■"Iran's Stocks Plunge After Vote for U.N. Review of Nuclear Program," by Nazila Fathi, New York Times, 9 October 2005, p. A5.

You thought the former Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani lost the election?

Well, sort of.

Turns out the mullahs pick him to run the Expediency Council, which is basically a sort of supreme court that mediates disputes between the mullah-run Guardian Council and the elected government-sort of like John Ashcroft getting to be Attorney General after losing a race for the Senate to a dead guy . . . in his home state!

The Expediency Council is given "final say over all government actions."

Why does this matter?

UN's IAEA votes to refer Iran to the UNSC last month, and Iran's meager stock market drops 30% pronto in the days that follow. Local stock analysts say they've seen nothing like it before, as what Iranian money there is heads to Dubai, which just opened up its markets to foreign investors.

Does this tell you that the IAEA is powerful? Hardly. It says the military-market nexus--even in tired, authoritarian Iran--is powerful.

And all this connects through Rafsanjani, who recently gave a powerful speech in which he said, "Managers at this sector should know that we need diplomacy and not slogans Ö This is the place for wisdom, the plase for seeking windows that will lead you to the goal."

So what "windows" does the U.S. offer right now? We need Iran desperately as an ally over time if we hope to bring real stability Beirut, Jerusalem and Baghdad. We need Tehran to suffer heightened connectivity with the global economy, bringing foreign direct investment in, not watching it fly out.

Here's one of my Iran's entries in my Conclusion, "Heroes Yet Discovered":

Iran's John Marshall: John Marshall was the first great Chief Justice of the United States, who, more than any other figure in U.S. judicial history, established the independent role of the Supreme Court within America's federal government. What Iran currently lacks is a judicial authority that is free and clear of the influence of the unelected supreme leader, or ayatollah. When the role migrates from the ranks of the unelected leadership to the elected government, this will be the clearest sign that Iran's theocracy has come to an end.

What's so weird and interesting about what the Ayatollah did here with Rafsanjani is that he basically took him and institutionalized him in the role of opposition government, with a strange, supreme court-like role in adjucating differences between the government and the executive, just like here. Not exactly migrating to the "elected government," but oddly closer, huh?

Seems like even the Ayatollah realizes the need for Iran's "John Marshall function," however inadvertently.