A Chinese translation of PNMóauthor and vision

Dateline: SWA flight from Providence to Tampa, FLA, 11 July 2004

Flying down on a Sunday afternoon to Special Operations Command in Tampa to participate in a multiday workshop on the future of the global war on terrorism. No, Iím not being asked for my opinion on how best to kill terrorists, or anything operational for that matter, because thatís not what I know. Iím an expert on the ìeverything else,î or how that activity relates to the world at large in terms of diplomacy, politics, economics, social change, etc.ówhich isnít where ìthe rubber meets the roadî but instead asks the biggest questions of ìwhere does this road lead to?î

Should be an interesting time, not the least of which will involve meeting the other experts assembled, to include Peter Schwartz of Global Business Network (the one person here I have metóduring Y2K at a Highland Forum), sci-fi writer Orson Scott Card, Caleb Carr (author of ìThe Alienistî), and several other notables from a weird variety of disciplines.

I last interacted at this level with SOCOM when I briefed all the senior leadership there (and around the world via video teleconferencing) in 1999 regarding the upcoming Millennial Date Change Event, otherwise known by the acronym Y2K.

That brief was very funny (Y2K naturally lent itself to humor), and what I remember is that whenever I glanced at the view screens that showed VTC audiences, I could see them shaking now and then. At first, I though there was something wrong with the picture, but then I noted that everyone in the room with me was also shaking on and offójust enough so I could barely perceive it unless I actively stared at them. I finally realized these guys had perfected the art of the silent-but-jiggling guffawóchief among them then-CINCSOC (Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command) Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the guy pulled out of retirement by Rumsfeld to serve now as Chief of Staff for the Army. The general almost looked like he was going to fall off his chair at one point, he was shaking so muchóbut never the slightest sound emerged. Other than my voice and the sound effects, you could have heard a pin drop.

Yes, yes, the silent service they. As I will be on the content of the next three days (pretty sure).

So the meat of todayís blog will be an abstract of the quasi-review article that appeared about a month ago in the big Chinese newspaper ìNanfang Daily.î ìAbstractî here simply means that my new friend at Beijing University, Professor Niu Ke, was kind enough to have someone generate this rough summary of what was said in the piece, as opposed to a word-for-word translation.

I edited the following for spelling and grammar in order to make the meaning clear. I also put the items into bullets rather than running them altogether in thick paragraphs broken up by semi-colons. I donít know what the actual title of the article was, but Iím assuming it was the title of my book. The authorís name was Xue Yong. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in history at Yale. Hereís the abstract as rendered by Prof. Niu:

Editorís Note:

∑ The plight in Iraq forces U.S. military to reflect on its war ideas/strategy since the Gulf War

∑ Thomas Barnett becomes a dramatic figure in this process

∑ Will his new ideas become the framework for future US global security strategy?

Foreword:

∑ Heated debates have arisen regarding Barnett and his newly published book, The Pentagonís New Map

∑ If lucky enough, Barnettís ideas will probably not only become a blueprint for future U.S. global security strategy, but also reshape the relationships of the United States and the rest of the world
∑ What attracts Chinese attention most will be his strong arguments in favor of a Sino-U.S. alliance in the 21st century.

The Conceiver of Future U.S. Armed Forces (secondary title)

∑ Barnett has worked for a military transformation office led by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski

∑ Barnettís brief resume

∑ Barnett successfully foretells the booming of terrorism

∑ Brief comparison with Andrew Marshall

∑ Barnett becomes more and more influential in national security community, giving lectures and briefings at the Pentagon

∑ Hot debate about him

∑ Rumsfield reportedly shows interest

∑ It is said that Barnett is a most influential figure in military reshaping.

Two roles for U.S. Army (secondary title):

∑ Two types of countries in world: ìgapî and ìcoreî

∑ Two branches of military force: Leviathan and the System Administrator Force, with fairly detailed description of both

∑ Lessons from Iraq experiences

∑ Barnett briefs at Joint Staff: ìYou can manage to win two or three Iraq-type wars easily, but you are not able to operate an occupationî

∑ Barnettís critical views on Bush Administration and the ìneoconsî

∑ Barnettís viewpoints on war on terrorism, and his criticism of Bush strategy: too much armed force, not enough diplomacy.

Worldís New Core:

∑ A beyond-the-military view of war

∑ Barnettís positive views on Chinaís role, as well as it leadership

∑ Also included are India, Russia, Europe, NATO allies

∑ Authorís remarks: Barnett is open-minded compared to Andrew Marshall

o Desires less secrecy and more transparency

o Transcending the narrow military perspectives and Realpolitik of great powers

o Sees overlapping interests among great powers

o Seeks to educate citizens on how to understand the world after 9/11.

Concluding Remarks:

∑ Barnettís ideas have been on a journey from periphery to mainstream, facing strong opposition from the military but supporters are growing (example of Republican House member Mac Thornberryís remarks: Barnettís vision is helpful in building bipartisan consensus

∑ Barnett also deliberately tries to reduce any perception of his political bias, criticizing both G.W. Bush and John F. Kerry

∑ Barnett voted for Gore in 2000

∑ A Democratic administration is expected to be even more receptive to Barnettís ideas

∑ Authorís personal suggestions:

o Most importantly, Barnettís multilateral strategy needs more international responses in order to gain more legitimacy inside the U.S.

o Chinaís ìPeaceful Risingî theory should be weaved with Barnettís ideas, in order to build a more solid basis for Sino-U.S. relations in 21st century

o As for Iraq, China should take the role of ìa friend of the U.S. who gives forthright admonitions,î promoting the UN to internationalize the Iraqi situation while continuing to press the U.S. to cease its unilateralism

o Military cooperation with the U.S. in Iraq is necessary and reasonable, so China should considering deploying troops to Iraq.

COMMENTARY: The article strikes me as sort of a review of the book and sort of a recap of Greg Jaffeís Wall Street Journal profile, meaning the author is leveraging Jaffeís analysis regarding the visionís growing acceptance within the U.S. military community. I will confess that I changed the line ìIt is said that Tom is the most influential figure in military reshapingî to ìIt is said that Tom is a most influential figure in military reshaping,î because I honestly believe that my natural humility was being lost in translation (which, of course, is why I draw attention to it here).

Clearly, the analyst likes me and the book because I see an overlap of strategic interests between China and the U.S. (isnít it weird to read about a ìSino-U.S. allianceî as opposed to a ìU.S.-Sino allianceî?). What really struck meónot to mention made me feel goodówas the authorís suggestions at the end regarding China stepping up to a more responsible worldwide partnering relationship with the U.S.: not just some silent junior partner, mind you, but a ìfriendî who isnít afraid to speak harsh truths.

You know, I walked through the Providence airportís main bookstore on my way to the plane this afternoon, as always looking to see if my book was still there on display. It was, in what looks to be a brand new section against one wall labeled simply ìWAR.î

I was a little taken aback by the designation, since most stores will stick me under ìMilitary Affairs.î Throughout my entire career I have always been known as the guy who argued far more for peace than for war, so the notion that I am a ìphilosopher of warî like a Mahan or Clausewitz is something I simply recoil from. To me, such strategists were all about war and very littleóif at allóabout peace. Deep down I consider myself a peace strategist, which is why I donít consider my lack of military experience to be a detriment to my legitimacy.

Because I work for the military, and because I speak forcefully and at length about the certain types of wars as a way to achieve lasting peace, I am necessarily labeled a ìwar strategist.î Go figure! I work in the Warfare Analysis and Research Department at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College.

But remember this (he says confidently, especially since the subtitle was completely Neil Nyrenís idea): the PNM is about war and peace in the 21st century. The key concept of the book is the need to think about and conduct war within the context of everything else. Thatís why the book and the vision attracts such attention both here and in China: it puts this global war on terrorism into a larger context, something everyone desperately wants.

That is why Iím flying on a plane this afternoon down to Special Operations Command. There is nothing in my experience that allows me to tell the Combatant Commander there how he should lead this Global War on Terrorism.

No, Iíve been brought down to explain the everything elseóyou know, the happy ending. That happy ending has little to do with victory in the classic sense (order) but everything to do with a truly durable peace (justice).

And so I will represent that which I both know and believe over the next few days . . ..

Todayís catch:

You want a fair fight? Then do it yourself!

ìPanel Describes Long Weakening of Hussein Army: White House Saw Threat; Senate Cites C.I.A.ís Data That Found More Risk in Erratic Regime,î by John H. Cushman, Jr., New York Times, 11 July, p. A1.

ìBad Iraq Intelligence Cost Lives, Democrats Say,î by Adam Nagourney and Jodi Wilgoren, NYT, 11 July, p. A1.

The coming reform of intell: everybody hold your breath!

ìDespite Terror Risk, Washington Is Unlikely to Press Reform of C.I.A. This Year: Congressional reports see a need to alter a culture and a ëgroup thinkí dynamic,î by David E. Singer, NYT, 11 July, p. A10.

Iraqis: it takes one to control one

ìIraqís Rebellion Develops Signs Of Internal Rift: Tactics and Goals Split Iraqis and Foreigners,î by Ian Fisher and Edward Wong, NYT, 11 July, p. A1.

ìA Tough Guy Tries to Tame Iraq,î by Dexter Filkins, NYT, 11 July, p. WK1.

Saddamís trial: exhibit A in the case of the missing A-to-Z global rule set

ìWho V. Saddam? The U.S. has spend years preparing for Saddam Husseinís trial. But it is not all that certain who will try him or whenóor whose ends that trial will ultimately serve,î by Peter Landesman, New York Times Magazine, 11 July, p. 34.