The readiness canard

ARTICLE: "Army Brigade, Long a Symbol Of Readiness, Is Stretched Thin," by David S. Cloud, New York Times, 20 March 2007, p. A1.

Did an interview with "Inside the Pentagon" yesterday on this subject, but in reverse: would creating stabilization forces limit Big Army's ability to escalate?

The questions posed by the reporter reflect the Big Army's old trick to define SysAdmin-like forces as peacekeepers only. This has never been my argument, although some have described "stabilization" forces in this manner.

I see SysAdmin as a much larger function, so my embedded Marines readily rise up to Fallujahs or better. As I have written, I don't believe in the 3-block war. I want my Marines to remain Marines, and I want the non-combat portions of the SysAdmin function filled out by civvies and private sector.

As for turning Army into pure PKO-style troops, that's where the international/coalition factor must come into play.

We put 22-23 ground personnel per 1000 local population in Bosnia and Kosovo, and in both cases we're about 10 percent of total. That's a real model.

In Iraq we field 6-7 per 1K and supply over 90 percent ourselves. Surprise! That both fails and strains readiness.

But here's the kicker canard you'll now hear from Big Army in the budget battles ahead:

Military officials say that the United States, which has more than two million personnel in active and reserve armed forces, has a combat-tested force that could still emerge victorious is another major conflict arose. But the response would be slower, with more casualties, and would have to rely heavily on the Navy and Air Force, they said.

Bullshit, bullshit, and duh!

The response would not be slower.

It would not involve more casualties.

It would be air-heavy from USN and USAF asset bases, and it would simply win the war from above with no attempt to secure the victory from below. It would be pure Powell Doctrine, which is still valid and entirely proper for high-end scenarios (NK and Iran) being discussed

Do not be sold this line.

This is really the Future Combat System and the rest of Big Army's acquisition community squealing. But FCS is huge and expensive and largely inappropriate for the 21st-century battlespace that is the Gap, and no amount of readiness whining is going to change that.

Yes, we need more ground troops.

Yes, we need lots of gear replaced.

And yes, transformation in tactics and technology largely await application within the ground forces (unlike the air community--Vern Clark's point to me).

But the increased separation between air-dominated Leviathan and ground-pounding SysAdmin continues ...