ARTICLE: In Iraq, 2 Key U.S. Allies Face Off, By Sudarsan Raghavan and Anthony Shadid, Washington Post, March 30, 2009; Page A01

Hard not to expect that the Iraqi Shia, with the Iraq Army firmly in control, won't start going after the Awakening types. From the perspective of the Kurds, this was always the expected first step, with them as #2. For a while there, it looked like you might see the dynamics fast-forwarded to the point where it would rapidly become Arab-v-Kurd, and I think you will definitely still see that on Kirkuk and Mosul and all the bits outside the KRG's current three provinces where some Kurdish ambition remains. But at least this way, the Shia controlling Baghdad have to fight a bit of a two-front effort, which it looks like they're more than willing to attempt right now. Upshot? The scenario by which a Shia strongman simply eventually replaces the old Sunni one seems on track. If I'm Saudi Arabia, that gets my attention and logically my support in some effort to prevent, and then we're back to the possibility of significant civil strife backed by outsiders. If I'm the Kurds, I would welcome this prospect versus the one in which the Shia successfully move forward on the Sunni Awakening players and then inevitably turn north in their ambitions. At some point in our withdrawal process, we're going to have to ask ourselves how well we will live with an outcome that, if left unchecked, may empower Iran dramatically. Yes, the Arab Shia in Iraq won't exactly kow-tow, and yet, if they go down the path of trying to reestablish a unitary state, this time under Shia control, they will meet with a lot of local resistance and Iran will inevitably become the major sponsor. Lest anyone forget that a rollback strategy on Iran isn't just about Hamas and Hezbollah and Syria. It's also about making sure the Shia don't simply replace Saddam with a new dictatorship, because Maliki is making all the steps to keep that option seemingly open and real.