Buy Tom's Books
  • Great Powers: America and the World After Bush
    Great Powers: America and the World After Bush
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett
  • Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating
    Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett
  • The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century
    The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett
  • Romanian and East German Policies in the Third World: Comparing the Strategies of Ceausescu and Honecker
    Romanian and East German Policies in the Third World: Comparing the Strategies of Ceausescu and Honecker
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett
  • The Emily Updates (Vol. 1): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    The Emily Updates (Vol. 1): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    by Vonne M. Meussling-Barnett, Thomas P.M. Barnett
  • The Emily Updates (Vol. 2): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    The Emily Updates (Vol. 2): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett, Vonne M. Meussling-Barnett
  • The Emily Updates (Vol. 3): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    The Emily Updates (Vol. 3): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett, Vonne M. Meussling-Barnett
  • The Emily Updates (Vol. 4): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    The Emily Updates (Vol. 4): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett, Vonne M. Meussling-Barnett
  • The Emily Updates (Vol. 5): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    The Emily Updates (Vol. 5): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    by Vonne M. Meussling-Barnett, Thomas P.M. Barnett, Emily V. Barnett
Search the Site
Powered by Squarespace
Monthly Archives

Recommend The shifting global oil markets (Email)

This action will generate an email recommending this article to the recipient of your choice. Note that your email address and your recipient's email address are not logged by this system.

EmailEmail Article Link

The email sent will contain a link to this article, the article title, and an article excerpt (if available). For security reasons, your IP address will also be included in the sent email.

Article Excerpt:
SOURCE: Department of Energy's International Energy Outlook 2006, found online at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/oil.html
The IEO is always to be taken with a grain of salt, especially the long projections into the future. What is more interesting is how the numbers in current years and in the deep out-years change by issue. For example, until recently, both North America (basically the U.S.) and Asia took larger percentages of the Persian Gulf's oil (closer to two-thirds for Asia and closer to one-fifth for North America). Now each is down quite a bit (Asia takes just over 50% and North America a mere 11%). Who's picking up the slack? Non-OECD ROW, which translates roughly as the oil-importing Gap (Non-Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development Rest-of-World). The oil-importing Gap accounted for a whopping 26% of Persian Gulf exports in 2003 (the year of last measure; or 5.9 of 22.5mbd), but will see that percentage drop to about 22% in 2030 (7.4 of 34.3mbd), due largely to Asia's growth. The key numbers as I cull them:
-->North America takes 11% of PG's oil in 2003 (2.5 of 22.5mbd, or millions of barrels a day) and will take 10% in 2030 (3.5 of 34.3mbd) -->Asia, both OECD and developing, took 50 percent of PG oil in 2003 (11.4 of 22.5mbd), and will take 58% in 2030 (20 of 34.3mbd) -->Viewed from the perspective of the importer, the PG accounts for 19% of North America's imports in 2003 (2.5 of 13.5mbd), and in 2030 the PG will account for 18% (3.5 of 19.4mbd) -->The PG accounts for 63% of Asian imports (and 32% of China's mere 2.8mbd) in 2003 (11.4 of 18mbd) and will account for the same percentage in 2030 (20 of 31.5). The percentage of China's imports from the PG will rise dramatically from 32% in 2003 (0.9 of 2.8mbd) to 53% in 2030 (5.8 of 10.9mbd). And yes, that means China's imports will more than triple between 2003 and 2030. -->Africa OPEC (west and north) exports 1.7mbd to North America in 2003 and will export the same absolute number in 2030. China's total 0.3mbd in 2003 will rise to 1.6mbd in 2030, or basically our equal. In 2003 China and North America both get about 12% of their imports from Africa. In 2030, the projection says that share will drop to about 8% for North America, but rise to 15% for China. -->The PG accounts for 43% of world trade in 2003 (22.5 of 52.8mbd), and that share is predicted to rise to just 44% in 2030 (34.3 of 77.3mbd). -->Non-OECD (New Core + Gap) sucked down 20.4mbd in 2003, but will see that amount rise to 37.3mbd by 2030, a jump from 39% of global imports to 48%. In absolute terms, an increase of 83%. Developing Asia, viewed alone, accounts for most of that growth, jumping from 9.9mbd to 22.3 (or from 19% of the world's imports to 29%).
What does this say? Europe and America together take about 20% of the PG's oil today, whereas Asia takes half and the ROW gets 30%. In 2030 the West proper will take about the same 20%, while Asia takes out almost 60% and the ROW makes do on about 20%. Europe is more dependent on the PG than the U.S. is. In 2003 it accounted for 25% of Europe's imports and in 2030 that percentage will rise to 28%. North America will sit steady at just under 20% of its imports from the Middle East (with the true U.S. percent closer to about 15%, according to other sources.) The U.S. Energy Information Administration says that for 2005, total U.S. oil supply broke down as follows: 55% from North America and 12% from South America. Another 14% from Africa and 4% from Europe/Russia. The Middle East accounted for 15%. Looking at it this way, I would say about 70% of U.S. oil comes from pretty stable places (I know, Chavez talks, but he still sells), with only 30 percent coming from the Middle East and Africa. Judging by these projections, that percentage will stay roughly the same in the future. Meanwhile, you could say China's imports are over 40% dependent on the Middle East and Africa today (43%), with that percentage rising to almost 70% dependent (68%) in 2030. So to sum up, U.S. dependency on foreign oil is about 70-30 safe-to-unsafe today, and that will likely remain stable in coming years. China's, however, is about 60-40 safe-to-unsafe today, reversing to about 70-30 unsafe-to-safe in 2030. I like a nice 70-30 split, you know, like the Chinese like to grade Mao and Stalin--as in, 70 percent good, 30 percent bad. Here ends my data diddling. Gotta start the Fast Company piece.


Article Link:
Your Name:
Your Email:
Recipient Email:
Message: