Iraq the one-off not looking so good
Thursday, July 27, 2006 at 6:45AM The China hawk crowd loves to push the notiont that Iraq is a one-off, that the Middle East is a blip, and that the Long War can be outsourced completely to Special Operations Command.
None of that is looking so good right now in Southwest Asia.
Of course, back in 1982 (a great summer for me, as I met my wife that summer) we had much the same tumult with Israel invading Lebanon to evict the PLO that time, and Iran and Iraq both seething with violence--just directed against one another. None of this was considered "World War III" or the "end times" by anyone other than Jack Van Impe on his late-night cable show (boy, does he have some competition nowadays!). America was too busy enduring the first Reagan term recession.
Like in 1982, a lot of brave talk about an international peacekeeping presence. Back then the U.S. went into Lebanon basically on its own, leading to Reagan's darkest day: the Beirut Marine barracks bombing in 1983. We pulled out then, declaring it a one-off and vowing not to return.
That was two wars and one counter-insurgency ago.
And it's that sort of understanding and frustration with history that pushes this administration to go farther and deeper than any previous one in trying to shake things up.
Recently there was a WSJ story (sorry, summer, and my citation skills are slipping) about how the Old Core was debating who should go into Lebanon and how many troops should be involved. A Euro diplomat said something to the effect, "There is no set formula here," insinuating that anyone who proposed such a thing must be some doctrinaire nimrod.
But ask yourself: why aren't there any formulas for this? Everyone is talking about the need to regularize such efforts, and yet, whenever such an opportunity arises, the same people act like having anything close to doctrine would be constricting.
Yes, yes, keep your options open. That's a great way to explain your inaction, your muddled responses, and the general inefficacy of the subsequent intervention and reconstruction program. Make it all sound so idiosyncratic to the culture and the region and the religion. Trot out the regional experts who can tell you 1,000 ways why nothing you try will succeed. Treat everything as a one-off.
I mean, why change a winning hand?
Reader Comments (7)
I appreciate the recent references to Jack Van Impe and other End Timers, who were quite vocal already back in 1980-1982, enough to paralyze the emotions of this 20-year-old. Pat Robertson used to say Soviet invasion of Israel in 1982, Rapture in 1988. Nice call Pat. Tom's blogs speak my language and I am truly grateful for them.
I'm with the european diplomat but probably with a different spin. There should be no *set* formulas. I suspect that his emphasis would likely be there should be no set *formulas*. Unfortunately that leads to the chaos and ad-hoc-ism that is the curse of the present system.
I think it would be eminently sensible to convert police training, diplomatic intervention, military contribution, and the whole host of things that need doing to some common denominator and allow individual Core nations to agree on a common plan and provide a certain number of points, initially based on national GDP as a baseline estimate of the potential strength of their society. Here's the kicker. You evaluate effectiveness and adjust the burden for the next operation based on the execution of this operation. If your troops have lax discipline and are trading food for sex, causing scandal, the point system costs you going forward. If you're providing no-bid sweetheart political deals back home and the effects on the ground are only a small fraction of the formally committed resources, it'll cost you.
And if the PRC wants to trade Togo 10k gap intervention points for shifting its embassy from Taipei to Beijing, well, that's ok too. And if the ROC wants to trade France to do the reverse, just fine with me.
So there's nothing wrong with leaving flexibility in the response so long as there is a response.
I guess I should mention that there should also be upward adjustments. If your soldiers are highly effective, above the norm, your committing them should earn you a bonus at the end of the deployment. If your infrastructure people build roads at above average speeds while maintaining quality, or your army training efforts are superior, this too will earn you tradeable credits.
Who will adjudicate all these adjustments is something of a problem, the UN being too corrupt to trust. Any thoughts?
TM,
I like the idea of a points system. Maybe there could be a private arbitration body set up to adjudicate this. Pay the arbitrators etc, let them establish a rep for fairness. Not sure how to fund it...maybe voluntary contributions by nation states that are running the peacekeeping forces? Or maybe something NGO/foundation funded? Or perhaps self-sufficient by performing biz and other ADR functions for a small fee/plus a cut of verdicts. I know the Int'l Chamber of Commerce does a lot of private arb work.
Tom,
Since you had a front row seat at the Pentagon, any insights as to the nature of institutional resistance to lessons learned from past CI efforts?
Why not "Spheres of Influence" and an "Open Door Policy" like in 19th Century? Core nations might be more effective (less cultural difficulties/more experience with their neighbors) and might reduce costs (less lengthy logistical train). Additionally, difficulties associated with operational agreement, supervision and management might be reduced. The selfish factor could kick in somewhat. Each major Core nation would have its own AO and could use whatever method(s) (within certain boundaries) worked best. Specialized expertise, development of long-term relationships and better benefits for all, at less cost and with less difficulty, might be achieved. Just a thought. Bill C.
Bill C - Sphere's of influence inherently promote the fragmentation of the Core into various loosly connected cores that are much less likely to progress on shrinking the Gap.
I would disagree with TM only as follows: The Core today, as relates to fixing the Gap, is already fragmented (thus, no action or inadequate action -- as noted above). "Spheres of Influence" and the "Open Door" are only offered as an alternative "formula," one that might be able to overcome this shortcoming. They ("Spheres" and the "Open Door") would need reworking -- but they are examples of Core nations coming together to deal with Gap difficulties in the past. Bill C.
The Old Core has been indefinite and fumbling with the Gap regions ever since the USA came into the interface of the two regions. You can even trace it back to the USA's reaction to the Moroccan pirates. The Europeans sent protection money, the Americans sent cannonballs.