Maybe Fallon would have kept his job if he'd been profiled in Time instead of Esquire.
That being said, do you believe that the Esquire article and the subsequent fallout will inhibit your ability to influence the Military and Government in the future? Will you have the same access to power in the future to advance your message? I fear that the “baby may be thrown out with the bathwater” and perhaps you will become PNG in some circles over what the Military may see as a betrayal. While I must admit I’m one of those folks who was quite upset with the Esquire article (as you know from our email exchange), I am more concerned that your message will be lost as a result.
Adm. Fallon was obviously a shrewd judge of character and situation, so he did what he had to do, but I wonder if he could very well have won that argument in the White House. Does no-one argue with the president anymore? Or the vice president? Does no-one but the press try to keep them transparent, too?
Naive, I know--I'm young too. Young enough to ask the impertinent questions, I suppose.
That this "appearance of disagreement" was simply a traditional disceptive ploy -- which was discussed, determined, and agreed to by all parties before Admiral Fallon's assignments -- its ultimate purpose also being traditional: to keep the opponent off-base, to cause him to let down his guard, and/or to cause him to move in a desired direction?
(As has been noted, Admiral Fallons reputation, certainly before going to Centcom, was exceptionally well known. Thus, could the assignment of Admiral Fallon to Centcom, in part, have been designed to utilize his reputation -- but actually for the administration's true purposes?)
In this scenerio, the media is "used" by the leadership.
However, in allowing the Tom/Esquire interview, these individuals determine that they have overplayed, and/or improperly played, their hand -- or that it has outlived its usefulness -- and, thus, determine to move on and work a new and different angle?
Dittos, Chris. And Tom, thanks for your updated thoughts on the events!
Ironically, all the hoo-rah will also draw more attention to an excellent piece that goes through the nuts and bolts of miding the Gap.
Thanks for for such an important article.
How else to implode the Mullah's rule? Diplomacy only works from a position of strength.
Most Iranians hate the rule of the Mullah's. Remember they were educated and free, their women were liberated, under the Shah. They remember.
Fallon's real motivation or role? We can only guess .... but there are very good thought patterns in this comment thread.
I'm glad to see you won't carry their guilt for them.