The deal we're not making with China on North Korea

■"China Uneasy In Korea Role, Wary of U.S.," by Howard D. French, New York Times, 19 February 2005, p. A1.

■"7 Habits of Highly Effective Cadres: Western Management Experts Descend on an Eager China.," by David Barboza, New York Times, 19 February 2005, p. B1.

The opening paras of the first story tell it all:

The dispatch by China of a high-level envoy this weekend to persuade the North Koreans to return to talks on their nuclear weapons would seem to present it with an ideal opportunity.

China's economy is growing enormously, casting shadows in every direction. Its fast-modernizing military has the attention of every power, regional or global. No other country, meanwhile, enjoys the kind of long, unbroken friendship that China has nurtured for over five decades with North Korea. In short, all the pieces would seem to be in place for Beijing to score its first big coup in global diplomacy, brokering an end to the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula.

The only problem with this optimistic scenario is that it is shared by almost no one in China.

For now, the Chinese remain reluctant to take major diplomatic risks on North Korea, convinced that this longtime ally, a country that Chinese soldiers shed blood in large numbers to defend, will never turn against them. Analysts say that Beijing's top priority is to maintain quiet on its frontier, and that it would take a more aggressive tack only if tensions between Washington and North Korea were to increase seriously.

Beyond such doubts, however, lingers an even more fundamental reason for the reluctance of China to take the lead in this crisis: its deep-seated skepticism about the United States' strategic designs in the region.

"If we cut off aid and the Koreas are unified on South Korean terms, that would be a big disaster for China," one analyst said. "The U.S. would insist on basing its troops in the northern part of the peninsula, and China would have to consider that all of its efforts going back to the Korean War have been a waste."

Other experts here look cynically on Washington's insistence on Chinese leadership in the North Korean face-off, seeing it as part of a broader effort by the United States to entangle Beijing in a growing web of international arrangements, the better to limit Chinese influence.

A fresh example of the divisions between the United States and China was provided this week with confirmation that Tokyo is moving closer to Washington's policy position that the status quo on Taiwan must be maintained. Chinese analysts often point out that having a friendly country tying up American troops on its northern border frees Beijing to focus its forces on other contingencies, notably the Taiwan question.

What this tells me is that America has it within its power to enlist China's support for Kim's removal from power, but that we're not signaling in the right way to make clear to China what benefits would accrue to it for this major effort on their part. And that's because we're of two minds on China, and that's too bad, because absent these sorts of Cold War leftovers (Taiwan defense guarantee, North Korea), there isn't much to divide us. China wants our ways, our advice, our progress.

What we can't decide is how important China is becoming to us, and so Kim lives on in our state of strategic confusion.

Again, too bad, because with China's help, Kim is eminently vulnerable. Clearly, we prefer fearing China more than getting rid of Kim. It's really that simple.