The email sent will contain a link to this article, the article title, and an article excerpt (if available). For security reasons, your IP address will also be included in the sent email.
A
grand strategy grading sheet
On
articulation,
President Bush
gets a "T" for "trying"--as in, too hard. As Jacob Weisberg
argues in his 2008 book, The
Bush Tragedy,
George W. Bush was determined to succeed where his father had failed
in articulating a grand strategy for a tumultuous era he felt clearly
needed one. But as with the multitude of reasons offered by the
White House for invading Iraq, Bush's inability to stick with any
single message greatly hampered his delivery. Indeed, Weisberg
charts an ever-morphing grand strategy across Bush's two terms,
starting with "unipolar realism" of 2001 and jumping to the "with
us or against us" fervor immediately following the attacks of 9/11.
Once that very sizable political capital was translated into the
doctrine of "preemption," the Bush White House boldly dreamed of
creating "democracy in the Middle East," otherwise known as the
"big bang" theory of politically recasting the region through
Saddam's toppling. That vision was subsequently expanded into
"freedom everywhere" in Bush's second inaugural speech, only to
meet such widespread international scorn in the light of our
continuing failures in the region that it was abandoned by the
administration long before Hurricane Katrina basically sent it into a
political lame-duck status from which it never recovered.
As
for managing the world's balance
of power,
Bush-Cheney achieved an inadvertent passing grade for letting their
self-proclaimed "war on terror" divert the administration's
many hawks from targeting rising China for sustained
confrontation--their initial instinct. To the extent that the
Middle Kingdom was later slated for careful containment
through a "hedging" strategy that saw Washington bolster existing
bilateral military alliances in Asia (e.g., Japan, Australia) while
forging new ones (India), the administration recovered the strategic
initiative somewhat, but overall, that effort pales compared to
China's persistent and pervasive "charm offensive" throughout
Asia and beyond. Similar containment efforts against a resurgent
Russia and a regionally revived Iran can also be described as
failures in the sense that Bush-Cheney had no desire to actually
trigger system-wide balancing against the United States--just the
opposite. But when you begin your post-presidency two years into
your second term, well . . . let's just say, you're asking to be
disrespected.
As
for bringing all elements of power to bear in the long war against
radical extremism, or the so-called DIME
package, the
Bush administration, while displaying serious ingenuity in employing
financial sanctions against both terror networks and rogue regimes,
nonetheless failed miserably in creating a unified, government-wide
effort in both of the major overseas interventions it launched.
While those failures have triggered, from below, a wave of
bureaucratic experiments, such as the State-USAID-Defense-blended
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) originally fielded in
Afghanistan, the inherent weakness of the interagency process itself
remains unaddressed, leading me to expect future interventions will
also be helmed by czar-like figures who appear and disappear at the
whim of the chief executive. In short, Clinton's ad
hocism on
interventions has unfortunately been enshrined by the Bush
administration, which instead chose to make its lasting bureaucratic
mark in homeland security.
Bush's
definitions of endstate,
whether we're talking individual interventions or the long war
itself, were slippery indeed, in large part because of his laissez
fair attitude
regarding America's efforts to shepherd the process. More than
Clinton, Bush was eager to use military power as a sort of Deus
ex machina that
triggers downstream change, but unlike Clinton, Bush willfully
ignored the need to line up one's allies sufficiently for the
postwar handoff, leaving the U.S. military holding the bag, for all
practical purposes, in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Those outcomes
have naturally triggered great friction,
both within the
U.S. military itself (especially in the younger officer ranks) and
America's relationship with NATO, dissipating whatever sense of
institutional confidence either entity took away from previously
shared experiences in the Balkans.
In
terms of goals,
the Bush-Cheney grand strategy of resetting the global rule set
regarding rogue regimes was not just well-intentioned but
well-directed. Much like the Sarbannes-Oxley Act, triggered in
response to the Tech Crash and corporate scandals of the early 2000s,
set a new minimum standard for being a responsible public corporation
in the 21st
century, the Bush pre-emption doctrine, however crudely articulated,
possessed similarly laudable ambitions--namely, a new minimum
standard for being a nation-state in the era of globalization.
SARBOX basically warned companies that if they did not meet this new
regulatory standard, they'd be reduced to four choices: go
bankrupt, go off-shore, go private or get bought. Bush's doctrine
promised similar penalties to rogues--as in, get sanctioned, get
isolated or get invaded and have your regime changed.
But
here's where Bush-Cheney's hubris
proved to be their undoing: by assuming 9/11 empowered them to see
the world differently, they presumed to lead the world differently,
and, simply put, the rest of the world did not agree with that
strategic assessment. What America saw as a deep disjuncture in
history ("Our homeland is attacked!"), the rest of the world's
great powers viewed as merely its resumption for a superpower whose
geographic--and temporal--isolation from such hinterland violence
had left it unusually brittle. For once the fraternal empathy faded,
9/11 came to be viewed by even our closest allies as a sort of
"welcome to our world" moment that neither super-empowered
America to act, nor lead them, against this common foe. But lead
Bush did, and vigorously so, waiting only until the waning months of
his presidency to consider why his leadership style was viewed as so
unacceptably unilateralist. However, by then, most of what Bush
proposed as his new minimum security standard had been rejected by
other great powers eager to co-opt resource-rich pariah states on
their own terms. Our strategic selfishness had spawned the same
among others; if America could act unilaterally in response to its
particular definition of unacceptable risk, so could others.
That
is where Bush-Cheney muddied the waters of America's perceived
national interests:
by declaring
this a war of survival, they empowered any and all great powers to
pursue whatever strategy they felt most fitting. That decision alone
damaged our national interests by calling into question a global
security rule set that America had been long in the shaping, because
that rule set envisioned collective action by concerned great powers
against regional threats in wars of discipline. Wars of survival are
waged against imminent threats, a hard charge to levy against rogue
regimes located nowhere near your neighborhood but instead in the
neighborhoods of other great powers not similarly alarmed. Worse, by
declaring a trio of these regimes to be an "axis of evil," the
Bush administration threw down the gauntlet prematurely, like some
drunk who walks into a bar and declares pre-emptively, "I'm
taking all you bastards on--right here and now!"
So
I'll give Bush-Cheney an "A" for tapping into America's
post-9/11 jingoism,
but an "F" for telegraphing their kinetic
intentions long before Washington could possibly muster the requisite
power--both hard and soft--in aggregate. By alerting the trio in
advance, Bush courted strategic disaster by inviting all interested
parties to target his Leviathan's
initial deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. I mean, if I'm
Tehran's ruling mullahs, I can't wait to play the "away game"
against the Americans in Iraq versus the "home game" inside Iran.
Because if I can discredit Washington's latest geographic
extension of its Monroe-like
doctrines, I can call it into question the world over (like with my
new friend Venezuela), empowering other rising powers to probe in
ways both distracting and draining for this self-declared global cop.
So am I eager to see co-religionist ex-pats from Iraq sweet-talking
the Bush administration into believing that both the war and the
subsequent nation-building
would be a "cakewalk"? You bet. Because I know the Americans
don't have the staying power.
Unfortunately,
before invading Iraq the Bush administration basically shot itself in
the foot by declaring to all potential allies something to the effect
of, "If you're not tough enough to show up for the war, don't
bother showing up for the peace--and forget about any contracts!"
Not surprisingly, the countries that will fight you on the "first
half" decision to intervene militarily are the same ones who fear
you'll shut them out economically in the "second half" peace.
Why? They typically already have a better trade deal with the pariah
regime in question, so what you decry as the "oil for food"
scandal is simply their version of maintaining an open
door in an
unflat military world.
Where
Bush-Cheney does deserve credit, despite their many errors in
judgment, is in their staying power, or strategic patience.
But even here
I'm loathe to give anything but a split verdict, because another
six-to-nine months on the diplomatic run-up to Iraq and we could have
had a lot better buy-in from clearly interested great powers, all of
whom were not interested in a Vietnam-like quagmire
if it meant they'd be shut out of the economic endgame. As it is,
it's interesting now to watch Russia, China, and Iran consistently
win infrastructure-building contracts in Iraq, because it only proves
that good things come to those who placate. Then again, that was
also true for the Bush White House regarding the al Qaeda-infused,
Sunni-based insurgency inside Iraq. By sticking it out long enough,
despite the high casualties, we simply waited long enough to take
advantage of the Salafi jihadists' natural tendency to go overboard
with the locals. Abu Musab Zarqawi's impatience to turn Iraq into
al Qaeda's global cause
celeb led to
brutality that eventually alienated Iraq's Sunni tribes, yielding
the "Anbar awakening" that signaled the beginning of General
Petraeus' somewhat successful rollback
(or is it buyback?)
of al Qaeda's presence there.
Shifting
gears to seapower,
I'd have to give the Bush administration high marks for letting
U.S. Navy leaders explore new, more globally networked definitions of
sea control, even as I know most Americans remain convinced that Bush
did little to secure our ports. But here's why I'm lenient:
port security at home is really an unobtainable dream absent a
comprehensive effort to spread transparency across all the world's
oceans and into ports of debarkation--meaning "over there." In
other words, even if I'm scanning everything here, that's far too
late in the process to declare any security achieved. America needs
what the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard are now pitching: maritime domain
awareness throughout the global supply chain system. No, that's
not going to happen overnight, but for now, our naval forces are
steaming in the right direction--toward partnership with the private
sector and the rest of the world's navies and coast guards.
I'm
less inclined to worry about reducing the threat
of violent extremists over time than I am about inducing unreasonable
fear concerning them, so I'm less one to argue that Bush-Cheney
have made the world a more dangerous place, because I don't think
they have. When, several years into a long war, your aggressive
engagement of the enemy in his home neighborhood appears to have
swelled his numbers, I'm not surprised. Frankly, that would be
like expecting fewer numbers of Japanese to have fought in World War
II as America drew ever closer to the imperial capital. The goal
here isn't fewer terrorists but fewer successful terrorist acts,
and by "successful" I mean impactful to the point of lowering our
resolve or forcing us to systematically adapt our global networks in
ways that degrade their efficiency (not easily done, because most
terrorist threats get lost in the noise of our day-to-day challenges
in keeping networks up and running, meaning they're not necessarily
bad for business if they force routine "tightening up" that's
otherwise beneficial).
What
does worry me, however, is the tendency of many security experts and
political leaders to describe our world as constantly under attack
from terrorists--in effect an existential crisis rather than a
security/management challenge. Other than the classic capture/kill
kinetics of our military units in the field, dealing with
transnational terrorism remains overwhelmingly a police function in
the Core countries, where, in terms of business, terrorism is but one
of many complex management challenges routinely faced in building,
operating, and protecting global supply and service chains. More on
that in Chapter 10.
Where
Bush-Cheney get an unambiguous passing grade is in their decision to
stand up an Africa Command with an eye toward maximizing its capacity
for unconventional
operations, or
what I like to call "pre-emptive nation-building." Long
strategically ignored and divided among three separate combatant
commands (Europe, Central, Pacific), Africa finally gets some serious
attention in what should end up being a farsighted, geographic
flanking maneuver against the radical Salafi jihadist global
insurgency, which, after it inevitably fails in the Middle East, will
be sorely tempted to shift its center of gravity there--unless that
door is pre-emptively slammed shut by progressively integrating
Africa into globalization on sustainable terms. Will that be
Africom's task? Yes, it will be, but hardly its task alone. More
on that in Chapter 9.
In
no area does Bush-Cheney get a lower grade than in the question of
virtue,
but since this is an entire chapter devoted to sinning, let me beat
that dead horse more thoroughly in a bit.
Regarding
WMD,
here I'd have to cite the Bush administration for a strange sort of
wobbliness regarding Iran's pursuit of the bomb. After all, we've
survived the Christian American bomb, the
commie-atheist-now-Russian-Orthodox bomb, the Anglican (UK) and
French Catholic bombs, the Confucian (China), Hindu (India), Jewish
(Israel) and Sunni (Pakistan) bombs. So what's all this
end-of-times, "World War III" talk about Shiia Iran finally
getting the bomb? Sure, Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has
been a master at shooting his mouth off on the subject, but we've
"been there and survived that" with a real genocidal leader in
Mao, not to mention a far more strategically tense stand-off in
Pakistan-versus-India, so why such an intense fear factor on Iran?
Does strategic deterrence all of a sudden not work? And as for being
a declared nuclear power, isn't that a better outcome if our
concern involves Tehran possibly passing nuclear technologies to less
stable third parties? Because history indicates that pariah or
undeclared nuclear powers are more willing to behave in that way than
accepted, declared powers--to wit, some truly nefarious
relationships pursued over the years by Pakistan, North Korea and
even Israel (remember apartheid South Africa?).
Finally,
the XYZ factors all yielded failing grades for Bush-Cheney. America
has become more unwelcoming to outsiders since 9/11, and some of that
xenophobia
could have been avoided by a little less crusader-like imagery from
the administration. When you're talking about a region as
religiously charged as the Middle East, the image of a largely
Christian occupation force will always be a hard sell, especially
when most of the area's downtrodden have long obsessed over the
tendency of the "distant" devil (Yankee)
to align itself with Jewish "occupiers"--that other, older Zion.
And here, the tail-wagging-the-dog description holds some truth,
because much of the argument offered by the Bush administration, as
well as Israel's backers in the States, is that the Jewish nation
cannot possibly be allowed to live under the threat of total nuclear
annihilation--a second Holocaust. Putting aside the reality that
more Jews live in the United States than in Israel, America needs to
be careful about extending any sort of implied, strategic
zero-deductible
insurance policy to Israel. It's not something we ever extended to
Europe during the Cold War, because our transatlantic allies were
expected to should their share of the risk--just like we did for
decades. Long armed with roughly 200 nuclear warheads, Israel cannot
expect America to defend its monopoly on WMD in the region ad
infinitum. And as Israel has longed lived with an existential
threat, its intellectual journey toward accepting the logic of
mutually assured destruction will be a short one.
...
And
what of America's relationship with the ICC? It's strained at best,
as the U.S. government has systematically strong-armed roughly a
hundred nations into signing bilateral immunity treaties, making us
exempt from ICC prosecution. We worry that American troops and even
government officials will be subject to war-crimes accusations
following future military interventions. That's not an unreasonable
fear, so I've long supported these "interventionary pre-nups,"
as I like to call them. There's little incentive in serving as the
world's "marshal" if rounding up the bad guys gets you in
legal trouble on a regular basis. But having achieved such blanket
immunity from the vast majority of states likely to be on the
receiving end of a U.S. military intervention, why should America
remain so aloof from the ICC? After all, the court's purview truly
extends only to lawless or rogue states that refuse, or are unable,
to police their own. So far, all of the ICC's cases have involved the
very same states from which America has obtained or sought ICC
immunity.
The
Bush administration's stubborn stance, continued from the Clinton
years, retarded the development of global case law concerning the
terrorists, warlords and dictators that America routinely targets in
this long war against radical extremism. Not surprisingly, our
go-it-alone strategy undercut our moral authority around the world.
I mean, if our own judicial system can't stomach much of this, how
can we expect to win any hearts and minds abroad by mimicking the
human-rights abuses of the very same authoritarian regimes (e.g.,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt) targeted by our lawless enemies, the Salafi
jihadists?
The
ICC, which was set up as a permanent version of the U.N.-sponsored
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, is--in
many fine ways--a logical descendant of the American-designed
Nuremberg war-crimes court constituted after World War II to try Nazi
officials. With 104 signatory states, the ICC possesses a
well-credentialed system for adjudicating and imprisoning these bad
actors. What the ICC critically lacks is a credible mechanism for
snatching these criminals and hauling them before the court once
they've been indicted. By definition, all typically remain beyond the
reach of accepted law, hiding out in either failed states or behind
rogue dictatorships.
Oddly
enough, the United States possesses just such a mechanism in our
armed forces, whose global reach allows us to snatch and grab these
bad actors with relative impunity, only then to shunt them into our
highly controversial alternative judicial system.
You
don't have to be a grand strategist to see where I'm going with this:
once America gets the ICC comfortable enough with its unique
"marshaling" capability, there's no reason why our
"chocolate" and the ICC's "peanut butter" can't
go well together. Indeed, figuring out how to stitch these two
systems together is logical and inevitable.