Tom's Washington Observer interview [updated]

Dejin Su is a reporter with the Washington Observer Weekly, a Chinese-language magazine on American foreign policy and politics that is sponsored by World Security Institute (formerly Center for Defense Information), a think-tank based in Washington, D.C.

'Washington Observer is one of the most influential sources of information for Chinese opinion makers, foreign policy makers and analysts. It has 150,000 subscribers, half of whom are journalists in mainland China, the other mainly officials and researchers.'

The following is the interview that took place via email between Tom and Mr Su:

1) "Stakeholder" has recently become a catch phrase to depict China's new status. However, not much is written about its specific meaning and ramifications. Can you shed light on China's rights and responsibilities in the international domain as a stakeholder? Do the new Sino-U.S. ties envisioned in BFA fit the description of China as a stakeholder?

Being a good stakeholder means--first and foremost--recognizing that nonzero-sum outcomes are the norm for most international security issues, meaning there are win-win solutions just waiting to be found in U.S.-Chinese cooperation on such issues as Iran (where the U.S. should be using China as an intermediary in diplomacy) and Darfur (where China should be willing to propose peacekeepers of its own in exchange for the oil it's taking out). Of course, win-win outcomes require both sides to recognize overlapping interests, and there I blame the U.S. leadership as much or more than I do China's, because too many of our own leaders can't get beyond looking at China primarily as a threat or enemy. I honestly believe China is far more ready to be a responsible stakeholder in global security than either we or the Chinese themselves realize. The problem is, the Bush administration hasn't really opened up that strategic dialogue yet with China. Yes, we have talks at senior levels, but we mostly lecture and don't really offer China anything more than our hectoring advice in exchange for Beijing's hoped-for support on a host of international security issues. The best news? Both China and the US are less than half a decade away from a generational change of leadership at the top, so I'm speaking more to those future leaders in BFA than I am to current leaders on both sides, both sets of which I consider to be largely unequal to the task of thinking ahead as strategically as I propose in that book.

But yes, I do consider the Sino-American strategic partnership that I describe in BFA as a good description of a China that is a valued and legitimate stakeholder in the global community of advanced states, or what I call the Functioning Core of globalization.

2) Are there any major differences in reception between PNM and BFA? To the Chinese general readership, a key factor of the success of PNM is that it is well-received by the military community in the U.S. Can the same be said about BFA?

Yes it can. There has been less media attention on BFA than on PNM, but far more acceptance for my ideas with the second book than with the first as far as the military is concerned. I now, for example, regularly brief to all the new flag officers each year for all of the four services. I don't know of any other officer with that kind of reach.

Oddly enough, given your question, is the fact that Beijing University Pres is currently holding up publication of PNM in Chinese, despite the volume being fully translated into the language. The problem? BUP wants me to submit to all sorts of censorship, basically removing all references to China in the book for fear of angering government officials. So for now, my ideas of Sino-American strategic alliance actually is better received among American admirals and generals than it is among the "general Chinese readership," who are prevented from reading PNM.

3) What prompted you to rethink Sino-US ties regarding Taiwan? ("Put Taiwan on the table" ) Why has strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan, which has served U.S. relatively well since the 1970s, become obsolete? How is your new position received in the Pentagon?

I didn't rethink it, but rather enunciated it for the first time.

Why is it important to do so? Too many elements inside the Pentagon (and especially the Air Force and Navy) use the Taiwan scenario to both justify unnecessary arms acquisition decisions (denying the Army and Marines the resources they need for this Global War on Terrorism) and prevent effective exploitation of nascent military-to-military ties and cooperation between the Chinese and American forces (something that U.S. Pacific Command pushes hard to develop, despite strong disapproval from Washington).

But my biggest fear is that leaving this strategic ambiguity intact allows Taipei to basically declare war between America and China at a time and under conditions of its own choosing, and to me that's just plain dangerous to our long-term strategic interests with regard to China.

I want North Korea gone and all talk of a missile shield in East Asia also gone, because both stand in the way of establishing an East Asian NATO-like military alliance, and that alliance not only allows America to shift resources from Asia to the Middle East and Africa, it allows Washington to explore strategic military cooperation with Beijing in both regions.

Taiwan simply isn't worth holding up all that potential strategic partnership ad infinitum.

4) Many people suggest that if U.S. views China as a threat, China will become a threat, sort of a self-fulfilling promise. Will China become a friend if viewed by the U.S. as a friend? What kind of role do personal interactions play in the formulation of your perceptions about China?



Both the danger and the promise of self-fulfilling prophesies exist with China. I'm just arguing that America has a choice here, much like England did in the early 1900s: we can assume China will be the United States of the 21st century (the rising power peacefully accommodated) or the Germany of the 21st century (i.e., the cause of global wars). This is a powerful choice that our business community seems to have already made. That economic connectivity, however, is nowhere matched by political and military connectivity between the two states, and yes, in that process, personal bonds and connections can be huge. Both China and the U.S. will have new generations of leadership within the next decade, so ties built across those generations may well prove to be the determining factor in any emerging Sino-American alliance. I consider such a goal to be a major task of my career, and I have already met plenty of my equivalents on the Chinese side--forty-somethings moving into positions of power and influence. But clearly, there is much work to be done. I return to Beijing in June, and expect to both strengthen old ties and establish new ones during that trip.

Update: the link to this interview in Chinese.

Comments

[Dimitar Vesselinov]

Causes of World War I
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_World_War_I