COMMENT: "An unholy alliance at war with Obama's foreign policy," by Philip Stephens, Financial Times, 15 January 2010. LEADERS: "Time to get tough: Barack Obama's first year has been good, but not great--and things are going to get a lot harder," The Economist, 16 January 2010. COMMENT: "Why America and China will clash," by Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 19 January 2010.

Stephens' main point:

The president must push back. Those who claim diplomacy has "failed" should be invited to offer credible alternatives.

Quite well said. Many critics act like Obama's diplomacy to-date should have solved all the world's problems, and because it hasn't, must be declared a failure. But to be replaced by what? A return to the unilateral bossiness of Bush-Cheney I? Since that was largely abandoned in Bush-Cheney II, I'm not sure what that would accomplish. Obama's first year, as the Economist points out, focused on stabilizing and repairing structure, relationships, reputation. In that, Obama did amazingly well, given all the problems he inherited. But that approach only satisfies, much less inspires, for so long. If you behaved badly and then apologize, great. But standing there, frozen, with that anticipatory smile on your face quickly gets weary, if no additional actions/leadership/new behavior is offered. Bush-Cheney II seems like ancient history at this point. Plus, we're naturally reaching an era of heightened contention with China, which has read its own press for so long--and ours--that its government seems convinced it can master any issue using the crude techniques of the past covered by incessant "smiling." And so we're now treated to a steady stream of "clash" predictions, as if pundits everywhere are suddenly realizing that Chinese and American national interests are not identical! (OMG!)--"superfusion" yielding to superfracturing. The hyperbole here is a bit much, because the underlying structural interdependencies haven't changed one whit. As usual, we in the West make a change in tack seem like a recovery from a mental breakdown ("What were we thinking?" "They were all myths! Myths, I tell you! And now we finally confront the truth!"). Seriously, helping China grow into a responsible world actor was always going to be a contentious affair, and most definitely non-linear. As will be its evolution toward internal pluralism, which the Chinese themselves will drive--not Washington, not Google, not anybody on the outside. Alas, our need to freak out is never-ending.