THE Ignatius analysis on Iran right now hits the nail on the head
Monday, September 17, 2007 at 10:37AM OP-ED: "Handle Iran with care," by David Ignatius, syndicated to Indianapolis Star, 17 September 2007, p. A6.
Not too long ago, I expressed some bafflement at Ignatius sounding the alarm on Iran's influence-peddling in Iraq. His analysis had struck me as a bit one-sided, like we should be surprised that Iran is actively seeking influence right next door with the world's first Arab Shia state. To me, it was uncharacteristically un-Ignatius.
This piece corrects any misperceptions from the previous one and reminds us what a comprehensively strategic thinker Ignatius is when he's on his game.
A very solid capture of the current dynamics:
The most dangerous flashpoint is still Iraq. Military forces are engaged--America's openly, Iran's clandestinely--in a battle for influence over the shattered remnants of the Iraqi state. Indeed, now that the new American priority is to prevent Iranian hegemony over Iraqi Shiites. U.S. officials say they have tried to reassure Iraqis they won't fight a proxy war against Tehran on Iraqi territory. But that's precisely what has been happening in recent months.
Even better are the four areas Ignatius highlights for the Bush administration to conduct more aggressive diplomacy:
1) Lebanon: some deal between central gov and Hezbollah
2) Palestine
3) Syria: to break off from Iran while the breaking's good
4) the PG: where "America's top military commanders in the Gulf favor an 'incidents at sea' agreement with Iran."
To me, that's a great idea that mirrors what we did with the Sovs. I will bet money that's Dave Nichols, Dep CENTCOM commander (who brought me down to Tampa last March) and especially Fox Fallon, CENTCOM commander who tussled with Rummy over Fallon's desire to do mil-mil cooperation with the Chinese while he was PACOM's boss. That desire would be in line with reports that Fallon and Petraeus are at loggerheads over the commitment of U.S. forces to Iraq for the long haul, leaving CENTCOM with little asset leeway to deal with any other scenarios--hence the desire not to be artificially trapped into some unwanted response on Iran. Combatant commanders want wiggle room when tensions are high. They want venues and options. What they don't want to be told is that "this is our only possible response!"
Whenever anyone proposes "negotiations" with Iran, the hardliners on our side act like you're proposing that and only that, when the reality is, that's the one thing that's been missing for years now. It's been all yang and no yin with Iran and on that basis we assume--wrongly--that there's no useful possibility of payoffs from real talks (instead of the ones we always pursue, or the ones that mandate Iran give up its nuke program to get anywhere in the process).
We need a real mix of confidence-building, useful negotiations on areas of common concern, plus the usual targeted sanctions and containment-focused shows of force. If all you do is sanction and show force, there's no balance to your approach, meaning you can signal your unhappiness but never your approval. We were smarter than that with the Sovs and it worked. With Iran, we're doing not much smarter than we do with Cuba.
As Ignatius rightly points out, our problem isn't the Iranian navy (such as it still exists), but rather the naval forces of the Revolutionary Guard.
His ending is also very sharp:
The United States and Iran are playing a game of 'chicken' in the Middle East. A collision would be ruinous for both. Each side needs to be careful to avoid miscalculation and act in ways that avert a crack-up.
What does this column tell me? Ignatius is a true canary in the coalmine. If he's writing this now, that tells you how actually close we are to military conflict with Iran.
Reader Comments (1)
Non-rhetorical question: has anyone stopped to work out the effects a nuclear attack on Israel would have on the Palestinians? Depending on how many Palestinians are killed outright or sickened by fallout, "Iran's most potent propaganda weapon" may be easier to disarm than people suppose. Personally, I don't see myself feeling grateful to someone who promised to free me by killing me.