Kick-ass on so many levels: Shinseki as Sec Vets Affairs

Nice symbolism and a good pick to boot.

You want to say, "What a cabinet!"

But then again, didn't we say that about Bush too?

Still, the all-stars keep rolling in . . ..

Comments

[Bob W.]

I have no doubt that Gen(R) Shinseki will do a bang-up job as Veterans Affairs Secretary.

But General Shinseki, while seemingly prescient on the amount of troops required for Iraq, was also on the wrong side of many critical decisions that affected the readiness and capability of the army as well.The typical narrative normally fails to examine his record beyond the one day of testimony before Congress in February 2003; he was Chief of Staff of the Army for four years, after all. . .

[Tom Barnett]

You're only three years too late to make that charge here, because the narrative offered in Blueprint for Action (p15) concluded with:



"Now, here's the rub on the Army: more than a few inside the Pentagon will tell you that Shinseki's stance on the postwar situation was both principled and wrongheaded. In short, he didn't want the war because he knew the Army would get stuck with the peace, so he argued (quite accurately, it turned out) for a huge ground presence in order to raise the public's perception of long-term costs--almost a form of public emotional blackmail. This is a charge that has been leveled against the Army in the past (e.g., perceived foot-dragging responses to our involvement in the Balkans in the late 1990s), reflecting the Army's Black Hawk Down fear of being left holding the bag in some backward and savage landscape. In Iraq, this bureaucratic passive-aggressive response reached its apogee . . .



In Great Powers, I make the argument--a la Rumsfeld--that we went to that war with the Army the Army had been wanting and buying for the last three decades--an army that was designed NOT to do postwars and even was designed to be inappropriate for them as a bureaucratic defense against being stuck with them. Shinseki, as Army Chief of Staff was clearly part of that, buying into the Future Combat System vision of future warfare, when his career (like in Bosnia) told him differently.

But when push came to shove, the man spoke his vest version of the truth, knowing it would be unpopular and end his career.

And that's a rare enough quality in this world.

[Bob W.]

Tom.

I cited his memorable testimony in my own post and agree he deserves credit for that, even though truthful best military advice is part of doing one's job as a Flag officer testifying before HASC, is it not?

The media narrative on the Shinseki pick will be driven by that one day of testimony on the Hill; the fact is that General Shinseki, besides that one day of testimony, led an organization for four years that was investing in the wrong equipment and falling short in the preparation of its personnel for likely future conflicts.

He testified in support of Comanche and Crusader, too, after all.

Cheers.

[Robert Langland]

He has talented people - sure. This was the easy part.

Now he has to find a way to make them a team. To do that he has to get them to park their egos at the door (and there are some big ones), then break the historical stove pipes. To do that he has to convience them he will assume strong control of the cabinet - not to make sure they toe the line, but to ensure they get full credit for the good works they are about to do. Then he has to deliver the ego stroking.

[Sean Meade]

pretty sure Tom said somewhere that, yes, Shinseki was right on the Iraq numbers, but part of his reason for using the bigger number was because he didn't want to have to do it (or, you know, even didn't think it was a good plan for the Army).

[outback]

Tom,

One of your strongest criticisms of the Bush was his tendency to stock his administration with Ford and Reagan retreads. Now Obama is putting into power an endless list of Clintonian retreads who...many who appear to party like it's 1999. The Shineski pick just the latest example.

[Tom Barnett]

Wrong outback.

It was a strong observation but not the basis of any of my criticism. I never said anyone was bad for being a retread. I said that their previous experience had a great hand in shaping their behavior in the Bush administration.

I have never made the argument against retreads per se. It would be an illogical one at best--an argument against experience.

You just have to know the experience you're getting, and the Clinton experience--by historical standards--was a very good one: very peaceful, very contented, and very prosperous--along with a huge expansion of globalization's reach.

Why not bring back such expertise at this historical juncture?