1:30AM
Flunk the SysAdmin, lose the Leviathan

ARTICLE: The Army's Other Crisis: Why the best and brightest young officers are leaving, By Andrew Tilghman, Washington Monthly, December 2007
Why this analysis matters?
If we don't master the SysAdmin, we lose the talent to do the Leviathan anyway. These officers see the pointlessness.
(Thanks: Jamie Ruehl)
Reader Comments (21)
I see alot of my own experience in this article. When I came in I wanted to make this a career. It was 2004, we'd been in Iraq less than a year, and I wanted to do my part. Now it's 2008, i've been on two deployments, and i'm less than 2 weeks away from the end of my active duty time because I just can't take all the BS that goes on.
It's not the deployments driving me out. As Zeke Austin said in the article, it's the "preoccupation with institutional process. "Rather than focus on important stuff, they focus on PowerPoint slides. They'd have me up all night to make one slide a little prettier..." The amount of man-hours wasted on wordsmithing people's performance reports and awards packages would astonish someone who's never seen the process in action, and is just one example of the mass of administrivia that drowns us so much at home station that deployments become a nice respite. If only we could bring the family along...
Bottom-line, I think every service is probably losing a big chunk of their best and brightest, and I'm happy to finally see somebody list things other than the war that are driving them out.
If Tom ever gets his wish and we create a Sys-Admin force, or Department of Everything Else, count me in. Until then I'll just have to content myself with teaching school kids history, serving in the guard, and an occasional deployment.
Please do whatever it takes to get this article out to the "rest of the world."
High-profile Nagl to leave Army, join think tank
Well, that would have been good.
But we are the good guys, and Leviathan is a key part of the foundation of a stable world order.
The single most important thing any organization can do is find, hire and retain the best possible people. If you don't do that, nothing else matters. That is not Lex's opinion, it is Peter Drucker's.
Based on this article, and many other data points showing the same thing, the US military gets a big fat F on the only grade that really matters.
This is a true disaster. A slow motion disaster is still a disaster.
Maybe Obama could outfox everybody on defense by talking about this, since no one else is? Can someone send him an email?
On John Nagl: any room in Enterra for a counterinsurgency expert?
William, is it more married soldiers the military needs or just a better way of dealing with single-parents? What about, say, a communal barracks environment of all the single parents and their kids stationed at a single base? When some parents are on duty, others would be off-duty and able to care for the kids. When some parents are deployed in hazardous areas, others would still be on-base to care for the kids-- even if a parent never comes back.
a. The national leadership and the military turns its back on the Gap and counterinsurgency and focuses, instead, on China and the big war.
b. Other concerns/conflicts to be handled as done cir. 1975 - 2000.
So, as has been said, clock gets reset -- but, in this scenerio, to the time before 9/11.
You're still left, though, with the question of holding on to good officers-- Masters or no. Putting a guy through years of rigorous grad school and making him crank out a good thesis only to have him spending his days nickpicking paperwork and getting ignored by superiors sounds rather counterproductive.
The trend is neither unprecedented nor irreversible. For most wars in American history, the army was too small at the start and too big at the end. So they downsized it, only to repeat the cycle the next time. We've been trying to fight this war on the cheap for 6 years, resulting in multiple deployments for many soldiers. But unlike his repeated comparisons to the post-Vietnam era army, morale today remains high and there aren't systemic disciplinary problems. All we need to alleviate the problem is to substantially increase the size of the army.
With regards to William R. Cumming, your suggested reforms would make it much harder to fulfill manning requirements. Besides, the military already has several competitive graduate schools: each joint and service specific Command and Staff College and War College, plus the Air Force Institute of Technology, Naval Postgraduate School, National Defense Intelligence College, etc.
Mr MachulaThe service academies indeed provide a minority of the officer corps, but these 'ring knockers' are a much larger proportion of the senior leadership.
I am leaving the Army for variety of reasons, the best I can boil it down to is this: I am sick and tired of being limited by the bureaucratic system, [micro]managed by mediocre field-grade and flag officers, the cultural belief that technology is more important than soldiers, socialist assignment/evaluation/promotion policies, and dealing with the minority of awful soldiers at the expense of the good ones. Putting up with these frustrations and lack of personal satisfaction has made the deployments to Iraq not worth the sacrifice.
Over the past 7 1/2 years, I've seen officers with huge potential leave the service for greener pastures, while I've seen more than my share of second-rates get promoted because they're the best of what's left. I have friends who decided to take the $30k bonus in return for three years of obligation--and are already regretting the decision. This is anecdotal, I know. Mr. Machula--perhaps retention rates were worse in 2000, but the point of the article was not the quantity of retention, but the quality--and I have yet to see the Army attempt to compare the quality of officers departing to the quality of those retained.
I'm not sure what it would do to the situation on the ground, but it would reduce the stress on the normal units and give the surviving paper-mongers and rules-makers a better idea of what is actually needed overseas.