We're excited to announce the launch of Wikistrat's Middle East Monitor for August 2011, which can be viewed in its entirety here.
Summary
The biggest development in August was the successful taking of Tripoli by the NATO-backed Libyan rebels. The capturing of the capital effectively brings the rule of Muammar Qaddafi to an end, though significant challenges remain, including locating Qaddafi and his sons and preventing an Iraq-style insurgency by regime loyalists. The Transitional National Council also faces a difficult challenge in unifying the different tribes, militias and political factions under one authority.
The U.S. and European Union called on Syrian President Bashar Assad to relinquish power, and the U.S. ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, has met with opposition activists in Jassem. The U.S. has decided to officially move into the corner of the Syrian opposition, though there is no discussion of providing material aid or military intervention at this stage. The countries that have the power to place severe pressure on the Syrian regime, however, are Turkey and the European Union. The E.U. accounts for approximately 90 percent of Syria’s oil exports. Turkey is the main country that can present Assad with a realistic military threat and is best positioned to support the opposition. The Syrian regime is aware that the U.S. and European Union may lack the public support for military force, having just intervened in Libya.
The U.S. is threatening to decrease aid to the Palestinian Authority if it pushes for a U.N. vote on official Palestinian membership and recognition of statehood based on the 1967 borders. It is expected that the bid will be vetoed in the U.N. Security Council, but that the General Assembly will approve a resolution in support of the bid. It is likely that many countries will unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state. However, Israel is accustomed to diplomatic pressure and strategically, the vote is insignificant. The main danger is that it will provide a pretext for major provocations against Israel, and will be used by Syria and Iran and their terrorist allies to distract from the Assad regime’s internal problems. It is also in the interest of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists to increase tension with Israel ahead of the October elections in Egypt and Tunisia.
Read the full report here.
Wikistrat Bottom Lines
Opportunities
- The attack on Israel by Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula offers a chance for Israel and Egypt to face a common enemy. If Al-Qaeda acts too aggressively within Egypt, the group and perhaps other Islamists will see a steep drop in public support.
- Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is now battling Yemeni tribes, both those loyal to the opposition and those loyal to the Saleh regime. This will undermine Al-Qaeda’s support in the country and put pressure on the Awlaki tribe to expel Anwar al-Awlaki, the American imam known for inspiring homegrown extremism in the U.S. and Europe.
- The alliance between Iran and Sunni Islamists, especially Hamas, is strained because of the uprising in Syria. The Iranian regime has reportedly suspended funding to Hamas for not staging pro-Assad demonstrations. Hamas is in the awkward position of having to choose between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and its chief state sponsor.
- The Palestinian support for the anti-Assad protesters creates an additional fissure within the Islamist bloc, and could cause a positive long-term trend where Palestinians hold Arab leaders more accountable.
Risks
- The Yemeni Prime Minister has returned to his country, and President Saleh is still determined to come back. This raises the risk of a civil war as the regime tries to reassert control, and the opposition is determined to prevent Saleh’s return.
- If the security situation in Libya spirals downwards, it will jeopardize Western support for Middle Eastern opposition movements and could cause protesters to question the price of their cause.
- The possible vote on Palestinian statehood at the U.N. in September could create a political environment that bolsters Islamists ahead of the elections in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as elevate their power within opposition movements in the region.
Dependencies
- The strength of the linkage between anti-Israeli sentiment and votes for Islamist parties. A key question is whether increased tension with Israel will cause voters in Tunisia and Egypt to vote for Islamist parties when they otherwise would not.
- The strength of the Islamist powers in Libya, including militant elements like the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and non-violent parties like the Muslim Brotherhood.
- The ability of secularists to reconcile the population’s desire for an official Islamic identity with the need for constitutional protections against governance based on Islamic law.
- Turkey’s view of acceptable options in pressuring the Assad regime to cease violence against its population, such as the creation of a buffer zone within Syria and robust support for the Syrian opposition.