Hedging China the wrong way

Reference sent to me by reader: http://www.mac.com//redirect/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GJ01Ad01.html.

Here's my problem with the piece: the Pentagon thinking it will stop China from becoming a regional military power. Not possible. Pissing in the wind, really. And if we choose to interpret our failure on this as "evidence" of Chinese "aggression," we'll be making a huge mistake.

Tone of this piece is to contain China with series of FTAs that they are inevitably forced to join. I think we're dreaming on this one, and being foolish to assume China can't become center of very stable and worthwhile Asian free-trade association that does not include the U.S.

This article highlights the big failing of the Bush Administration's vision: it assumes the "indispensable nation" notion lasts forever. It does exist now in the military realm, less so in the political one, even less more in the technological realm, and far less so in the economic realm.

China will build its networks where we're weakest: economic, then technological (e.g., their constant pushing for standards unique to China or Asia), then political (relationships, like those with Russia, India, Brazil, will follow the economic relationships), and then militarily (by achieving these networks, they essentially hedge against us asymmetrically).

The Bush people, so trapped in Cold War mindsets, can't escape their value imprinting from youth: we think we'll contain China militarily but China will asymmetrically work to contain us militarily over time, shutting us out of economic integration in Asia in the process.

I have praised the Bush team in the past, and will continue to do so on many levels, but my gut instinct on the 2004 election was correct: Bush had his time to change the rule sets, and did a great job. He was not the guy--nor the team--for the follow-through . . . on Iraq, on China--you name it. This crew has gone as far as it can. Everything that needs to be done now is--sad to say--largely beyond their imagination (although I still place great faith in Bob Zoellick, Dep Secy of State; and I believe Rumsfeld's reforms inside the Pentagon lay a lot of good groundwork for changes to come).

I fear American foreign policy will be largely useless between now and January 2009. Again, the discounting is coming with a vengeance. Everyone is making their plans for what comes next. Thus, the irrelevancy of U.S. foreign policy will grow immeasurably in coming months.