The upshot of Abdullah pulling out is: 1) we couldn't prevent Karzai from cheating his way to victory in the first election; and 2) we couldn't strong-arm Karzai into accepting a coalition with Abdullah (Kerry's mission to arm-twist for a second round has now backfired completely).

So the question begs: with those two pronounced failures, what makes us think we're going to ever get a strong partner in Karzai?

If I'm advising Obama and pushing for a smaller effort, I push very hard right now to take advantage of this fiasco. I shift my money overtly to Pakistan and say, "We have to work with governments that can at least make a decent show of democracy."

Is our concern really about democracy? Not so much as competency. Karzai is just competent enough to cheat his way to victory but not competent to keep the country together or rule it in an uncorrupt fashion.

So I see an opportunity passing here, unless we were to get very tough and then we negotiate further from that point.

But, as always, the State Department pipes in with the clumsiest of congratulations, demonstrating we know how to pick sides in disputed events (and that Honduras wasn't a fluke but the normal ham-handedness).

As it is, I see us approaching the "victorious" Karzai with less-than-zero leverage now--if we choose to reward his non-win with more money and more troops.

Ironically enough, I don't see this outcome playing well for us in terms of regionalizing the solution set. If I'm a regional power and witness this turn of events, I imagine the U.S. owns Karzai, so why bother? Of course, I believe the opposite to be true, thus we're screwed all the more.

First impression after a narcotic-filled weekend, but I see this development as bad, bad, bad.

And if I was Obama looking to leave, I would take advantage.