11:17AM
Intell: slowest and dumbest of all
Monday, September 24, 2007 at 11:17AM When the CIA Got It Right, By David Ignatius, Washington Post, September 23, 2007; Page B07
Nice piece by Ignatius on the history of the CIA. He brings an unideological perspective, which is quite refreshing.
Me? I like my politicians slower and dumber than my businessmen. I see safety and prosperity in that.
Beyond that, I want my military slower and dumber than my politicians. I see the preservation of freedom in that.
And beyond all that, I want my intell agencies slower and dumber than my military. I prefer my sins to be of commission rather than omission, and a better CIA would be more trouble than it's worth.
My two cents.
Reader Comments (10)
I want my intel guys to not only be as smart as I am, but to be predictive in what I'm going to want next - that goes if you're talking Leviathan, SysAdmin, or elements of national power. Sorry, I just don't buy the "smart guys are more trouble than their worth." That's why we keep hemorrhaging good folks from government into the private sector.
You know, if the Federal Government had a 10% tax rate rather than a 50% tax rate, this might be true. But I'd rather not see people working half of their lives to pay for bad decision making.
Likewise, on intel... bad decisions flowing from knowledge which is either missing or wrong... I'd quite like to see the brains of the operation shiny like telescope mirrors, all the better to peer into the unpredictable future.
A dumb intel agency will simply give the military what it asks for, whereas a smart one might decide to write the story themselves. A dumb military implements the policy of it's civilian leaders, whereas a smart one may decide it knows better and might even seek to become it's own boss. A dumb government recognizes reality and acts accordingly, whereas a smart government may think they can get enough details to exercise absolute control.
It makes sense from this Catholic's perspective...pride is the devil's favorite sin for a reason.
on balance, how would the CIA's covert actions over the years be evaluated: negative, positive or break even? i can think of some real doozies, but i am no expert...
A lot of what we see in the news in the past several decades and in books, such as Ted Gup's Book of Honor and the most recent Legacy of Ashes by Tim Weiner, as recounted in the column posted here, are the failures of CIA espionage programs. That's the Directorate of Operations in the CIA, the part that gets the most press because those failures engage other individuals and countries directly, sometimes fail spectacularly, and often leave lots of people wanting to talk about it. In fact, Book of Honor refers specifically to the book that is stationed under glass in the CIA atrium, right under the memorial wall that displays a star for each intelligence officer KIA. The book lists their names, many of which are missing (redacted) for security purposes. It's a mixed message, I think--what better way to show that the Agency sacrifices lives for the security of our country, but in efforts that may be questionable (espionage operations, with people out on the sharp end of our global reach) and, obviously, still going on. Meanwhile, and I may be mistaken here, there's probably not a single intel analyst on that wall.
And that's what seems to be ignored, or absent from the news media and Tom's assessment here: the analysis capabilities in the CIA Directorate of Intelligence. This is one of the major contributing components to the National Intelligence Council and the President's National Security Adviser, and probably a lot of what goes into the President's Daily Brief that we've heard so much about in the news. These are the things, the methods and reports, that remain so highly classified that we cannot hear about them, and only when an assessment (an NIE other report) is spectacularly wrong, or spectacularly right but dismissed or ignored by those with decision-making power, do we sometimes hear about it later. Think of the assessments that were issued to the Administration pre-9/11 but we heard about later, because they were right but ignored. Think of the assessments of post-Saddam Iraq that were at the top of the minds of mil-pol planners and decision-makers before the invasion, but dismissed by those in the Administration who felt they should be running the show.
It seems, from recent news, that the CIA is most often right in analysis, short on HUMINT, and wrong in espionage. Remember most of all that, when the CIA is doing its job right, we'd never know it. That's a superb example of one aspect of 5GW: invisible operation with results for non-attribution. I agree with Tom in some what, but not necessarily on the CIA, and not quite in the same language. I agree with lots of the comments above: the CIA ought to be the smartest group in the bunch, advising both the Administration (including the State Department and NIC/NSA) and the military. Politicians need to get smarter and less greedy, and need to exert their oversight of the intel community in a thoughtful and intelligent manner. The military is getting smarter every day, as evidenced by Petraeus' Ph.D. corps of advisers. It's the Administration that we need to be worried about most, because of the personal ambitions of those in power. The Constitution could handle that, of course, but only if Congress drags it out and reads it again.
As for the CIA, maybe now in the midst of chaos and doubt it really is the best time to re-form and re-organize that Agency so that it is again both "Central" and "Intelligent." Strip it of traditional espionage capabilities and leave that to JSOC, who should always take intel assessments into account; focus on recruiting the best-and-brightest to do the analysis and assessments even better; re-connect with more of the private sector and the intelligence agencies of our allies; and in D.C., build stronger voices and advocates to convince those in power that the CIA really can do the job in providing the best information, as objectively and depoliticized as absolutely possible, no matter what preconceptions the Administration already holds near and dear. The politicians just need to let the CIA do it's real job, and it will become more smarter (and more invisible to the media and global population) almost immediately.
How would then regard Blackwater USA? A business in the business of the military.
"on balance, how would the CIA's covert actions over the years be evaluated: negative, positive or break even? i can think of some real doozies, but i am no expert...'
There's a quote that you reminded me of:
"If you are right no one remembers, if you are wrong no one forgets."
Is Blackwater too big to fail?The rule set is coming on armed guards
bottom line: State and DOD need them. they are private SysAdmin. Pinkertons of the 21st centruty. they won't be liked. they'll have to clean up their act a little.