ARTICLE: Is Iraqi Kurdistan a Good Ally?, By Michael Rubin, MIDDLE EASTERN OUTLOOK, AEI Online, January 7, 2008

Good rundown by Rubin regarding the current state of corruption in Kurdish Iraq and how the ruling families dominate economic activity.

But he goes too far in dismissing long-term alliance between the U.S. and the KRG.

First off, expecting democracy before development is unrealistic and ahistoric--especially in this region.

Second, transparency and rule of law come when the incentives for each are greater than the existing zero-sum impulses to dominate the local, albeit limited, pie that naturally arises once economic opportunity emerges.

Third, in the short term, those who dominate are the already dominant. Why? Their relatives have the most experience and education (both typically achieved abroad) at first.

Fourth, the local ruling clans will--if successful--soon max out the economic possibilities offered locally and in conjunction with more marginally competitive and somewhat corrupt global players. To move beyond those limitations, the local elites need to access larger financial pools. Those assets come with demands for transparency and certainty (rules are government-dependent, not ruler-dependent).

Fifth, when that expansion of connectivity expands transparency, the economic opportunities expand to a wider array of potential players, over time creating power/influence-demand centers that compete with the ruling elites. If the elites beat back such competition in a manner too off-putting to foreign investors, that money will not flow and those economic limitations will not be superseded.

Interestingly enough, the Kurdish elites clans openly express a strong preference for Western investment, which will come with demands for more transparency. Why would the Barzanis and Talabanis prefer the West to others?

Ah, therein lies our ability to provide security guarantees.

For the same reasons why east-central European states, once freed from the Soviet grip, wanted westward economic and security and political integration, the Kurds want security lock-in ASAP. It's just a logical choice, given their fears.

In turn, our logical choice is to see where such security takes the KRG economically, and how that demonstration effect serves our interests elsewhere in Iraq.

Knowing that, why would America dump the Kurds as strategic allies, despite their less-than-stellar current achievements in democratization? Wouldn't that just replicate the same illusions of the neocons regarding Iraq as a whole?

If we were so narrow-minded and went all tough-love on the Kurds, should we expect a better developmental outcome? A better political outcome? A better security outcome?

Or should we logically expect a fear-threat reaction that totally screws the pooch?

Rubin's thinking here strikes me as awfully shortsighted and surprisingly naive--especially on the economics--for a regional expert.

A disappointing piece from AEI, which is rarely so defeatist or strategically impatient.

As always, the regional experts are most expert at telling you why nothing good will come of any effort you contemplate.

You want to refuse a deal offered? Have your lawyer review it.

You want to kill any long-term alliance? Ask a regional expert to review it.

We need to be more mature in our thinking. Rubin's reporting here aids that effort. His accompanying analysis does not.

(Thanks: Matthew Garcia)