REPORT: Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran's Nuclear Development Facilities, Abdullah Toukan and Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 14, 2009 [via James Fallows]

Having read through the brief, it's highly technical but good stuff. Lays out the scenarios in all their complexity. Bottom lines would seem to be: Israel can strike with bombers or missiles and damage the three top nuke sites (Arak, Natanz, Esfahan) either way. Bigger strike packages could encompass a total of two dozen nuke sites (north, central, west and south) and two dozen missile sites (pretty much all over). Deaths would be even more substantial then. The environmental fallout from just Bushehr (Russian nuclear power plant) would be substantial, stretching across the PG to the small Gulf states. Even in the smaller strikes, Iran would likely suffer immediate deaths in the range of 5-10k and long-term deaths possibly reaching six figures. Again, wider strike packages would yield substantially higher death totals. Success would be measured in how delayed Iran's program became as a result. Problem? Once struck, Iran is likely to go overt and speed up the effort substantially, essentially erasing the gain. Of course, Israel, if it used bombers, would have to cross Arab/Muslims states (northern route through Syria and Turkey, central route through Jordan and Iraq, and southern route through Jordan and Saudi Arabia). Some losses would occur en route. Then there is the high likelihood that Iran would second-strike with missiles. A given is retaliation by Hamas and Hizbollah. Israel could suffer significant losses in aggregate, but let's bet Israel does better and suffers far less. In sum, none of this pretty and all scenarios are unlikely to yield a decisively good (for Israel) outcome. Question is amount of delay and how fast Iran decides to erase that perceived "victory" margin. Having read it, I don't change my mind about Iran basically having--now--the equivalent of a sloppy, asymmetrical nuke deterrent. Or that it will grow substantially stronger by the time America is done unwinding the Bush-Cheney strategic tiedown of Iraq/Afghanistan/Pakistan. So it all comes down to how much Israel perceives it can gain in delay in the meantime versus the costs incurred. Personally, I expect the attempt, and I expect history to judge it a failure. (Thanks: Patrick O'Connor)