OP-ED: by Steve Coll, The New Yorker, October 26, 2009

Another great piece from Coll, upon whose judgment I rely a lot. Fascinating opening:

Over the summer, the Afghan Taliban's military committee distributed "A Book of Rules," in Pashto, to its fighters. The book's eleven chapters seem to draw from the population-centric principles of F.M. 3-24, the U.S. Army's much publicized counter-insurgency field manual, released in 2006. Henceforth, the Taliban guide declares, suicide bombers must take "the utmost steps . . . to avoid civilian human loss." Commanders should generally insure the "safety and security of the civilian's life and property." Also, lest anxious Afghan parents get the wrong idea, Taliban guerrillas should avoid hanging around with beardless young boys and should particularly refrain from "keeping them in camps." The manual might be risible if the Taliban's coercive insurgency were not so effective. Afghanistan's self-absorbed President, Hamid Karzai, might even consider leafing through it; if he could account for his citizenry's appetite for justice and security half as adaptively as his enemies do, Barack Obama would not be struggling so hard to locate the "good war" he pledged to win during his campaign for the White House.

The bit about "beardless young boys" being kept in camp reminds me of the crass joke that's often applied to any number of militaries in the world: How do you separate the men from the boys in the X army? With a crowbar. But that's an ancient story in that part of the world. Coll follows later with kind words for Abdullah:

It goes without saying that Afghans have had enough of violence. Abdullah's restraint signals a broader, resilient desire among many political and tribal leaders to avoid having their country descend into chaos again. This is the opening that American policy has repeatedly failed to grasp since the Taliban's fall in late 2001: an opportunity to reject the false expediency of warlords and indispensable men, in favor of deepening participatory, Afghan-led political reform and national reconciliation.

Makes you think of that floated idea of a coalition gov with Karzai as figurehead and Abdullah as guy who tackles real issues in a way Karzai seems incapable of. Coll's list on that score is instructive:

These include how electoral fraud might be prevented in the future; whether provincial governors should be elected rather than appointed at the President's whim; how ethnic balance can be assured as the country's Army and police force grow; whether political parties should be encouraged; whether the 2004 constitution should be revised to strengthen parliament; how local government can be improved; how corrupt or drug-dealing government officials should be brought to account; and how Taliban foot soldiers and leaders might be encouraged to forswear violent revolution for constitutional politics.

Coll's point: you need Afghans themselves to make these talks happen and for answers to emerge. Why? It's the only path to legitimacy. Brilliant finish:

Since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, in 1979, attempts by foreign powers to shape events there have repeatedly been thwarted by what intelligence analysts call "mirror imaging," which is the tendency of decision-makers in one country to judge counterparts in another through the prism of their own language and politics. The Politburo, for example, engaged in energetic debates about the extent to which Afghanistan might conform to the stages of revolutionary development contemplated in Marxist-Leninist theory. As the Obama war cabinet now debates its choices, American discourse barely refers to Afghan leaders by name or to the particular equations of the country's diverse provinces. Instead, historical analogies and abstract concepts from political-theory texts abound--arguments about "legitimacy" and "governance," as if the Taliban were motivated primarily by the "Rights of Man." Obama and his advisers might profitably consult the Democratic Party's own book of rules, specifically an entry composed by a peaceable boss from Massachusetts: All politics is local. In the case of Afghanistan, there is a corollary: All local progress, or failure, will be political.

Very timely. (Via WPR Media Roundup)