Nations adopt rules as they advantage them

ARTICLE: “Bush and China Endorse Russia’s Nuclear Plan for Iran: Tehran could operate civilian facilities, but not control the fuel,” by David E. Sanger and Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 27 January 2006, p. A3.

ARTICLE: “EU Lobbyists Now Back Push for Transparency: Mandatory U.S.-Style Rules Gain Momentum in Brussels; Abramoff Sets Off Alarms,” by William Echiskon and Glenn R. Simpson, Wall Street Journal, 27 January 2006, p. A7.

ARTICLE: “At WTO Talks, Stances Are Hardening, “ by Scott Miller and Marc Champion, Wall Street Journal, 27 January 2006, p. A7.

China says it’s all for Moscow’s plan to enrich uranium on Tehran’s behalf, but that it’s not interested in pursuing economic or political sanctions, which means there is no point in taking this matter to the UN Security Council. China is basically choosing to give Iran the same near-nuclear status that South Korea and Japan have long had, meaning they could go nuclear if they wanted in a relatively short period of time, but they choose not to do so.

Why isn’t China ready to grant sanctions against Iran? China’s a country that's amazingly dependent on globalization. You derail that burgeoning trade and investment flow, and there’s really no chance that the country can maintain its growth trajectory, meaning bye-bye to what political stability there is now in the interior provinces. So China doesn’t care for that rule set and the threat it entails, especially vis-à-vis a country that’s becoming a very important energy source for it.

Expect that to be a regular stance by New Core pillars like Brazil, Russia, India and China. International sanctions may be the coward’s war in the West, but it’s a fool’s errand elsewhere, because it tends to hurt too indiscriminately those who depend far more on the global economy’s advance.

The EU is willing to rush into U.S.-style rules on lobbyists, because they fear similar outcomes as the brewing Abramoff scandal here in DC. When the fit’s better, the transmission is rapid: good rules beget good rules.

But that fit is determined largely by where any country stands on the development curve, which is why the grand bargains required to make the Doha Development Round come to fruition in the WTO do not seem in the offing. Rob Portman, US Trade Rep, says the “Doha lite” option doesn’t work for us, because we want a deal that triggers significantly greater trade flows. Best estimate by WTO director Pascal Lamy is that the deal is about 60% complete, something Egypt’s trade minister will take today if nothing better is in the offing and the alternative is collapse.

Other Core players blame the vague nature of Doha’s expressed goals, which were born in the heat of 9/11 and spoke to the desires of advanced states to rapidly elevate the economies of underdeveloped states, lest they become (or can’t stop being) breeding grounds for transnational terrorists.

Problem was, “WTO members never agreed specifically on how that was to be done.”

Perhaps a good definition would be whatever it takes to get postwar situations like Iraq to work, don’t you think?

Or is anyone under the illusion that trade and investment flows don’t play a key role in that?

But apparently, not enough WTO members see themselves advantaged by tackling such issues, and perhaps that’s because few can imagine trade making a difference when the U.S. screws up the occupation as badly as we did in Iraq.