No, that doesn't mean pulling out of Iraq precipitously, but it does argue, as former Bush administration policy planner Richard Haas (who held the George Kennan position at State) states, "for minimizing the scale, visibility, and duration of U.S. military presence in the region." Some of that is accomplished by concentrating U.S. ground troops in the friendliest local countries, like Kuwait or, in the future, the Kurdish portion of Iraq that seems destined to become independent. Some is accomplished by maintaining much of our presence off-shore in naval capabilities. But where we have to keep significant numbers of uniformed personnel on the ground for lengthy peacekeeping and counter-insurgency operations, like in Iraq, it also means making any overt military presence as multinational as possible and likewise avoiding any overly "occidental" cast. If we cannot shape our interventions in such a way as to attract allies from the East, such as the Russians, Indians, Chinese and even Iranians and Turks in the specific instance of Iraq, then we do more than invite their indifference; we also invite their meddling. Russia has ambitions for developing Iraq's energy sector and India and China will inevitably need access to those energy reserves. As for Iran and Turkey, they are the two obvious regional integrating entities for Shia Iraq and Kurdish Iraq, respectively, with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria playing that role for Sunni Iraq. Disputing those underlying realities is self-defeating, because America cannot simultaneously make a federated Iraq safe enough, stable enough, and somehow connected to the global economy unless all of these actors' demands are minimally addressed.