EDITORIAL: "A price too high: The rise of China is no reason to trample on the non-proliferation regime," The Economist, 4 August 2007, p. 11. BRIEFING: "The long march to be a superpower: The People's Liberation Army is investing heavily to give China the military muscle to match its economic power. But can it begin to rival America?" The Economist, 4 August 2007, p. 21.

Taken together, a lot of common sense on China's build-up, which is naturally amazingly "provocative" to the Leviathan crowd inside the Pentagon currently running scared from the Long War and its force structure implications, but far less so to anyone familiar with a great power's emergence (is this behavior any more provocative than what America did in the last years of the 19th century?). The best parts are about China's rather pathetic "tinkering" with carriers (hint: they make better tourist magnets than anything else). Everyone thinks that all it takes to become a superpower is get a bunch of carriers, but they're the ultimate platform, meaning they do nothing on their own, so if you can't master the far more complex logistics and command and control and comms and the all-masterful naval air component, then all you got is bupkis (or a wonderful steel adornment for your pier). Yes, China's getting respectable in land-based air and its subs are gaining muster, but the only real deal with this crowd is missiles, and last time I checked, they don't exactly project power with any lasting effect. More to the point, though, is China's complete lack of combat experience. The last warfighting experience is 28 years ago, meaning the very oldest officers once fought Vietnam in an aborted border incursion that was supposed to give Vietnam a "bloody nose" but instead left one on the PLA--not exactly a pass to today's net-centric warfare. So , sure, catalogue all the new equipment, but every time the Chinese practice anything with anyone, the other side comes away deeply unimpressed. As one Western diplomat put it, "We have to be cautious about saying 'wow.'" Most definitely, the Chinese military strategists write very tough-sounding stuff, and they're clearly looking into anything that works asymmetrically against the U.S., with a special emphasis on cyberwarfare (almost certain to become the largely impotent chemical warfare of the 21st century--all tech-nerd wet dreams aside), but all that means is now we've got somebody trying to rip off all our military-industrial secrets more than the French and the Israelis (oh my!). If we want the Chinese to stop aggressively hacking into all our industrial and defense and intell systems, then we'll have to co-opt them ... uh ... better than the French and Israelis. We may think it's all a question of whether China is the 21st century's America versus Kaiser Germany, but from their perspective, there's huge doubt as to whether America settles into a mature English stance or devolves into Nazi Germany. Frankly, after 8 years of Bush, more people in this world fear our potential future pathway than China's, and that's amazingly sad.