ARTICLE: "A New Model of Terror: Tools for Prosecution Seen in Padilla Case," by Adam Liptak, New York Times, 18 August 2007, p. A1.

The key excerpt:

But the sharp split between military detention and criminal prosecution starts to blur as conspiracy charges are added to the mix. That is because conspiracies aim at the future. A successful conspiracy prosecution looks both backward, to punish the crime of conspiring, and forward, to stop dangerous people from completing their plans. The weaker the evidence of conspiracy is, the more such a prosecution can look like a request for judicially sanctioned preventive detentions.

Padilla's evidence? He applied to go to a terrorist training camp run by al-Qaida. You can see the danger, but also the need here. There was a time when being merely a member of the American Communist Party was enough to get you blacklisted. The justification of intent mixed with the guilt by association was murkier than applying to an al-Qaida camp, but you spot the dangers of slippery-slopes--yes? Still, just because al-Qaida is not a nation state doesn't mean we blow off either its declarations or acts of war, so giving aid or simply joining that enemy is cause enough for America's response. But intent to join? That's clearly trickier, suggesting we need a revamped rule set regarding where the lines can be said to be logically crossed. Say my kid fills out such a form as a lark or joke or form of rebellion but does nothing else. Is that enough to brand him a terrorist? Tricky ruleset indeed. Say I just accuse you of intending to apply. Is that much better than screaming, "She's a witch!"? Where do you draw the line?