ARTICLE: Rep. Skelton foresees trouble over Taiwan, By Philip Dine, St Louis Post-Dispatch, 09/05/2007

Great example of the breakdowns in logic on Taiwan: Skelton goes to China and "discovers' all this Chinese will on the subject, which is apparently news to him (their military actually plans for this?). In Skelton's defense, it is stunning how myopically and pathetically the PLA focus on this one scenario, which infantilizes their strategic thought to this day. Skelton then logically wonders about how realistic it is (good instinct on his part). The answer? It is both highly realistic (we can kick the PLA's ass to great ends) and highly unrealistic (to what frickin' end?). If you want to recapture the Alice in Wonderland feeling of strategic brainstorming on nuke targeting and strategy in the Cold War (discussions that veered into the brain-numbingly fantastic almost from the get-go), there is no better substitution than delving deep into both PLA and Pentagon warfighting scenarios for the invasion/defense of Taiwan. Then again, just because thinking about the unthinkable typically devolves into tactical gibberish and strategic incoherence is not enough of a reason to stop engaging in it, because such discussions serve both sides as a sort of psychotherapy, as in:

FLAG OFFICER: "Doctor, I have a strong craving for a [substitute your favorite fantastically expensive platform]." STRATEGIST: "And how does that make you feel?" "DEVIL" CONTRACTOR ON RIGHT SHOULDER, STAGE WHISPERING: "Like you need at least 20 of them!" "ANGEL" CONGRESSMAN ON LEFT, DITTO: "All built in my district!" FLAG OFFICER, CONFLICTED: "Like I miss the Cold War ..."

A whole lot of growing up to do on both sides of this equation, but naturally, in our hubris, we assume it need only occur on China's side, when actually, this scenario restricts our strategic/force structure planning vision only somewhat less than China's, and by that I mean a difference in degree, not kind. Why does this fixation matter? I believe it kills our soldiers day-in and day-out by restricting the resource shift in this Long War from the Big War to the Small Wars. If we're not going to accept the reality of that shift, then we shouldn't engage in the Long War and just stay home and plot our brilliant, high-tech war against the Chinese. There are no wars out there worth winning in this strategic environment unless you're prepared to win the peace that follows. That takes bucks and bodies, and that means we reorient off the wars we'd prefer to fight to the ones we cannot escape--and the allies we must have.