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GREAT POWERS
By Thomas P.M. Barnett
G.P. Putnam's Sons
Pub Date: February 5, 2009
GREAT POWERS:
America and
the World After Bush
By
Thomas P.
M. Barnett
"The Pentagon's
New Map is easily the most influential book of our time. I
never dreamed that a single book would change my outlook on the United
States' role in world affairs, but one has."
- Thomas Roeser,
Chicago Sun-Times
"Thomas Barnett is one
of the most thoughtful and original thinkers that this generation of
national security analysts has produced."
- John Petersen, President, The Arlington
Institute
"[Great Powers]
stands out for its in-depth analysis, historical acuity and delightfully
witty prose."
- Kirkus
Reviews, Starred Review
Lately, we are being told this
is no longer our world. America is in decline. Wars may be won, but
the peace belongs to others and we have no choice but to get used to
it. Others suggest it is not so much that America is in decline
as that the rest of the world has caught up to us and, once again, the
only thing we can do is get used to it. Taken for granted in each
case is that the trends unleashed in the world today are unmanageable
and chaotic and constitute a threat to our future. New York
Times bestselling author and national security strategist Thomas
P. M. Barnett sees things differently. "Globalization as it
exists today was built by America; we're still
its leader," says Barnett. "Further, the trends unleashed
in this world of our making--a world modeled on our system of networks
spreading, economies integrating, and states uniting--should be viewed
not with foreboding but with a sense of possibilities for the future
providing we have the will and strategic imagination to act in the present."
In GREAT POWERS:
America and the World After Bush (G.P. Putnam's Sons; February
5, 2009; $29.95), Barnett--who has been described as "the most
influential defense intellectual writing these days (The Washington
Post)" and "one of the most important strategic thinkers of
our time (U.S. News.com)"--presents a remarkable analysis
of America and the world in the post-Bush era. He also offers
a visionary grand strategy for how to proceed as we stand poised on
the verge of what is arguably the greatest achievement of all time:
the peaceful knitting together of a truly integrated global economy
and the establishment of a truly centering middle class. Barnett
believes it's up to America to shape and redefine what comes next.
Now he offers a roadmap to exactly what that is and how we do it.
As our globalized system continues
processing its worst financial crisis ever, Barnett sees the next few
years as being the first true test of globalization. He writes,
"President Barack Obama encounters an international order suffering
more deep-seated strain than at any time since the Great Depression.
If there was any remaining doubt that the world's great powers either
all swim or sink together in this interconnected global economy, then
this recent contagion has erased it. Globalization is no longer
a national choice but a global condition, and at this seminal moment
in history it demands from its creator renewed--and renewing--leadership.
President Obama's opportunity to--as he often put it--'turn the
page' could not be greater, for history rarely offers such made-to-order
turning points." However Barnett also points out that the choices
we've made over the past eight years have shifted the global landscape
in ways that simply cannot be reversed with a new American president
or even new American policies. It's not a matter simply of a
course correction, but of a fundamental recalibration, and the opportunities
it presents are far greater than the perils. GREAT POWERS
gives us a clear understanding of both, and shows us not only how the
world is now--but how it will be.
Barnett's theories and arguments
are non-partisan. His supporters are both Republicans and Democrats,
liberals and conservatives. Simply, he provides a way to frame
the debate on how to make globalization truly global, retain great-power
peace, and defeat whatever antiglobalization insurgencies may appear
in the decades ahead. Above all he shows us that although there
are many great powers at work in this complex world, it is America that
has the greatest opportunity to extend or to sabotage globalization's
stunning advances around the planet.
Highlights of GREAT POWERS
include:
- A look at how America
went off the rails during the eight years of the Bush administration.
"The Seven Deadly Sins of Bush-Cheney" cited by Barnett are Lust,
leading to the quest for primacy; Anger,
leading to the demonization of enemies; Greed,
leading to the concentration of war powers; Pride,
leading to avoidable postwar failures; Envy,
leading to the misguided redirect on Iran; Sloth,
leading to the U.S. military finally asserting command; and Gluttony,
leading to strategic overhang cynically foisted on the next president.
("Strategic Overhang" is the time it will take successive administrations
to "burn off" the "weight" of long-pursued interventions with
deeply sunk costs.) Barnett shows that facing up to these sins
and the problems they have caused is essential to America's successful
reengagement with a world left more unnerved by our government's counterterrorism
strategy than it was ever perturbed by actual terrorists.
- Barnett also looks
at what the Bush-Cheney administration did right including its handling
of a provocatively nationalistic government in Taipei; China's rise
in general; Vladimir Putin's consolidation of power in Russia and
that country's reemergence as a player to be reckoned with in international
affairs; steering the U.S. through rough waters in global trade without
succumbing to congressional or popular pressure for trade protectionism;
and displaying a real strategic imagination regarding key development
issues (outside its failed reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and
Iraq).
- A "Twelve-Step
Recovery Program For American Grand Strategy." Barnett argues
that our recovery doesn't stop with looking at what we did wrong.
Fences need mending and relationships require repair. Drawing
on the best traditions of self-help programs he describes the basic
steps America needs to take to break out of the angry isolation in which
it has remained somewhat trapped for the past eight years, regain some
control over its destiny, and realign its as yet unstated grand strategy
to a world transforming at an incredible speed.
- A journey through
America's two great historical arcs: the creation, transformation,
and taming of the United States from 1776 to the start of the twentieth
century; and the subsequent projection of that "states uniting"
model upon the global landscape, beginning with the administration of
Theodore Roosevelt. In no uncertain terms Barnett shows that globalization
as it exists today is an environment of our creating--the result of
a conscious grand strategy pursued from the earliest days of our republic
right through Bush's decision to invade Iraq. "What we've
done is spread the same competitive spirit that drove our rise to other
great powers now seeking to replicate that rise," says Barnett.
"The trick will be in having the patience to steer the emergence of
this global middle class while allowing the political freedoms of the
rising great powers time to catch up with the economic freedoms they're
beginning to attain."
The core of GREAT POWERS
consists of a chapter devoted to each of the five major elements of
U.S. grand strategy. In each domain Barnett looks at the most
important long-term trend for making globalization truly global in a
post-9/11 world. He then explores a serious recent disruption
that prompted new thinking on our part or a retrenchment from our grand
strategic vision; offers a sense of the new rules that seemed to emerge
as a result of the disruption; and outlines the "new normal" into
which we slowly settled as the Bush years wound down. Jumping
back outside the U.S. he then shows what happened to the long-term trend
as America headed off on its own toward its "new normal."
Finally, he identifies the major realignment we need to make to bring
us back in line with the world of our creating and then lays out the
global development we should be crafting over the next five years.
The five major elements explored
in this core section are:
- Economic
- Barnett starts with what he considers the most profound economic
dynamic of the last half-century: China's historic reemergence as
a worldwide market force. He looks at the impact on the American
system of 3 billion new capitalists (in China, Brazil, Russia, India,
and all the smaller emerging markets); unfounded fears in the West that
China's stunning rise challenges the notion that economic growth triggers
democracy; and the extent to which China's economy increasingly mirrors
our own. He delves into the implications of Wall Street's latest
meltdown and what it says about globalization's interdependency.
And he shows how rising Asia could become America's primary strategic
asset in making globalization truly global. Says Barnett, "You
want to 'drain the swamp' preemptively and foreclose opportunities
for terrorists in the backwaters of the earth? If you really want
to win this long war then do whatever it takes to make globalization
go faster because jobs are the only exit strategy."
- Diplomatic
- Barnett explores the two main problems in current American grand
strategy: our unreasonable expectation for immediate success (democracy),
and our obsession with terrorists. He looks at the impact of America's
big bang in the Persian Gulf (the toppling of Saddam); how we dropped
the ball with Iran by fixating on its peril rather than its promise;
and the need to "socialize" the Middle East problem by attracting
Eastern military powers into the mix there as quickly as possible.
He reflects on the extent to which a universe of players have succeeded
in containing America's use of power internationally over the past
several years (as well as the challenges the Obama administration will
face in reversing that trend); and the implications of China's "soft-power"
approach on the world stage. Finally, he explains why we need
to build a team of rivals made up of the world's emerging powers who
are better suited to the nation building/economy-connecting role than
we are.
- Security
- Barnett begins by looking at the U.S. military's post-Vietnam
"overwhelming force" mindset and how it was largely unprepared for
what came next--the rough-and-tumble politics of wars fought within
the context of everything else. (In Iraq "everything else"
included the economic forces at work as globalization crept into the
region as well as the social blowback that penetration was creating.)
He examines the impact of the so-called "lost year" in Iraq (defined
by most observers as the period running from early May 2003, following
President Bush's declaration of "mission accomplished," through
the explosion of insurgency violence in Fallujah the following April);
and he reflects on the extraordinary paradigm shifts that have occurred
within the military since then. Barnett goes on to explore the
impact of the privatization of American foreign policy, and the inescapable
realignment we now face: the reblending of diplomacy, defense and development
in the long war against violent extremism. He wraps up this chapter
by looking at what comes next in the long war: a shift in the center
of gravity to Central Asia or Africa.
- Networks
- Here the author begins by looking at globalization's ability to
create superempowered individuals and a shallower but wider pool of
enemies. Barnett writes, "While emerging powers are increasingly
integrated economically and great power war remains off the table thanks
to nuclear weapons, every pirate and smuggler and druggie and transnational
terrorist/criminal now registers on our radar." He looks at
how our rules in the marketplace are shifting from "know your customer"
to "know your supply chain," examines the particularly worrisome
vulnerabilities of the global food trade, and explores the search for
strategic deterrence in the age of globalization. Barnett also
delves into the extraordinary changes that have occurred in infrastructure
development in emerging and developing economies, and the opportunities
these changes present for Western companies. He concludes by looking
at our approach to post-conflict/post-disaster situations in areas of
the world largely disconnected from the global economy, and argues for
the need to create a "SysAdmin-industrial complex" that is just
as hungry for these types of situations as our long-standing military-industrial
complex is for "big war."
- Strategic Social
Issues - Barnett begins by looking at our social response to 9/11;
the response of traditional, off-the-grid, patriarchal cultures (in
this case the Arab world) to the incursions of the global economy; and
what each of these can teach us about managing the loss of identity.
He reflects on the disruptions caused by Hurricane Katrina and the ways
in which the fight against "global warming" became the counternarrative
to President Bush's "global war on terror." (Barnett also
explores the dangers of the former becoming as overhyped as the latter.)
Other issues raised in this final realignment chapter include the need
to link our middle-class ideology to globalization's emerging middle-class
(rather than thinking in terms of erecting walls to shut out "unfair"
competition); why we should consider a global economy no longer so dominated
by America our greatest achievement rather than a signal of a "post-American
age"; the challenges of continued economic growth in an environment
of dwindling resources; the emerging competition of world religions;
and the need to resurrect a progressive agenda focused on "cleaning
up" globalization's many dark corners.
Barnett concludes GREAT
POWERS by reminding us that although the future does have a way
of happening--that it is inexorable--many of the twenty-first century's
most important outcomes will be determined by the choices we make over
the next dozen years. He writes, "The American System blossomed
into an international liberal trade order, which in turn gave birth
to the globalization we enjoy today. These are the United States'
most powerful acts of creation. This world-transforming legacy
created the twenty-first century environment, one marked by more pervasive
poverty reduction, wealth creation, technological advance and--most
important--stabilizing peace than any previous era in human history.
That legacy is worth preserving, defending, and expanding to its ultimate
height--a globalization made truly global."
About the Author:
Thomas P. M. Barnett
is a strategic planner who has worked in national security affairs since
the end of the Cold War. He is the Senior Managing Director of
Enterra Solutions, LLC, which advises governments on economic development,
and currently serves as a Distinguished Strategist at the Oak Ridge
Center for Advanced Studies at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and
as a Visiting Scholar at the Howard W. Baker Center at the University
of Tennessee. Named as "the strategist" in Esquire's
first-ever "Best and Brightest" issue in December of 2002, he has
been a Contributing Editor for the magazine, as well as a weekly opinion
columnist for the Scripps Howard News Service
since 2005.