Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 4 April 2005

Some stories that catch my eye:

First one sent to me by friend Kevin in Berkeley and it's a Russian story about the creation of a special new combined-services military branch within the Russian military ("The Special-Purpose Army" by Russian Gazeta.ru web site on 11 March ; find at http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_272412.php ). Seems that Putin is moving all the Special Ops units from the seven military districts (up to now under the control of the district commands) into a single unified command much like our Special Operations Command controls all the Special Operations Forces from the four services (and likewise spread around our regional commands in units). Not sure from article how much physical centralization involved, but clearly command unity being achieved. On the surface, this seems sinister, and the article speaks in that direction (". . .perhaps will be able to start wars outside Russia's borders without the authorization of the Federation Council."), but to me, this is reflective of how our choices in military strategy naturally influence others around the world. We launch the Global War on Terrorism and designate SOCOM as the lead command in this new type of war for this new era, and Russia, taking note, says, "We need a SOCOM too!" This shows how our definition of warfare is rather self-fulfilling in a Microsoft-defining sort of way, as in, when the biggest player in the market makes a choice, others follow.

Second story is "Help Wanted: China Finds Itself With a Labor Shortage" (by Jim Yardley and David Barboza, NYT, 3 April 05, p. A4). Fascinating summary story of phenom I've been tracking: notion that China's cheap labor supply is endless is nonsense. It assumes a static development model, as if all that investment and change wouldn't result in higher wages in China like it has everywhere else in the world throughout history. After a while, you run out of 19-year-old women just off farms and willing to work for near nothing in terrible conditions. Not because you literally run out of those women, but because they have better choices after a while, so to attract them, you need to pay better and offer nicer conditions.

An intriguing counter to that story on China is yet another story on the "rich-poor gap" inside China ("China Wrestles Rich-Poor Gap: As Divide Threatens Unrest, Beijing Turns to Rural Development," by Andrew Browne, WSJ, 4 April 05, p. A12). Here's the interesting possible twist: story talks about how industry in coastal regions is unlikely to simply pull up roots and move inland just because the government wants to push development there. However . . . as labor gets tighter on coast and these companies consider outsourcing some production abroad, there is the possible dynamic whereby these companies "intra-source" in the direction of the poorer, inland provinces. How feasible is this? Beijing is pouring a lot of infrastructure money into these regions, and can certainly make it hard for these companies to outsource production if it wants that flow redirected inward, so to me, it's more than just possible, it's probably a big part of the Party's strategy to deal with rural poverty.

Pair of stories about Zimbabwe election are depressing. First one ("Mugabe Threatens to Meet Street Protests of Election Count in Zimbabwe With Force," by Michael Wines, NYT, 3 April 05, p. A5) shows how effectively Mugabe's rule has infantilized the population. There is only his party, so when he "opens" the election at the last minute, the opposition is simply too embryonic to do anything to take advantage of the "freedom," and Mugabe wins in landslide. The opposition then feels ripped off, as always, but isn't organized enough to really do anything about it. More depressing is op-ed by Sebastian Mallaby, a writer I really like. His piece ("Zimbabwe's Enabler: South Africa Falls Short As Monitor of Democracy," WP, April 4, 2005; Page A21) speaks to South Africa's non-leadership role in dealing with Mugabe's horrible rule. They basically take a pass on dealing with him, and that's pretty sad given their potential role as a Core pillar in the region.

Here's the telling three opening para:

Thursday's election in Zimbabwe was not merely stolen. It was stolen with the complicity -- no, practically the encouragement -- of Africa's most influential democrat. If you think too long about this democrat, moreover, you reach a bleak conclusion. For all the recent democratic strides in Africa, the continental leadership that was supposed to reinforce this progress is not up to the challenge.

The bankrupt democrat in question is Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's president. For the past few years, he's been promising a pan-African Renaissance, a new era in which Africans would take charge of their own problems. Mbeki led the creation of the grandly titled New Partnership for Africa's Development, which commits members to the rule of law and other principles of good government; he's the driving force behind the peer-review mechanism that's supposed to police compliance with those pledges. The New Partnership's principles are quoted frequently by Africa sympathizers who advocate more foreign assistance, and they've boosted Mbeki's profile marvelously. Mbeki has become a fixture at the rich countries' annual Group of Eight summits. He has been treated by George Bush and Tony Blair as a player. He has felt emboldened to advance South Africa as a candidate for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.

But do Mbeki's New Partnership principles mean anything? In the run-up to Zimbabwe's election, when the regime's thugs were denying food to suspected opposition sympathizers, Mbeki actually undercut the international pressure for a fair contest. He expressed a serene confidence that the election would be free and fair. He allowed his labor minister, who was serving as the head of the South African observer mission in Zimbabwe, to dismiss the regime's critics as "a problem and a nuisance." He quarreled with the Bush administration's description of Zimbabwe as an outpost of repression. He did everything, in other words, to signal that mass fraud would be acceptable.

Last story involves growing sense that overthrow of government in Kyrgyzstan was more a coup than people's revolution ("Kyrgyzstan's Shining Hour Ticks Away and Turns Out To Be a Plan, Old Coup," by Craig S. Smith, NYT, 3 April 05, p. A5). I think this judgment is misplaced. People's anger and "revolution" was real. What's missing here is simply a genuine civic society to take advantage of all that anger. So yeah, the people get fed up with corruption and drive out the Big Man, but there's no one in the wings ready to be anything else, so now we watch a host of Little Men all line up to replace him. The West pumps in money to help opposition parties and media, but that's a bit like creating a head with no body. People need their own confidence, and that comes with their own freedom and a sense that there's a gap between their personal freedom (typically economic) and their collective freedom (the politics). People in Kyrgyzstan know they're being ripped off politically, but they don't feel any confidence to do anything much about it besides get pissed off. That confidence will come with rising economic connectivity with the outside world, not simply with the means of voicing their anger. So nice to give aid to political parties, but offering the public the chance to develop power that isn't easily controlled by ruling elites is more fruitful over the long run. Connectivity kills dictatorships.