Repeat after me: grand strategy is a LONG TERM pursuit
Wednesday, February 1, 2006 at 4:04AM Interesting bit on the myths and failures and hubris of any attempt at grand strategy by Fabius Maximus (yes, I know it's hard to take people seriously when they insist on using pseudonyms and silly ones at that) at Defense and the National Interest.
Find it here: http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_myth_of_grand_strategy.htm.
It's serious writing whose only flaw is this assumption I run into time and time again: if it can't be done within a couple of years, then your grand strategy is obviously a failure. Notice his analysis of Iraq (the people essentially reject our system). I simply don't see that in Iraq. In fact, I think it's quite amazing how well they accept our system. The notion that accepting it will magically lead to no conflict is a bit naive. I wonder if Fabius remembers how nasty and unruly our system was for . . . oh . . . the first hundred years or so.
Grand strategy isn't about this fiscal quarter, or administration, or even this decade. It's about decades of pursuing the world you define as worth creating. It will not be linear, and every difficulty does not signal complete failure, just a tougher row to hoe.
And yeah, it does scare me that so many people you'd expect to think long term get so scared so quickly by the difficulty of actually doing what they preach--I.e., think grand strategic and then stick to your guns.
And then there is this weird assumption of the 4GWers at DNI in particular: if you name a nation as being in the Gap, then clearly you assume we must invade! Talk about your close reading. Yes, I do predict US invasions of Brazil and Argentina (Oops Fabius, I actually put those states in the Core! But no bother, we'll invade those too.).
There is something strangely literal about people at DNI. It's a bit like arguing with bible thumpers ("If it's in the book, then by God...).
How these criticisms kill the utility of grand strategy or mine in particular is beyond me. Do we agree that the states we worry about in this Global War on Terror are geographically concentrated in what I call the Gap? Do we want to shrink that Gap over time? Do we see a role in this for the military? Must we change the military to adapt itself better for this role? Will it be hard? But will we not also learn from mistakes over time and get better?
Do you have any alternative to this world view other than to say this is hard and our first effort was quite difficult?
The Fourth Generation Warfare types argue themselves out of the debate with this approach, and what they offer as long-term strategy would require an America that few Americans would care to live in, because it would look a bit too much like Israel. That's fine for the Martin van Creveld addicts, but for the rest of us, we'd like America to still look like America at the end of this process and yes! We actually do believe that America is a model for the world, one that will be filtered and reshaped the planet over just like Japan shaped it for Singapore shaped it for South Korea shaped it for China shaped it for Vietnam shaped it for ...
But you know what Fabius? It won't happen by Tuesday!
You know, it's not serious navigation aid to sit in the back seat whining, "Are we there yet?" all the time.
These guys need to look beyond their blood-and-guts view of history. They're missing all the good stuff.
Here's my "bold" prediction on Iraq: Every good 4GWer knows that the average insurgency takes a decent decade to kill. We went into Iraq, allowed one to flourish, dealt with it badly, and now we're getting a whole lot smarter (my upcoming article in March issue of Esquire. By 2010, Iraq won't have an insurgency worth mentioning. We'll clock in on this one at about 7 years, or three ahead of schedule.
But guess what? Many experts will call this an absolute failure, even many 4GWers, and they'll be completely wrongheaded to do so.
It's a sad thing when those who seem most open to long-term strategizing are the first to declare surrender every time the going gets tough.
Reader Comments (14)
Very reasonable - realistic look.
I would note an AP article today in Jakarta, Indonesia, the Foreign Minister in an intended negative comment about Iraq said, "Before a total victory, America will not withdraw."
He didnt intend it as such, but it seems to indicate a new international view of America. At least one different than the one I grew up with. Perhaps, we are now perceived by the world as truly meaning what we say, able to do what we say and willing to actually do as we say.
To me some amount of predictability is very important to positive international relations.
Now if our own citizens and media would feel this way...
Rob
Grand Strategy is not kids's biz. So "long term" is when we will be dead. That should give the necessary calm to ponder things. Right ?
That is one of the best things I like about your thinking, it's long term outlook.
The criticism reminds me of the talk after the National Security Strategy was released. Everyone seemed to harp on the one word, pre-emptive. A lot of other ideas were in there, including using all our resources to combat threats. Now, we may not have lived up to that document 100 percent, but the thinking was there.
Pre-emptively dealing with a threat in the Gap, might mean helping build trust, and good relations, and sheparding them towards the Core. Without using the "hard kill" on every state.
Even your A-Z rule-set allows that not every situation is going to go through the same steps.
I have been on the Internet for a decade and a half, give or take. For the majority of that time, I used a pseudonym for my comments. In that time I've received death threats and threats to report me to the FBI. Pseudonymity can be pierced but most of the yahoos who utter these threats are incapable of doing it so the alternate persona served its purpose, keeping me safe from the nutters.
That minor defense being said, I think you're too easy on the guy. If you demonstrate to a Bible thumper that his position isn't actually in the Bible, he'll change. The fact that you're not advocating what Fabius Maximus is saying isn't likely to change his views on Grand Strategy in general and on Barnettism in particular. We've drunk too deep of the Marxist cup of truth as a class construct and in Maximus' case it seems his 'class' is the church of 4GW.
This is Fabius Maximus. Thank you for your gracious comments. Unfortunately, most of them are irrelevant to the points I raise.
The core of my argument consisted of specific -- if theoretical -- reasons why an *ambitious* Grand Strategy was not feasible for a developed State. Followed by a brief description of what a "humble" Strategy for America might look like (more on this in the remaining 2 parts).
Your major objection is that the Iraq people have *not* rejected our system (or more specifically, as I said "our economic and cultural systems." This seems clearly contradicted by the evidence to date.
Both the Sunni and Shiite Arab communities have clearly chosen a fundamentalist Islamic social order, a clear rejection of our cultural system.
The Iraq Government, such as it is, has also rejected the extreme free market vision of the US attempted to install in Iraq. Although its still early days, it seems likely that Iraq will have a larger State role in the economy than that of most western States.
I agree with your assertion about the Long Term nature of Grand Strategies, but this is absolutely irrelevant to anything in my article.
As for your correction of my error, that you put Brazil and Argentina in the Core (not Gap), this is contradicted by explicit statements in your Esquire article -- which, dated before the War, I used as the framework against which to measure its success -- and provided a link for readers to see for themselves.
You mention Brazil and Argentina twice. First as "seam states" and second in a list of Gap States in which you "expect real trouble in the 1990s, today, and tomorrow."
As for the second half of your comment, I refer to *your* criticisms about Lind's review of your book. Did you read my article? For instance, you ask "Do you have any alternative." That was the closing section of my paper, and mentioned as the subject of Part 3 -- "A Grand Strategy for America."
Nothing in the 2nd half meaningful relates to my article. Perhaps your internet browser flipped you to another site?
Also, your ad hominem attacks are, in my opinion, unworthy of someone with your standing in this field. "Strangely literal" "Bible thumpers" "Addicts" "Whining"
You discuss the outcome of the Iraq War at some length. At the end of my article I gave links to my articles on that subject. I would find your comments on them of interest.
Last, thank you for sharing your opinion of my pseudonym. If you read a few of my articles and some history about Fabius Maximus, you will see that it was chosed to highlight what I consider a key parallel between his actions and my recommendations.
I will, however, consider changing it to "Tom."
If I recall from the second Punic war correctly, Quintus Fabius Maximus basically decided to deal with the virtually unbeatable military genius of Hannibal by not fighting him. He didn't lose because he never fought. True, Hannibal never defeated the Roman Empire even though he defeated several Roman armies (A Grand Strategy faux pas on Hannibal's part as tactically gifted as he was to not crush the Roman center of gravity, Rome itself), but Fabius never defeated Hannibal either.
Bottom line, TGWOT and instability in the Gap isn't going to go away because we surround it and attempt to minimize its damage to the Core. The Gap is going to shrink based on our efforts inside it be they military, economic or otherwise.
During the second Punic War there was a phrase, a warning really, that scared the daylights out of the Romans 'Hannibal ad portas'. Well the Gap is at the figurative gates and we can either find a way to sally forth and kill it, or wait until it finds a way inside.
I think I'll take the strategy of Scipio Africanus who had a far better plan for defeating Hannibal. He killed Hannibal's logistical base of operations, Spain, and threatened Hannibal's political base of operations, Carthage itself. Most importantly though, Hannibal was never defeated on the Roman penninsula, he was however crushed in Africa.
Aherring --
That's not really correct.
Fabius Maximus' defensive tactics were more active than passive. Rebuilding Rome's strength while activly harassing Hannibal's efforts to gather supplies -- avoiding pitched battles. A form of attrition warfare.
Rome disregarded his advice in 216 BC. The result: Cannae, one of the most complete military defeats in history.
His nickname "Cunctator" (delayer) was originally an insult, later a honorable title.
The victories won by Scripio Africanus were with men and resources built during the previous 7 years, in essence, by Fabius. Perhaps an example of the adage "Amateurs discuss tactics, pros discuss logistics."
Also, Fabius Maximus won 2 noteworth battles.
His co-commander, Minucius, openly called Fabius a coward. At Larinum Fabius rescued Minucius from defeat, almost inflicting a severe defeat on Hannibal. Minucius said afterwards "My father gave me life. Today you saved my life. You are my second father. I recognize your superior abilities as a commander."
Fabius also retook Tarentum in 209 BC.
All this is relevant to our situation. One difficulty in conceiving Grand Strategy is to distinguish strong from weak positions. That is difficult during periods of rapid change.
The next 2 parts in my series discuss this in detail.
Bottom line, which I don't expect you to agree with before reading, is that we are weak not strong, and a defensive/conservative strategy is best.
Also, as known by strategists from the ancient world down thru Clausewitz, defense is an inherently stronger posture than offense.
Grand strategy is ideational in nature - look for example at the Atlantic Charter and related high policies of FDR, Stimson,Marshall, Churchill, Truman, Acheson etc. - deciding offense or defense is a subsequent question.
Even Containment, which was inherently defensive, relied upon an ideational critique of the economic and political flaws of the Soviet system. Without that built-in perspective providing an implicit and at times explicit rationale, Kennan's statregy would have made little sense.
Fabius Maximus - A stylistic point, it's traditional to not lead off with a pronoun when an article and several commentors have already entered the fray. It confuses who you are addressing.
A logic point. If you purport to address "ambitious" grand strategy and specify a particular candidate, it is quite relevant when you do not actually come to grips with the arguments of the candidate strategy but instead knock down caricature arguments of it. This is the famous straw man argument. If you wish to discredit the idea of Core/Gap (or what I call Barnettism) as a realistic candidate for grand strategy, it is important to actually understand it, not a caricature of it. You haven't demonstrated that you know what you are dismissing.
Approaching the meat of your argument, that ambitious grand strategies are not possible for an advanced or developed nation, that's absurd unless you either define the West as not advanced or not developed during the Containment period or that containment was not an ambitious grand strategy. You have a further problem of the alternative strategy of Rollback. Why was that possible in your theoretical construct? You don't seem to say.
The problem of the Gap/Core is a higher level, above the GWOT. It deals with the GWOT as an instantiation of the Core/Gap principles, an interesting subset, of dire day-to-day importance but not the entire story and not how we want to focus our efforts because down that road lies a clash of civilizations and the inevitable alienation of a billion muslims.
We have a fundamental problem that the Gap is misusing modern medicine and provoking fast evolving superbugs with the inevitable consequences of randomly spaced global human epidemics to which there are no effective medicines. The death toll from even one bad global epidemic will likely eclipse the death toll in the GWOT to date (including the muslim on muslim internal conflict). Does your modest strategy have anything to say about this? Barnettism does.
We have a problem of international dependencies where Gap states export their "surplus" population to the Core so they don't suffer revolutions. Does your modest strategy have something meaningful to say about this? Barnettism does (see the four flows for a starter). If a country adopts enough of the global rules, it's going to generate enough internal labor demand that they don't have to mass export people.
There are other issues (and if you respond to the above two, we'll go further) that Barnettism addresses but are unlikely to be addressed by a "humble" grand strategy more focused on the current headline, urgent problem, the GWOT. Please either show how a humble grand strategy will address the other problems or how the other problems shouldn't be included in a grand strategy.
TM Lutas -
Thank you for the stylistic advice!
As for your logical point, that I attacked a "straw man" or caricature of Barnett's views, please elaborate. In what way were the quotes I used to represent his strategy not representative -- either of his views or the substance I was critiquing?
Note that Barnett was used only as an illustration. The article was not intended as a detailed refutation of Barnett's subtle and complex proposal. It was to advocate "humble" rather than "ambitious" Grand Strategies. As you implied, containment was clearly a humble -- and successful -- strategy.
Part I introduced the general concept. Part II will give another, more specific, example: Israel vs. Palestine.
Your points -- which I agree are all concern key questions -- will appear in the last and most important section: Part III, Grand Strategy and America.
Perhaps the general structure should have been more clearly described. Something to revisit in Part II! That's why I find these blog debates so useful -- fast feedback.
This is especially useful when discussing issues like Grand Strategy, where nobody has final answers and all proposals yield more questions.
P.S. I discussed some of your points in earlier articles, albeit in less detail. You might find them worth a look, esp. the 2 Iraq articles. Also relevant are "Women Warriors" and "Militia: the dominant defensive force in the 21st C?". Links appear at the end of my article.
Fabius Maximus - If you only wanted to use Barnett's school as an example, it would have been better, IMO to deal less with Barnettism and throw in a 2nd grand-strategy contender. You make it look like (at least in my eyes) that you're going after Barnettism by using it as your only example of ambitious grand strategy. I'll believe that you're after a humble grand strategy based on a complexity of faction argument on your say so for now (barring later evidence).
Your argument that there are just too many factions, pulling in too many different directions has one major problem. It's ahistorical, at least for the United States and goes against bedrock american ideology, to wit, Federalist #10. Madison's document is accepted by all the major political factions but your call for a necessarily humble grand strategy violates it. Madison's vision is that multiplying factions creates stability and tolerance. An ambitious grand strategy can be built on such a foundation because people are used to forming short, even long coalitions with factions they fundamentally disagree with but who travel the same road. Christian believers in charity and love will want to shrink the Gap. Atheists who believe disconnectedness defines danger will be right along with them (or the other way around) but very much for their own reasons. You can assemble a persistent bi-partisan coaltion that can carry a majority in both major parties for decades that way (which is what you need for successful grand strategy of any type). American politics has socialized us all to accept the lion laying down with the lamb as a daily occurrence and that's all due to the reasoning behind Federalist #10. Square your idea with that worthy document and you might have something there.
What Tom, and those of us following his ideas, has been missing for far too long now is an honest debate on the sum total, as well as the individual elements, which comprise his grand strategy to achieve a future worth creating.
If Tom, through an honest debate, is able to defend his positions and, when necessary, wise enough to adapt his perceptions, then we will all benefit from the exchange. If, however, he and his adoring followers are only prepared to silence all challenging ideas with rhetorical slight of hand arguments (or through juvenile insults) then as far as I can tell only one man will benefit from the exchange.
A future worth creating can definitely benefit from a grand strategy. And there is no doubt that the goal of this strategy is achieved over many decades. But these strategic ideas do not just lay unperturbed for generations and then finally coalesce into an instantaneous flash of reality either. Those ideas must be nurtured individually and adapted to the realities of each and every day. Only a fool would hold on to all of their beliefs with each passing day in the face of what their eyes, and an honest and open mind, reveal.
As Tom is apt to say from time to time when dealing with those who see life in black and white I will say confidently now; The exchange of ideas in an honest debate of how to achieve a future worth creating does not have to be viewed as a zero sum game.
TM Lutas -- Great point about Fed#10, which I shall consider.
Jim -- nice comment, and one I seldom see on the web!
Here's a background note you might find useful in watching this debate...
My "Myth of GS" is an intro to the series. Short, provocative.
The next article will explain how in times of great change it is difficult to determine who is strong, who is weak -- which can cause serious strategic errors. This is easy to see in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) at the close of the Middle Ages, and in the strategies of the Axis powers entering WWII.
Part II will use Israel vs. Palestinians as a current example. By most important metrics Israel is weak, the Palestinians are strong -- and seem likely to win A horrible outcome, another historical tragedy.
Part III is the article you are looking for, describing how the US is weak in several vital dimensions. From this I develop an appropriate strategy, focused on defense, so we can conserve our strength and rebuild while we adapt to a this new era.
After this 3 part series, the next one will describe the force structure suitable to implement the proposed Grand Strategy. The end result will be an alternative to Barnett's "Pax America" vision.
Today there is no comprehensive vision in the "RMA" or "4th Generation War" communities. It is an advantage for Barnett to have a vision that goes from Grand Strategy down to the operational art -- and to his credit that he's stated it so clearly.
Last, something to consider when listing things an author should have mentioned. On the web the number of readers decreases sharply with length of an article. I've found aprox 7 pages (2500 words) as the upper limit. That does not allow the detailed analysis these subjects require, so serious work requires a series of articles.
For example, see the Small Wars Journal. Feature stories are 1k - 2k words, the length of my light, topical articles. Short articles are 750 to 1,000, the length of my letters to Mom. My "Myth of GS" is 2300 words; PIII will be much longer.
Fabius Maximus - There is no reason why you cannot create a wiki that will adequately cover your topics in the depth that they deserve and link your 2.5k articles into the wiki for those who want further depth. I've advocated that this happen with Barnettism too but I haven't been able to get one together yet.