OP-ED: “The Gulf Between Us: The solution to our Iran problem may lie in Riyadh,” by Flynt Leverett, New York Times, 24 January 2006, p. A25.

We are told by the Iran experts that our carrots haven’t worked in recent years, but this is bullshit.

Read on:

AS the United States and its European partners consider their next steps to contain the Iranian nuclear threat, let's recall how poorly the Bush administration has handled this issue. During its five years in office, the administration has turned away from every opportunity to put relations with Iran on a more positive trajectory. Three examples stand out.

In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, Tehran offered to help Washington overthrow the Taliban and establish a new political order in Afghanistan. But in his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush announced that Iran was part of an "axis of evil," thereby scuttling any possibility of leveraging tactical cooperation over Afghanistan into a strategic opening.

In the spring of 2003, shortly before I left government, the Iranian Foreign Ministry sent Washington a detailed proposal for comprehensive negotiations to resolve bilateral differences. The document acknowledged that Iran would have to address concerns about its weapons programs and support for anti-Israeli terrorist organizations. It was presented as having support from all major players in Iran's power structure, including the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. A conversation I had shortly after leaving the government with a senior conservative Iranian official strongly suggested that this was the case. Unfortunately, the administration's response was to complain that the Swiss diplomats who passed the document from Tehran to Washington were out of line.

Finally, in October 2003, the Europeans got Iran to agree to suspend enrichment in order to pursue talks that might lead to an economic, nuclear and strategic deal. But the Bush administration refused to join the European initiative, ensuring that the talks failed.

Now Washington and its allies are faced with two unattractive options for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. They can refer the issue to the Security Council, but, at a time of tight energy markets, no one is interested in restricting Iranian oil sales. Other measures under discussion - travel restrictions on Iranian officials, for example - are likely to be imposed only ad hoc, with Russia and China as probable holdouts. They are in any case unlikely to sway Iranian decision-making, because unlike his predecessor, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad disdains being feted in European capitals.

Leverett’s answer?

A “contact group” of Core powers (U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China) + the Gulf’s powers coming together to declare a nuclear-free Gulf. This is the new Saudi proposal that does not link this goal to Israel’s relinquishment of nukes. In other words, we create an organization for the region like what the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe did alongside NATO in taming and ultimately integrating the old Soviet threat. We guaranteed security and seats at the table, and countries that could have had nukes when the Soviet empire fell apart chose not to make that choice.

Grand bargains are never in the offing. You build these relationships slowly but surely in tiny little steps—meeting after meeting.

We have come nowhere near to exhausting this process. What we’ve exhausted is our military in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran-the-regime-change is not an option, because no one will help us on this one—bet on that.

We’ve waged the war as much as we can for now. Better get on with the peace.