That's not how intell works

ARTICLE: 'Assessments Made in 2003 Foretold Situation in Iraq: Intelligence Studies List Internal Violence, Terrorist Activity,' By Walter Pincus, Washington Post, May 20, 2007; Page A06

There are always intell reports that explore all potential downsides. Their existence proves nothing, because that's intell's job: list me the bad things that can happen if I do this, or if I don't do this.

It's like the surgeon telling you before the op about all possible complications. Their potentiality is but one element to be calculated in your decision.

That's why this notion of "faulty intell" is all wrong. It's not how intell works. You get a range of potential outcomes (inevitably, all worst case) and then you make your call.

The presumption of "good" or "bad" intell can't really be proven per se. Some always ends up being "amazingly prescient," the rest is a load of hyperbolic crap.

When things work out, no one cares about all the "bad" intell. But when it goes badly (always for a host of reasons and decisions, or simply because the decisionmakers prefer the sub-optimal outcome to no action at all), then the "amazingly prescient" intell is inevitably touted as "proof" of the intell "failure" (I made this argument first in PNM).

Also inevitably, there will be calls for "reform," none of which can possibly overcome this essentially political decisionmaking process, nor will it stop the very same politicians from declaring their pet defense programs "crucial" because "we live in a world of COMPLETE UNCERTAINTY!"

In short, no president can be "controlled" or "corrected" by perfect intelligence--a useless concept if ever there was one.

Bush and Cheney made their decisions. Until the casualties began piling up ("high" by today's standards, marginal by yesterday's), their decisionmaking was supported--in poll after poll and congressional vote after vote--by the clear majority of Americans and their leaders. Once the bodies piled up and a sense of non-progress ensued, a clear majority turned against those decisions--and those decisionmakers.

That's just how it works in our political system.

So the real correction is--duh!--get the casualties down, not "fix intell."

Iraq stopped being a binary outcome a long time ago. Kurdistan is where we've won, and Kurdistan is where we'll manage to define a partial victory, reduce our exposure and casualties by concentrating the bulk of our troops there, and continue to sequence the rest of Iraq toward something better over time (back to Hoagland and Friedman--and me for two-plus years now--on engaging Iran and keeping this Big Bang strategy alive).

For some, it will always be solely about kinetics and the intell that justifies it.

To others, it'll always be a mix, a sequence, a balance.

The former is a strategy all right, just not a grand one.

And no amount of good intell will overcome that mindset.

Comments

[Rick Price]

My recollection of the polls was that around 65 percent of the public supported invading Iraq contingent upon approval by the UN. Approval by the UN was never attained.

I suppose you are right that Kurdestan will be our "victory" in the short run.

The terrorists, however, will only increase and continue fighting as long as we have our heathens on the ground in the middle east.

The war in Iraq has increased terrorism, and now, according to the LA Times, is providing the cash money needed by al Quaeda in Pakistan. The war has been a total disaster in ever conceivable way.

A complete waste.

[Matt R.]

From my experiences sitting in intel briefings, there are two parts to the intel. The facts and the assessments. In my opinion, "bad" intel does exist. When the facts are inaccurate, or when the assessment of correct facts does not adhere to logic and sound reasoning, this constitutes "bad" intel.The playing up of bad intel during situations that do not go as planned is a recurring theme for any opponent to any situation. What it comes down to it that leaders make decisions, based on the information and assessments at the time the decision needs to be made, balancing objectives and risk. That is what they are elected/appointed and paid to do. If every leader didnt make a decision just because of a few percentage points of a chance of a bad outcome, then no decision would ever be made. I invest in the stock market. There is a chance I could lose my money, but a small chance. So, I accept that risk. I am sure that the president was made aware of these reports, and determined that the risk of statewide collapse was small and acceptable.If information or situations change after the decision is made, then the decision cycle starts again.Getting the casualties down is a great idea. How to do it? Do we simply retreat, or do we attack and engage? WRT to actual combat operations, attack and engage is the only true way to limit casualties, because an army in a defensive posture is an army waiting to be beaten. Complimentary progess in the economic and political realms will help dramatically.

[Tom Barnett]

That's a nice distinction on intell that I did not include.

Thanks.