Anthony Cordesman's deconstruction of the destruction of Falluja

■"Winning or Losing the Sunnis: Fallujah and Its Aftermath Are No Tipping Point and Don't Break the Insurgent's Back," by Anthony H. Cordesman, email to listserv, 18 November 2004, 1900 words approx..

Cordesman's as good as ever on this piece. Here's the key bits:

It is far from clear what the US ìvictoryî in Fallujah really means in a military, political, and economic sense. There are, however, good reasons to question whether the tactical victory will have a positive strategic effect Ö

In military terms, there seem to have been some 2,000-3,500 dedicated insurgents in Fallujah before the US campaign began and preliminary interrogations of detainees indicate that some 95% of them were Iraqi Sunnis. US spokesmen has since claimed over 1,000 casualties and equally large numbers of detainees - with some estimates of casualties going as high as 1,500-2,000- but all such casualty data are a pure guesstimate and many of the detainees seem to be local recruits rather than hard core insurgents.

Most reports indicate that large numbers of insurgents left Fallujah before the fighting, and significant numbers escaped Ö

As a rough guess, however, it seems unlikely that the killed and detainees made up more than 10% of the hard core insurgents, and that the attack did not kill or capture large numbers of key leadership cadres -- although some do seem to have been affected.

The US has recently talked about a total of some 12,000-16,000 core insurgents, but has never defined what this means . . .

As of the summer, some 75-85% of all Iraqis indicated they distrusted Coalition forces. In short, the Sunni insurgents had a very large recruiting base before Fallujah, and it is likely to be much larger now. Experienced cadres can draw on this for high-risk action, saving themselves to maintain the overall level of activity Ö

It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that Sunni insurgents were able to react to the US attack on Fallujah with a wave of attacks and incidents throughout Iraq. These attacks were particularly effective in Mosul, but hit Baghdad and virtually every city that is largely Sunni Arab Ö

This scarcely makes the Coalition victory in Fallujah unimportant, but it does clearly show that it is part of a campaign that has only begun Ö

Iraq also presents the unique problem that insurgents already have massive stockpiles of arms and weapons, and seem to have more than adequate funds. They do not need major outside support or volunteers, and it is unclear that they need sanctuaries or fixed bases to maintain a high level of activity, recruiting, and training Ö

Insurgent HUMINT is excellent and US forces, Iraqi forces, and Iraqi government areas are heavily penetrated by insurgent sympathizers who have shown over the last few months that they provide excellent tactical intelligence Ö

It seems unlikely that the Sunni insurgents will ever be able to directly challenge Coalition forces in military terms, but they also have only limited incentive to do so Ö

The political problem is complex. There has never been a meaningful ethnic census in Iraq, and the estimates that Arab Sunnis make up 20% of the population versus 60% for Arab Shi'ites are guesstimates that also are decades old. It does seem likely, however, that there are over 5 million Sunnis in Iraq. Most do not live in Al Anbar or any part of the so-called Sunni triangle, and live in Baghdad, Mosul, and other cities. They may be angry at the US, but anger does not mean they are opposed to the Interim Iraqi Government or will not participate in the coming series of elections if they feel they can benefit.

The Arab Sunnis are scarcely monolithic. Many are intermarried with Shi'ites, most did not benefit under the Ba'ath and Saddam, and many think if themselves in terms of family, tribe, and nation - not religion Ö

There as yet have been no reliable public opinion surveys that can show how serious Fallujah was in alienating Sunnis in given areas, but it seems likely that it has had a serious impact Ö

So far, therefore, Fallujah has been a political victory for the insurgents. It has further polarized the Arab Sunnis, weakened Sunni participation in the interim government, and raised more questions about the independence and legitimacy of the Allawi government Ö

Initial anger fades, and Sunnis may come to see participation in the elections as a better alternative that open ended insurgency and the creation of a Shi'ite-Kurdish government. As long as Al Sadr and any other Shi'ite groups do not join the insurgency, it is at least possible that the Sunnis may see an ìendless insurgencyî and sacrifice as the worst alternative Ö

The broader question is also whether any credible amount of aid can deal with the economic problems the Sunnis face in time to be politically effective; whether the Iraqi government has the number of trained and competent people to secure Sunni areas and govern effectively, and whether the Sunnis will be grateful given the damage done in Fallujah, the ongoing clashes with US forces, and the fact that no government can credibly promise to given the Sunni elite the same privileges it had under Saddam Hussein Ö

Pretty sage analysis, methinks. I don't see anything here that stops me from saying what I wrote for the February issue of Esquire, as much as that piece may end up pissing off an even larger portion of the Pentagon than I usually do.

Can't say anything more, or Mark Warren's promised to kick my ass.

God, it's so demeaning to be a pawn of the gigantic Hearst corporation!