Cops before capital

POST: Cop Tech Key to Iraq Fight?

It's a simple observation to make, but most of the Gap's militaries are just national police in khaki or green, meaning their primary function is internal order--not external defense.

Even so, most Gap nations' effective police forces are the thinnest of thin blue lines, especially on a local basis. It's the opposite of the U.S., where our cops are bottom heavy in their distribution (no, not a doughnut jibe), meaning the bulk are local, then a thinner bulk at the county level, thinner still at the state trooper level, and then thinnest up at the national level.

So Bing (an old acquaintance from my time at the Center for Naval Analyses) is dead on in pointing out that the Iraqi military logically takes a back seat to the local Iraqi police in any scenario pathway you'd hope to call "successful."

And you don't hear as much about the cops as you do the military, but segueing from the latter to the former is a big deal in any postwar environment--the essence of a return to some normality (as corrupt as such institutions often are inside the Gap). Until cops replace soldiers, the forces of civilian recovery typically do not mobilize in critical mass numbers.

Private-sector capital flows (not public aid) are the Holy Grail of post-whatever recovery. As soon as some foreign capitalists trust your present enough to plant some big factory inside your border, you've got a future. You've been magically transformed from less-developed country to low-cost country.

That's because jobs are the only lasting exit strategy--not uniforms, but jobs.

But capital is a coward, so the cops matter first and foremost.

Comments

[James Anderson]

"But capital is a coward" Now that's an insult. Capital isn't always brilliant, but it's not completely stupid. Yes, the cops do matter....

[Dave Puetz]

Interesting article but like many of the things Mr. West writes about it is very hopeful but not completely honest about how things shake out on the ground. I'm a Marine serving on my fourth tour in Iraq. Everyone has their own view of reality but the one that many of us here now have is that we are simply arming many militias and calling them police.We arm and train the Iraqi Army but do not allow them to have tanks, RPG's and other equipment an army would have. Most IA are sent to fight in different parts of the country than where they are from to avoid conflict of interest. They are far from perfect but it is an attempt to minimize the likelihood of local corruption and influence.The Iraqi Police are trained by U.S. Military and carry the same basic weapons as the IA. The IP are basically trained to be SWAT. There is not much detective work being done over here by the IP. The American advisors do, but most IP do not. At the very least the IP need oversight in their “detective work” to make sure it is not just for taking out rival leaders. The IP work in their hometowns and are basically loyal to their Sheiks and local tribes. Needless to say the IP and IA do not work well together. Basically we are creating two identical armed forces, one representing the “national government” and the other representing local interests. There is also a “Border Patrol” force made up of mainly Kurds from the north. I’m not sure who they answer to.I’m not that excited about spending years and years over here but it seems that the quicker we rush through training and arming these guys we are missing the most important part. Leadership and accountability. I know I’m not breaking any new ground with that observation, but every day I see IP’s driving around working for local Sheiks and appearing to follow their own agenda. I wonder if we are simply creating armies for local bad guys who want the U.S. government to pay for their own army so they can kill the foreign A.Q. fighters (good for U.S. in short term) and rub out local rivals claiming they are “anti-coalition.” Sometimes I feel we are arming and equipping many “local Sadams.” Basically we need to make sure we are taking a long view of the IA and IP. In my view if the country keeps a strong national government and does not divide up into multiple regions we need to have the IA secure the country and create conditions so eventually local towns can police themselves. I do not believe corruption will ever be separated from how things are done here. But we should do better recognizing this and accounting for it when we think about expectations and strategy. Our own country fought a civil war based on local vs. national interests. Right now the Iraqi Government and U.S. forces are fighting gangs, thugs, criminals, and foreign fighters in civilian clothes. Hopefully we will not see large scale IP vs. IA fighting. The only advantage I see would be that we gave them uniforms so it will be easier for us to figure out who to shoot. The most important part of a future SysAdmin force will be having people with cultural “street smarts.” Think about more “Goodfellas” and less “Black Hawk Down.”Keep up the good work.

[JM]

A few basic facts about counterinsurgency were never quite understood by Rumsfeld and his Generals. Native insurgents generally do not put down their arms once they pick them up. They must be completely eradicated. The only way you will ever stop them is to kill each and every one. Do not take prisoners unless you want to keep fighting.

The counterinsurgency must be won by the domestic forces of Iraq. They can't win by giving them a few months of on-the-job training. They must be taken out of the country, trained well, equipped well, then redeployed to Iraq where they seek out and destroy the insurgents with maximum efficiency.

To keep others insurgents from taking the place of the deceased ones, economic and general living conditions must be improved. They must have working electricity, water, sewer, and air conditioning.

We shouldn't have invaded Iraq, but we can't afford to lose at this point. Those who got us into this mess have done a major disservice to their country.

[Mark in Texas]

From what I have been reading, one of the primary jobs of the American advisers serving with Iraqi Army units is to shake loose pay and rations from the thoroughly corrupt Iraqi payroll and logistics system.

It would be nice if we had the time for enough Iraqis to develop a less corrupt mindset so that this sort of thing could be handled automatically by the Iraqis themselves, but we are running out of time.

We ought to just pay and supply the Iraqi Army directly. If there is a banking system that is reliable enough, we ought to make it possible for the soldiers to send money to their relatives. If that cannot be done within the existing banking system, we should deliver money to the Iraqi soldiers' families if that is their wish.

As a result, we can count on the Iraqi soldiers feeling a degree of loyalty to us that they do not feel towards their government that is too corrupt to earn that loyalty. This can be a very valuable thing since the current struggle is to overcome ethnic, family and tribal loyalties. Over time, this will change expectations within first the Army, then other institutions.

[Thomas Barnett]

Great comment Dave. Generally, a bad sign when the comment is longer than the post (one senses the lecture coming ....), but yours was well worth it. Thanks for it and your service.