We're excited to announce the launch of Wikistrat's Middle East Monitor for July 2011, which can be viewed in its entirety here.
Summary
The uprising in Syria remained the crisis of the most strategic importance this month. The number of protesters is higher than ever, despite the widespread use of violence by the regime to crush the demonstrations. Significantly, the protests continue to grow despite Iranian assistance to the Assad regime, which includes electronic monitoring equipment that was used to undermine Iran’s Green Revolution.
The methods successfully employed by the Iranian regime in 2009 have failed in Syria today, which is a testament to the strength of the uprising. If the Assad regime has employed all of the advice offered by Iran, then it is out of options to use against the demonstrators. Its strategy will be to hope that severe repression and sieges of hotspots will stamp out the revolution over time. Preventing a serious split within the military ranks, particularly among the Allawite officers and generals, will be critical to the success of this strategy.
In Libya, the rebels are making advances in the mountainous area in the western part of the country, and have encircled the oil-rich city of Brega in the east. There is talk of allowing Qaddafi to stay in Libya if he gives up power, but representatives of his regime discount this possibility. He is intent on fighting the rebels to a stalemate that allows him to control an enclave and declare victory, and until impending defeat becomes apparent to him, this will not change. The murder of rebel commander Abdel Fattah Younes and the subsequent vows of retribution by his tribe is a serious blow to the rebel cause, as it threatens to undermine Western confidence in the rebels. It is critical that the rebels present a united front, and clashes between rival factions and tribes do not erupt.
Overall, talk of the Arab Spring’s demise is very premature. The rebels are making concrete advances in Libya, the revolution in Syria is strengthening, Yemeni President Saleh has yet to return to his country, and Morocco’s successful referendum on constitutional changes show the movement represents a dynamic shift. The Arab Spring is not a short-lived period of instability, and serious changes to the region’s power structures are underway.
Wikistrat Bottom Lines
Opportunities
- The decline of protests in Morocco after the referendum on modifications to the constitution enables the West to point to a government that successfully responded to the Arab Spring. This will help persuade pro-Western, undemocratic regimes that reforms will improve their stability.
- The positive reception in Hama, Syria to the visit by the U.S. and French ambassadors shows that the protest movements are eager for Western support.
- The delay of the elections in Tunisia and Egypt until October is a recognition that the non-Islamist parties need more time to organize. It is very questionable whether this still permits enough time to allow the non-Islamists to effectively compete, but the problem is understood and being addressed.
Risks
- Turkey’s decision to recognize the Libyan rebels as the official government of that country and threats to intervene in Syria benefit the West in the short-term, but Turkey remains governed by an Islamist party. The increasingly assertive role of Turkey in the region may not always be in the best interests of the West.
- Western support for protesters could result in an expectation of strong intervention on their side. If assistance does not follow and the protesters are victimized on a large scale, it could result in disillusionment with the West and play into the hands of the Islamists.
- Setbacks in Libya, such as the assassination of the top rebel commander, will undermine Western support for the intervention; support that is already dwindling. The rebels are making advances, but are still heavily dependent upon outside support.
Dependencies
- The potential continuing of mass protests in Morocco. The opposition says that the constitutional amendments do not go far enough, but the number of protests has sharply declined since the referendum. If massive protests erupt again and the opposition cannot be appeased, other governments will be less likely to implement reforms to try to satisfy their opponents.
- The strength of the public’s desire for quick elections vs. the strength of the public’s fear of an Islamist electoral victory.