Protecting oil connectivity with military assets? How strange!
Wednesday, May 24, 2006 at 6:37PM ARTICLE: “Pentagon Report Assails China’s Military Buildup,” by Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal, 24 May 2006, p. A3.
ARTICLE: “China Raises Fuel Prices Again But Remains Below World Levels,” by Shai Oster, Wall Street Journal, 24 May 2006, p. A6.
The Pentagon’s latest report on spending in China notes ominously that the Chinese seem intent on two things: building a high-tech military capable of fighting short, high-tech wars (like we do on a regular basis) and extending its power projection reach for the long-term goal of protecting its sea lines of energy importation (imagine that!).
Where do you think the Chinese learn such things? Obviously, they model their military on our own, because we’re the Microsoft of militaries and we show how a great power deals with a dependency on imported energy. So voila! They copy us. Unbelievable.
Just as amazing, we assume that any such development is a direct threat to us.
Reader Comments (6)
Alarm bells ought to go off whenever you think someone else has the same motives and outlook you do. It usually means that you are missing something crucial. In the case of the Pentagon report, I think there is some serious lack of imagination here. (The technical stuff is mostly good.)
Everything I've seen of the Chinese military suggests that it is focused mainly toward a Taiwan contingency. The huge expenditures that are being put toward that suggests that the PLA is well aware of how costly and nasty a military option regarding Taiwan is (and that is a good thing that they are aware of this).
There isn't much point in developing a Chinese naval presence to protect SLOC's. It's much more cost effective to route oil through land pipelines (at which point it should become obvious why China is not interested in annoying Iran and Russia). Also there is no point in protecting SLOC's with China trade partners since there is no point in protecting sea trade routes with the United States or Japan in case of a military confrontation.
One other point....
The US DOD must be the only people in the world that are confused about China's aims. They are the same as they have been for the last 180 years.
The trouble is that there are a lot of people in the US government who believe that China is the enemy and who think a second Cold War is inevitable. The trouble is that China has not been acting in a particularly evil and aggressive fashion. This confuses them, and when asked about Chinese intentions, they respond by saying that the Chinese are secretive and non-transparent about China's goals, when it is obvious to the rest of the world what they are (i.e. to make China a rich and powerful country). The ultimate confusion here is not in China's goals and tactics. The confusion is that China is acting in a way that is different from the evil, nasty way China should be acting.
Joseph writes: "Everything I've seen of the Chinese military suggests that it is focused mainly toward a Taiwan contingency....There isn't much point in developing a Chinese naval presence to protect SLOC's"
A clever comment, by saying "everything that I have seen" Joseph implies to the reader that he is extremely well read in Chinese strategic and military thought and that the reader should conclude there is nothing out there to suggest such an approach. He would also be fundamentally, and completely, incorrect.
If there is one clear, transparent trend in PRC strategic thought in the last decade beyond the Taiwan scenario it is increasing interest and near paranoia about China's SLOCs and a repeated emphasis from HJT/WJB on down on finding ways to secure them.
Then Joesph uses the "if only everybody was sensible like me" line of argument to show how China couldn't possibly be contemplating using military presence to secure SLOCs because "it doesn't make sense". Even a cursory knowledge of China's energy needs and routes would have revealed to Joseph that for all their appeal, land pipelines are not going to replace seaborne crude from the Middle East any time soon - as many Chinese strategists openly acknowledge.
Wang also ignores the authoritative commentaries on Chinese strategic thought like Zhanyixue which the American Pentagon appears to have finally picked up on. Nor does he reflect the statements by two successive Chiefs of the PLAAF that it must develop into an offensive force capable of projecting power beyond China's borders and of launching strategic air campaigns. Or just today the announcement carried by Xinhua that a key military research project will be to develop a long-range transport aircraft.
dylan: you have some good, legitimate points, so i'm going to let your comment stand unedited. but please tone down the rhetoric next time.
Re; dylan on 'authorative commentaries' paragraph.
you are talking about oranges to joseph's apples.
there are always different opinions and discussion on what a country should do. this is orange.
what the leadership really plans to do, is apple. it is what joseph was trying to address.
Tom's point is good but his analogy is a little off. It would be more appropriate with China as Microsoft. They incorporate good ideas from others, in this case military ideas from the pre-eminent military power, America. Microsoft has never been an innovator. They bought, licensed, or copied every good idea from others.
Nathan: while i agree with your opinion of Microsoft, this criticism's a little too precious. Tom's point is (i think) that our military is the biggest, best funded, etc, the 500 pound gorilla. in that respect, it's like Microsoft compared little tech companies. it's his analogy. let's give him the benefit of the doubt, ok? ;-)