Patience, then sequencing
Monday, May 1, 2006 at 9:27AM Tom got this email:
Hi Tom,I was wondering whether it would really be wise to go for the hard kill option on N.- Korea.
I mean, Kim has probably allready amassed a couple of nukes by now. Don't you think he's effectively achieved a deterrence with that?
In your latest knoxnews column you write that "Iran has already achieved a crude, asymmetrical sort of nuclear deterrence vis-A -vis the United States". And they haven't got the bomb yet. But N.-Korea however does have them in all probabillity. So don't you think that N.-Korea has effectively achieved this deterrence also then?
You argue for the hard kill option on North Korea, because it has no future in Asia. I agree with that, but I also think that it is too dangerous to take Kim out the hard way. Even if all the main powers in the region would support the hard kill option on N.-Korea, don't you think Kim is crazy enough to use the bomb? Cause I think he is...
What are your thoughts on this issue?
Erwin van der Rijnst
He replied:
Reasonable. Big difference is Iran is real nation and functioning regime, if bad. Authoritarian regimes can be killed with connectivity, but totalitarian regimes cannot, because population too enslaved.Going after Iran loses China, but NK done right gets me China, so you balance your goals and you're realistic on sequencing.
Given the collateral fall-out, I don't think there will ever be a time for hard kill on Iran (though you never say never, especially with Israel as an independent variable). With NK, it's hard to see avoiding the hard kill, because even the implosion scenario probably necessitates some version.
I want both regimes gone, but again, sequencing is second only to patience for the successful grand strategist.
Tom
Reader Comments (3)
If I'm reading things correctly, we're just coming online with the willingness to take N. Korean refugees. Isn't this a form of connectivity? We could stick the entire population of N. Korea in the Great Plains and still have entire counties be below "frontier level" population density.
Is allowing people to flow from NK to PRC to US a soft-kill option?
North Korea is a problem for China and South Korea. It was only our problem because we had undertaken to protect South Korea and stationed thousands of soldiers there. It is now clear that the South Koreans do not want us there and that they wish to run their own North Korea policy. Further, their resources far exceed those of North Korea. The Chinese have feed this mosnter in order to rattle it at us. We need to make it clear that we are out, and remove all of our troops from South Korea forthwith. We should also make it clear that a North Korean attack on Japan will be dealt with in kind.
With us out, the Chinese and the South Koreans will be forced to figure out how to deal with Lil' Kim, and they will undoubtedly do so in short order.
Soft Kill. and real cheap. Iran is a different story.
"Authoritarian regimes can be killed with connectivity, but totalitarian regimes cannot, because population too enslaved."
Well, just to play Advocatus Diaboli a bit - they can't be killed with connectivity, but they can evolve (devolve? Change?) depending on how patient you're willing to be and what time-horizon you think you have.
Most obvious counter-example being China's transformation from the Maoism of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, which Deng saw was nonfunctional. He then started the process of greater connectivity economically and internally away from Great Leader totalitarianism to the Oligarchical Fascism that China has now and which Tom believes will wither away over time (in his version of neo-Marxian materialist determination).
So North Korea will possibly/probably (if one is a materialist determinist *definately*) follow the same path - eventually. The problem always being how long are we talking about, how much untold suffering will occur in the meantime (note it still takes place in both China and Iran, but not on as massive a scale, unless, I suppose, if you're Tibetan, Falung Gong, Baluchi, Azeri/Kurdish, or any kind of open disident, but I digress).
Russia also from Stalinism to degraded Brezhnevism and ultimately Gorobcratic Failed Reformationism (leading to imperial collapse).
The real question is: what does one think will happen in the meantime, during the indeterminate period. Of these regimes, North Korea's leadership is clearly the most - I want to say "unhinged" but that isn't the right word so I'll settle for reckless. It's prolongation carries with it the greatest risk and disruptions.
The debate then I guess is where Iran's falls in, how much it's continued existance for however long carries with it and thus whether it would be better to attempt to cut the Gordian knot now or whether that would be more perilous.
Note also that ironically it is the devolutionary periods that carry with them the greatest risks - risks that the existing non-unaware leadership might do something desperate to try and retain power when they fear they are about to lose it. Iran's current antics, fanning the flames of indigenous nationalism and foreign policy brinksmanship, reek of that (note too how China's turned towards nationalism after Tiennamen Square).
If the "coup plotters" in Russia had been less comical and more capable and influential, then after Boris Yeltsin stood in front of the tank he might have ended up in the same place that the Chinese student who stood in front of the tank did, with untold consequences. Sure, eventually the whole rotten structure would collapse anyhow, but in the meantime, in betweentime: what?
The longer we wait, the worse things will get in dealing with North Korea. The question does remain, though, how far the Iranian regime will push things before they are pushed out of power. (Note I say that not really favoring any sort of "hard" option with Iran, because I don't think there are any feasible ones with enough "up-side", everything being a trade-off. So we must make the best of a very bad situation. But I think sometimes Tom is far too optimistic about our ability to work with the current Iranian regime, as an all-upside, no-downside-except-gettingo-over-neocon-hostage-nostalgia).