An exploration by Banyan in The Economist of the lack of progress toward democracy in Central Asia--and why it will matter more in coming years.
Nice point: "Central" Central Asia is not, but rather a true periphery--or in my vernacular the Gap's hernia in Asia.
Key point I've been making for a long time WRT the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: "Not only America but also Russia and China view the region as a bulwark against militant Islam." It either goes NE from the Persian Gulf or SW into Africa--or both. We create Africom in Africa as our instrument of bulwark, and Russia and China instinctively reach for what becomes the SCO. Same concept, similar execution.
But what really seals Central Asia off from radical Islam is being pulled into China's economic orbit, thanks to mineral and energy resources--a 50-fold increase in trade since 1990. Meanwhile, the West offers aid and advice.
But it's South Korea's growing presence that is the subject here, as well as the admiration for its national development model held by Uzbek president Islam Karimov, who is allegedly obsessed with the nation and its "cleanliness and order."
The analysis:
Yet Mr Karimov and others seem fundamentally to misunderstand the Korean model. Although government resources were channelled to favoured companies, these firms then had fiercely to compete among themselves and on world markets. In Central Asia the most successful companies are sinecures of nepotism.
What is more, South Korea's transition to liberal democracy entailed grassroots activism as well as top-down guidance.
Meaning the educated growing middle class was crucial.
Meanwhile, China is described as learning from Kyrgyzstan's mistakes by cracking down on its own NGOs.
Sounds like China's got the wrong model.