We could've had Iran

ARTICLE: Iran: Secret memo reveals Khamenei plan for nuclear arms, says report, AKI, September 15, 2008

As I write in Great Powers, in the end, all these stories will end up being true. Iran is highly incentivized to get actual nuclear weapons, to rule out U.S. invasion and Israeli strikes and to put Iran on a level playing field with the region's 200-plus-warhead mini-superpower Israel.

America decides to lock in on Iran instead of Iraq, then Iraq would be in this position today most likely. But we chose Iraq first. Good choice, in my mind. But given the poor performance of our missing-in-capacity SysAdmin force at the time, this is the inevitable result.

Whine about it all you want, that's strategic reality--as we have decided to trigger it. Once we get over the impulse to go all wobbly, then the real thinking begins.

(Thanks: Craig Nordin)

Comments

[Louis Heberlein]

Earlier writers noted the odd decision to invade Iraq in Gulf War II when we could have continued to use airpower surveillance and occasional strikes to restrain Iraq's WMD potential and conventional war threats to the region. Instead we chose to attack Iraq, and use diplomacy and economic actions against Iran which had some hostile leaders and a strong military and economic base. I think our decision was based on the view that Iran's culture was more oriented to the Old Core, there were more potential friends there, and it had a greater potential to become a positive New Core participant in the region.

Iraq's culture and history made it harder for a true New Core national culture to emerge. Instead tribal values and influences trump transformation, especially when problems or opportunities occur.