The strategic "tells" on China's military build-up
Monday, December 27, 2010 at 9:47AM 
NOTE: No WPR column today because journal takes off this week.
Great WAPO piece by John Pomfret (by way of David Emery) on the hollowness that is China's military rise.
Great line from Chinese expert (from China) about the inability of China's defense industry to create good engines being the "heart disease" of the PLA. Why? It's the crux of their inability to create a solid force structure on their own, hence the need to buy so much from Russia (half of the latter's exports in arms).
So how afraid are we supposed to be about a force that buys Russian stuff? Meanwhile, the much-feared "carrier killer" missile is . . . how many years from being operational? Who knows.
But here's the larger logic and the real "tell" when it comes to strategic intent: because China refuses to station troops abroad, it really doesn't have any overseas bases in the traditional sense. That, plus a paltry 3 replenishment ships and almost no training time for their subs (relative to ours) says this is nowhere close to being a blue-water force. It is - at best - a regional area-denial force, which means it's completely and narrowly defensive in scope.
And yeah, until China changes it mind about "non-interference" as represented by stationing of troops abroad, it will NEVER be a blue-water navy - simple as that.
I don't want China's navy to be offensive, but I do want it to become global over time. It can do that and remain largely defensive. China's resource dependency demands it.
And I want that because America will need some help in the years and decades ahead. Our fiscal reality demands it.
Reader Comments (1)
Can't make a decent engine? Not surprising. Unlike the United States which sought out the best technology in the world during its era of rapid industrialization (1870-1910 particularly from Germany and Japan which learned much from Europe and the US both before and after the 2nd World War, China prefers to go it alone or contends itself with just the Cliff Notes version of international technology (i.e. limited interaction and very rapid, generally ineffective assimilation.
I suspect that China era of rapid growth is close to over. without some major economic opening up. Indications are that the CCP has been more interested in limiting rather than expanding economic connectivity since 2003.
Just as with Japan in the 1980s, China has developed quite a real estate bubble. Have a look at this amazing Daily Mail link:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1339536/Ghost-towns-China-satellite-images-cities-lying-completely-deserted.html